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I. INTRODUCTION
What justifies regulatory policy? What are the moral criteria by
reference to which regulatory choices and institutions are properly
assessed? These questions have yet to be convincingly answered, or
so I will argue in this Article. My focus will be legal scholarship,
since it is legal scholars who, in recent years, have paid the most sustained attention to the problem of justifying regulation—the problem
of generating a moral theory of regulation in light of which general
regulatory approaches, specific regulatory decisions, the design of
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Rob
Atkinson, Brian Bix, Howard Chang, Eric Posner, and Dan Rodriguez, to participants in
the Florida State University Law School Symposium on Regulatory Theory and the University of Pennsylvania Law School faculty retreat, and to students in Penn’s Topics in Legal Theory course, for their extremely helpful comments. Many thanks, too, to Mark Seidenfeld and Heidi Hurd for giving me an opportunity to present drafts of this Article at
Florida State and Penn.
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regulatory agencies, and all other aspects of regulation can be evaluated as good or bad, right or wrong.
I will say nothing here about positive regulatory theories—
theories that attempt to predict what regulatory outcomes will be,
given (more or less) simple assumptions about human motivation,
human beliefs, and so on—except to make the obvious point that no
positive theory can tell us whether the outcomes it predicts are to be
embraced or avoided. For example, a positive theory may reliably
predict that a regulatory agency with jurisdiction over a concentrated
industry will choose outcomes which inefficiently benefit the industry, at the expense of diffuse and unorganized groups such as consumers or taxpayers. But this prediction is not yet grounds for dismantling or constraining the agency. It is not yet grounds for doing
anything.
Imagine that someone in a position of power over the agency (a
legislator, an administrator, or the President, for example) has the
capability to perform an action such that, if the person performs that
action, the agency will produce an efficient but otherwise morally
neutral outcome, relative to the outcome that the agency will produce
if the powerful actor stays her hand. Thus our positive theory predicts. Then the actor ought to take the action if, and only if, efficiency
itself has moral import. If it does not—if the efficient cast of an outcome is not (wholly or partly) constitutive of its goodness or badness,
rightness or wrongness—then the action will be a matter of indifference. For if efficiency is not (wholly or partly) constitutive of goodness
or badness, rightness or wrongness, then an actor has no more reason to choose one of two outcomes that differ only with respect to efficiency than she has to choose one of two outcomes that differ only
with respect to other morally trivial properties. The fact that one
outcome (O1) is more efficient than another (O2) would no more justify the powerful actor in producing O1 than the fact that in O1 a particular blade of grass is located at a particular spatio-temporal location, and that in O2 it is located somewhere else. But whether efficiency is (wholly or partly) constitutive of goodness or badness,
rightness or wrongness, is a question of moral theory, not positive
theory.
Does efficiency indeed possess bedrock moral significance? The
reader may be alarmed at my use of the adjective “bedrock.” If so, she
should reconsider her alarm. “Bedrock” adds nothing, besides emphasis, to “moral significance.” A moral theory purports to identify
the features of actions or outcomes that possess moral significance
or, equivalently, bedrock moral significance. Where an actor can
choose one action (A1) leading to O1 or another action (A2) leading to
O2, a moral theory purports to isolate the features of A1 and A2, O1
and O2, such that whether the actor is, all things considered, justified
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in choosing A1 rather than A2 is a collective function of those features. If the features are thus isolated by the theory, then they have
bedrock significance (within that theory); if not, then they do not.
In this Article I will criticize the two types of moral theories of
regulation that have been most influential within American legal
scholarship. One type, which I will call “neoclassical,” attributes bedrock significance to efficiency. The second type, which I will call “proceduralist,” does not do so, but instead attributes bedrock significance to the procedures by which regulatory agencies reach their decisions. The neoclassical type of theory is epitomized by Stephen
Breyer’s well-known book, Regulation and Its Reform,1 and is reflected in the leading casebooks on regulation.2 The proceduralist
type of theory includes the “interest representation” theory delineated (if not defended) by Richard Stewart in his seminal article The
Reformation of American Administrative Law;3 the “civic republican”
theories defended by Mark Seidenfeld,4 Cass Sunstein, 5 and others; 6
and, most recently, the theory of collaborative governance advanced
by Jody Freeman.7
Neoclassical and proceduralist theories are both flawed; but, as I
will suggest, it is proceduralist theories, articulated largely in response to neoclassicism, that are the most deeply flawed. Efficiency
does not possess moral significance, but overall well-being does, and
the two criteria are significantly coextensive. By contrast, governmental procedures, particularly the procedures of regulatory agencies, have no normative significance. Two governmental decisions
which differ only in the procedures by which they were reached are
1. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
2. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. HARRISON ET AL., REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS (1997); RICHARD J. PIERCE , JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1994); LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
O RGANIZATION: G OVERNMENT REGULATION (6th ed. 1985); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P.
TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1998).
3. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law , 88 HARV .
L. REV . 1667 (1975).
4. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV . L. REV . 1511 (1992).
5. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival ]; Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, SelfInterest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV . 271 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV . 29 (1985).
6. See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L.
REV . 801 (1993) (citing sources); see also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM . L. REV . 1, 76-86 (1998) (same); Note, Civic
Republican Administrative Theory: Bureaucrats as Deliberative Democrats, 107 HARV . L.
REV . 1401 (1994) (same).
7. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV . 1 (1997).
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morally identical. Proceduralism, because it says otherwise, is fundamentally misdirected.
Part II criticizes neoclassical theories. Part III criticizes proceduralist theories. Part IV outlines and defends an alternative type of
theory—a welfarist theory of regulation. A welfarist theory gives
moral significance (if not conclusive significance) to the criterion of
overall well-being. Welfarism and neoclassicism may not differ too
much in their practical implications, but neither are they practically
indistinguishable. In Part IV I describe some of the noteworthy ways
in which the recommendations of welfarism and neoclassicism differ.
Welfarism is, in effect, refurbished neoclassicism. Efficiency is an
untenable moral foundation for the practice of regulation, but that
foundation can be replaced without too much shifting of the structure
above. Proceduralists and others who properly criticize neoclassicism
go astray in thinking that regulatory agencies should make a largescale, rather than an incremental, shift away from the pursuit of
economic efficiency.
II. NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES OF REGULATION
A. Characterizing Neoclassicism
By a “neoclassical” theory of regulation, I mean roughly a theory
grounded in the normative premises of modern welfare economics.
More precisely, it is a theory with the following two elements: (1) the
adoption of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as one, if not the only, moral criterion by which to evaluate regulatory choices, policies, and institutions; 8 and (2) the adoption of the preference-based account of wellbeing, which holds that whether a particular person is made better
or worse off by a choice, policy, or institution wholly depends upon
the extent to which that person’s preferences are satisfied. 9 Neoclassical theories are espoused by such classics as Breyer’s Regulation
and Its Reform10 and Alfred Kahn’s The Economics of Regulation;11 by
most of the leading legal casebooks on regulation; 12 by much law-and8. See, e.g., J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696
(1939); Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of
Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
9. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 71-83 (1996) (describing and criticizing the preference-based view
of well-being held by welfare economics); L.W. S UMNER, WELFARE , HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS
113-22 (1996) (same).
10. BREYER, supra note 1.
11. 1 ALFRED E. K AHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS (1988).
12. See sources cited supra note 2. A similar approach is adopted by one of the leading
contemporary textbooks on policy analysis. See EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO
BENEFIT -COST ANALYSIS 9-29 (2d ed. 1990).
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economics scholarship on regulation; 13 and by Anthony Ogus’s book
on regulation,14 which is the most recent attempt by a legal scholar to
provide something approaching a comprehensive, normative theory
of regulation. Note that the term “neoclassical,” as I have defined it,
denotes a class of normative theories, rather than a unique theory.
Two neoclassicists who agree as to the moral significance of efficiency, and as to the equivalence of welfare and preference satisfaction, may disagree about whether some further moral criterion (besides efficiency) is also relevant in evaluating regulatory choices, options, and institutions. 15 One neoclassicist may think that the environment has intrinsic value, apart from human welfare; another may
deny that. Or, one neoclassicist may think that the fair distribution
of welfare, as well as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is an important thing;
another neoclassicist may be solely concerned with efficiency.16 It is
certainly not the case that Breyer, Kahn, Ogus, and all the scholars I
have just styled as neoclassicists adopt the same, unique theory of
regulation; but it is true, I suggest, that the otherwise divergent
theories they propose share a common commitment to efficiency and
to preferences.
This is not immediately obvious. It is a matter of interpretation,
or at least sometimes it is—since the neoclassicist’s commitment to
efficiency and to preferences is sometimes implicit or even obscured
rather than laid plain to view. 17 Nonetheless, this commitment is
plausibly inferred from other claims that Breyer, Ogus, and the other
neoclassicists do make quite explicitly and centrally. Consider the
“market failure” framework that these scholars adopt, within which
monopolization and spillovers (externalities) are seen to be two para13. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10
(2d ed. 1989) (stating that law and economics focuses on the “efficiency” of legal rules, with
efficiency defined in the Kaldor-Hicks sense as “the relationship between the aggregate
benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situation”); Chris William Sanchirico,
The New Efficiency Rationale: An Internal Critique (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (“For as long as Law and Economics has played a formative force in legal
scholarship, its principal mode of analysis has been to evaluate legal rules according to the
sole criterion of ‘efficiency’: that is, to judge rules by the simple sum of the costs and benefits that they impose on the population without regard to how those costs and benefits are
distributed among different individuals.”), available at http://www.cstone.net/~csanchir/
Taxes2.pdf (visited Oct. 3, 2000).
14. ANTHONY I. OGUS , REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1994).
15. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 32-33 (citing various possible noneconomic rationales
for regulation); HARRISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 30 (same); K AHN, supra note 11, at 18993 (same); OGUS , supra note 14, at 46-54 (same); PIERCE , supra note 2, at 11-50 (same);
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 79 (same); SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 313-55,
557-657 (same).
16. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the arguable moral relevance of criteria other than
overall well-being, including perfectionist and distributive criteria).
17. But not always. Some neoclassicists explicitly adopt efficiency, in the KaldorHicks sense, as a criterion for assessing regulatory policy. See, e.g., HARRISON ET AL., supra
note 2, at 20-25; OGUS , supra note 14, at 29.
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digmatic failures that justify some kind of regulatory response. 18
Anyone who thinks that the state is prima facie justified in moving a
market from the price-output point reached under monopoly (Pm), to
the price-output point reached under competitive conditions (Pc), is
plausibly interpreted as adopting a commitment to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Why? Because the move from Pm to Pc is necessarily KaldorHicks efficient, 19 but there is no other plausible moral criterion that
necessarily counts the move from Pm to Pc as a good thing.20 That
move is not Pareto-efficient, 21 since the monopolist is made worse off
by the move. It does not necessarily increase overall well-being, since
money has (or can have) differential welfare productivity across persons. Although the monopolist’s foregone profits at Pc are less, in dollar terms, than the consumers’ gained surplus, the consumers may
be wealthier than the monopolist, or otherwise less “productive” at
converting dollars into welfare, so that Pm is actually welfare maximizing relative to Pc. Even more obviously, the move from P m to Pc is
not necessarily better in light of distributive criteria (egalitarian criteria, for example) since the monopolist may again be poorer in overall wealth or welfare than the consumers, or otherwise more deserving in light of plausible standards for fair distribution. Nor, clearly,
is it necessarily better in light of deontological criteria, since some
anti-monopoly policies could move society from Pm to Pc but also violate the monopolist’s deontological rights, or in light of perfectionist
criteria, since they have no connection at all to human well-being.
The consumers at Pc have enjoyed a welfare gain that is large
enough, in dollar terms, to compensate for the monopolist’s welfare
loss. In short, it is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and that alone explains
why the state might be prima facie justified in choosing Pc.
18. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 15-16, 23; HARRISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 124-65,
191-94; O GUS , supra note 14, at 30-33, 35-38; PIERCE , supra note 2, at 12-21, 24-32;
SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 32-34; cf. K AHN, supra note 11 (focusing on monopoly);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 63-65 (same).
19. More precisely, the move is necessarily Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the welfarerelevant preferences are taken to be those of consumers and producers, see infra Section
IV.D.2, and if special cases such as “natural monopoly” are placed to one side.
20. To quote Richard Posner:
[W]hen economists say that monopoly is inefficient, they mean inefficient in the
Kaldor-Hicks or wealth-maximization, not the Pareto, sense. . . . The loss [in
monopoly] is clear from a wealth-maximization standpoint: the sum of consumer and producer surplus is less under monopoly than under competition. . .
. Thus a move from monopoly to competition would satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks or
wealth-maximization criterion for a gain in efficiency. But it would not satisfy
the criterion of Pareto superiority, because the monopolist would be worse off.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 91-92 (1981).
21. One outcome is “Pareto-efficient” or “Pareto-superior,” relative to a second, if at
least one person is better off with the first outcome and no one is worse off. In that case,
the second outcome is “Pareto -inefficient” or “Pareto -inferior” relative to the first. If one
outcome is neither Pareto -inferior nor Pareto-superior to another, the two are “Paretononcomparable.”
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A similar point can be made about the identification of externalities (spillovers) as a key scenario warranting regulatory intervention. Neoclassicists see externalities as troubling because externalities can be Pareto-inferior. If the external costs of an activity are
large enough, the state of affairs in which the actor performs the activity will be Pareto-inferior to some other state in which the actor
refrains from the activity. Indeed, the link between externalities and
Pareto-inferiority is inherent in the description of externalities as a
“market failure”; for what is special about an ideally functioning
market just is the fact that its outcomes are Pareto-optimal. 22 By contrast, it is clear that an ideally functioning market—one in which
(among other things) actors are perfectly informed, conditions are
competitive, and all goods are private—may still fail to maximize
well-being, achieve distributive justice, comply with deontological requirements, or advance perfectionist goals.
But neoclassicists do not suggest that an activity which is Paretoinferior by virtue of its external costs should be regulated only if the
regulator arranges or anticipates a side-payment from the costbearers to the actor. Rather, they think (or seem to think) that a Pareto-inferior activity is justifiably regulated without more—without
the actual payment of compensation to the actor. And this view implies a commitment to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, just like the view that
a monopolized market is justifiably moved from Pm to Pc even if the
monopolist is not actually compensated for the move.
What about the second component of neoclassicism, the adoption
of a preference-based account of well-being? The preference-based
view of well-being is even more deeply entrenched in welfare economics than the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,23 and often neoclassicists espouse that view quite plainly.24 Where they do not, the view
can plausibly be inferred from other claims.
First, it can be inferred from their adoption of “imperfect information” rather than, say, “objective badness” or “failure of pleasure,” as
a prime scenario where regulation may be justified. 25 Consider the
case where a purchaser (P) is about to buy a good or service (G). If
the preference-based view of well-being obtains, then regulators justifiably intervene here, in light of P’s well-being, only if (1) P is imperfectly informed about the consequences of buying G, or (2) P is ir22. An outcome is Pareto-optimal if there are no other outcomes relative to which it is
Pareto-inefficient.
23. See sources cited infra note 29 (citing theoretical and applied welfare economists
who reject Kaldor-Hicks criterion, but who do not generally reject the preference-based account of well-being).
24. See, e.g., O GUS , supra note 14, at 38.
25. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 26-28; HARRISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 210-19;
O GUS , supra note 14, at 38-41; PIERCE , supra note 2, at 32-33; SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra
note 2, at 34-35.
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rational. By contrast, the regulatory theorist’s focus on “imperfect information” would be quite puzzling if the theorist held an objectivelist view of well-being (such that P’s well-being consists in his
achievement of one or more objective goods, quite apart from his preferring or not preferring that achievement) or a hedonic view of wellbeing (such that P’s well-being consists in his experiencing one or
more types of pleasurable mental states, quite apart from his preferring or not preferring that experience). Perfectly informed and perfectly rational persons can still fail to realize objective goods or experience an optimal mix of pleasures, insofar as they just do not care
about the goods or the pleasures. 26
Second, the neoclassicist’s commitment to a preference-based view
of well-being is plausibly inferred from his distaste for paternalism.
Some kind of antipaternalism, ranging from mild skepticism to fierce
hostility, is characteristic of virtually all of the scholarship under
consideration here.27 Note that antipaternalism is one immediate implication of a preference-based view of well-being. On that view, if P
prefers the state of affairs which results from his buying G to the
state which results from his not buying G, then government’s paternalistic intervention to prevent P from buying G cannot make him
better off. By contrast, on an objective-list or a hedonic view of welfare, governmental intervention in the teeth of P’s preferences can
still be welfare improving for P. A certain kind of antipaternalism
may follow from objectivism—if the objectivist counts autonomy as
one of the goods constitutive of welfare–but the link to antipaternalism is less fundamental here than within a preference-based
view.
B. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency: Does It Have Moral Significance?
So much for my interpretive claim that Breyer, Ogus, and the
other neoclassicists are committed to (1) Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a
moral criterion (if not the only criterion) by which to evaluate regulatory choices, policies, and institutions and (2) a preference-based account of well-being. What is wrong with these commitments? Let me
26. It might be objected that objective goods are those goods that all persons, under
conditions of perfect information and rationality, would prefer—and thus that perfectly informed and rational persons would realize objective goods. See infra text accompanying
note 151. I would respond by noting, first, that objective goods are those things that pe rfectly informed and rational persons would restrictedly prefer, i.e., prefer for themselves; a
perfectly informed and rational person could act contrary to her own welfare and deny herself objective goods. Second, even in the case where preferences are “restricted”—where action is self-interested—a perfectly informed and rational person will have a prima facie
preference to realize objective goods, but may prefer, all things considered, to realize her
own, idiosyncratic conception of welfare. See infra Section II.C.
27. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1, at 33-34; O GUS , supra note 14, at 51-53. But see
SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 35.
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start with efficiency, since I think the commitment to efficiency is
more deeply mistaken than the commitment to preferentialism.
There is (as we shall see) a large grain of truth in preferentialism,
but the thought that Kaldor-Hicks has normative import is plain
wrong.28 These days, theoretical welfare economists generally reject
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a standard for ranking social states. 29 And
the considerations against efficiency as a moral criterion were fully
articulated in the legal literature almost twenty years ago, in contributions by Ronald Dworkin,30 Jules Coleman,31 Mark Kelman,32 and
others. 33 Nonetheless, the efficiency criterion lingers on in the works
of neoclassical regulatory theorists, and more generally in much of
law and economics. It thus bears repeating just why Kaldor-Hicks efficiency should be removed from our normative vocabulary. It lacks
the basic status of Pareto-efficiency, overall well-being, distributive
considerations, deontological requirements, and (perhaps) perfectionist value.
1. Putative Defenses of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
Consider the following putative defenses of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which at one time or another have been presented by economists or legal scholars. First, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is sometimes
linked to overall well-being.34 But it is clear that the two can di28. For a more compact argument defending the related point that cost-benefit analysis lacks normative import, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 187-94 (1999).
29. See, e.g., ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE , WELFARE ECONOMICS 96-101 (1984);
Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, A Review Article: The Case Against the Use of the
Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 CANADIAN J. ECON. 471
(1990); Stephen Coate, Welfare Economics and the Theory of Project Evaluation (April
1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). For a frank rejection of the KaldorHicks criterion by a leading textbook in applied welfare economics, see COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 6 (Richard Layard & Stephen Glaister eds., 2d ed. 1994), which states, “[T]here
is no ethical justification for the Hicks-Kaldor criterion; where compensation will not be
paid there seems no alternative to interpersonal comparisons of the value of each person’s
gains and losses.”
30. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
31. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV . 509 (1980).
32. See MARK KELMAN, A G UIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-50 (1987).
33. See generally Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV .
(1980); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
34. This seems to be the suggestion in J.R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income,
7 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 105, 111 (1940), which states, “This [the Hicks criterion] would seem to
be quite acceptable as a definition of increase in real social income.” Anandarup Ray has
also suggested a link to welfare:
Even though compensation tests are often claimed to be the foundation of traditional cost-benefit analysis, it is perhaps more sensible to interpret the traditional approach in a different way. If the gains and losses accruing to individuals are regarded as equal from the social point of view, then the [sum of com-
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verge,35 as I suggested above in my discussion of the regulation of
monopoly. A simple illustration of the divergence between KaldorHicks efficiency and overall well-being is the following. One so-called
exchange economy (S1) consists of a fixed stock of private goods (G1,
G2 . . . Gn) plus an allocation of those goods to various persons. The
total amounts of the goods are G1*, G2* . . . G n*. A second exchange
economy (S2) consists of the same goods (G1, G2 . . . Gn); however, the
total amounts in this economy are G1+, G2* . . . G n*, and G1 + is bigger
than G1*. In other words, the two economies have identical stocks of
goods except that S2 has more of G1.
Then S2 is necessarily Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to S 1 because, whatever the actual allocation in S1 and S2, the goods in S2
could always be reallocated (if reallocation were costless) to match
the allocation in S1, leaving a surplus equaling the difference between G1+ and G1*. Surely, however, the move from S1 to S2 does not
necessarily increase overall well-being. For example, assume that in
both economies all of the goods G2 . . . G n are allocated to a single individual Rich; in S1 the stock of G1 is divided equally among persons;
but in S2 all of good G1 is allocated to Rich. Then a shift from S1 to S2
will decrease overall well-being, despite the acquired surplus, if it is
the case that G1 (like many goods) has declining marginal utility and
the surplus (the difference between G1* and G1+) is not large enough
to offset the declining marginal utility of G1. More generally, unless
all of the goods have a constant (rather than declining or increasing)
marginal utility that is the same amount for all persons, the shift
from S1 to S2 will not be necessarily welfare improving, even though
it is necessarily Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 36
pensating variations] measure would represent actual, rather than potential,
changes in welfare.
ANANDARUP RAY, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: ISSUES AND METHODOLOGIES 26 (1984); see
also ROBERT SUGDEN & ALAN WILLIAMS , THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 93-95 (1978) (suggesting that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and distributional justice are different dimensions of “social welfare”); cf. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (rejecting utilitarian defense of
wealth maximization).
35. See David Copp, The Justice and Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 THEORY &
DECISION 65, 74-77 (1987) (arguing that a project with net monetary benefits can decrease
overall well-being); Peter Railton, Benefit-Cost Analysis as a Source of Information About
Welfare, in VALUING HEALTH RISKS, COSTS , AND BENEFITS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION
MAKING 55, 67-69 (P. Brett Hammond & Rob Coppock eds., 1990) (same).
36. The disjunction between Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and overall well-being is now
widely recognized in the literature on welfare economics. For example, that disjunction is
typically part of the case for the use of “distributive weights” in cost-benefit analysis, i.e.,
weighting factors that adjust an individual’s monetary valuation of a governmental or
regulatory project so as to reflect his marginal utility of money, or to reflect distributive
considerations. See BOADWAY & BRUCE , supra note 29, at 271-91 (advocating distributive
weighting); AJIT K. DASGUPTA & D.W. PEARCE , COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS : THEORY AND
PRACTICE 57-69 (1972) (same); D.W. PEARCE & C.A. NASH, THE SOCIAL APPRAISAL OF
PROJECTS: A TEXT IN COST -BENEFIT ANALYSIS 27-38 (1981) (same); RICHARD O. ZERBE JR.
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Second, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is sometimes linked to Paretoefficiency, via the claim that the surplus created by a particular Kaldor-Hicks efficient move can or will be redistributed through the tax
system, making the move universally beneficial. 37 This claim is confused. Imagine that S1 is a world where the regulator fails to initiate
a particular regulatory policy, that S2 is a world with the policy, and
that S2 is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to S1. S2 has two variants,
S2* and S2+. In S2*, the taxing authorities engage in Paretian redistribution 38 of the surplus created by the move from S1 to S2; in S2 +
they do not.39 Why, now, is S2 morally better than S1 ? If the variant
of S2 that obtains is S2*, then we have a clear answer: S2* is Paretoefficient relative to S1. But if the variant of S2 that obtains is instead
S2+, then the question remains unanswered. The fact that S2* is
morally better than S1 by virtue of being Pareto-efficient hardly explains why S2+, which is a different world than S2*, and which is not
Pareto-efficient relative to S1, is also morally better than S1.
To put the point another way, the fact that a policy is KaldorHicks efficient relative to the status quo merely entails that the policy could be transformed into a Pareto-efficient move via an ideal& DWIGHT D. DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS : IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 236-53 (1994)
(same); see also COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 29, at 6 (“[Unless one dollar is equally
valuable to all parties concerned], there are only two alternatives: to use some system of
distributional weights or simply to show the net benefits to each party and let the policy
maker apply his own evaluation.”).
37. This seems to be the suggestion in Kaldor, supra note 8. See also E.J. MISHAN,
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 170-71 (4th ed. 1988) (“[T]here exist within Western societies
economic institutions—such as progressive tax systems and welfare payments systems—
which act over time to translate a potential into an actual Pareto improvement.”); PEARCE
& NASH, supra note 36, at 28 (“While ensuring [through application of the Kaldor-Hicks
test] that we reach some position on the welfare frontier, we may use taxation and income
supplementation as policy instruments to move along the frontier to our chosen distribution of income (citation omitted).”); SUGDEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 34, at 92 (“A project
that satisfies the potential Pareto improvement criterion is one that the government can
use, in conjunction with tax changes, to make everyone better off.”). Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have also relied on the “surplus” rationale:
[M]oving to the efficient legal rule with an appropriate change in the income
tax leaves all individuals equally well off but leaves the government with a
surplus. With this additional revenue, the government can make each individual better off—for example, by lowering taxes by a fixed amount for each individual or by spending the funds on a public good that benefits everyone.
LOUIS K APLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, THE EFFICIENCY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM VERSUS THE
INCOME TAX IN REDISTRIBUTING INCOME 5 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 4457, 1993).
38. By “Paretian” redistribution, I mean a redistribution from those who are better off
in S2, as compared to S1, to those who would otherwise be worse off, such that the resulting
outcome is in fact Pareto-superior to S1, i.e., everyone is better off.
39. There are a host of reasons, including corruption, administrative expense, democratic constraints, the absence of statutory authorization, and many others, that might prevent Paretian redistribution by the taxing authorities. The sheer fact that S2 is KaldorHicks efficient relative to S1 does not guarantee that a Paretian redistribution will take
place, since Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is defined in terms of hypothetical, not actual, redistribution from winners to losers.
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ized, cost-free, lump-sum tax system. If a particular Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy will in fact be transformed into a Pareto-efficient move
through the tax system (that is, we will move from S1 to S2*), then
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is superfluous in explaining the moral attractiveness of the policy; that is more straightforwardly explained
by the unimpeachable criterion of Pareto-efficiency. Conversely, if a
particular Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy will not be transformed into a
Pareto-efficient move (that is, we will move from S1 to S 2+), then
something besides the Pareto criterion is needed to explain why the
policy is a good thing.40
Third, Kaldor-Hicks is sometimes defended through the notion of
a long-run Pareto improvement. 41 The idea, here, is not that the surplus from a particular Kaldor-Hicks move will be redistributed
through the tax system, but that any particular Kaldor-Hicks move
is part of a package of Kaldor-Hicks improvements such that this
package is, collectively, better for everyone. To put the idea most
crisply and plausibly: a general governmental (regulatory) practice of
Kaldor-Hicks evaluation is Pareto-efficient relative to other practices.
There are a number of difficulties here. To begin with, the longrun or practice-level justification of Kaldor-Hicks does not constitute
a full defense of Kaldor-Hicks as a moral criterion, since it fails to
explain why one-off Kaldor-Hicks changes—changes that are efficient but occur in a world where no practice of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation exists, or where the existing practice does not reach such
changes—are a good thing. More seriously, the claim that the practice of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation is necessarily or actually Paretoefficient relative to other practices is simply untrue. One reason is
40. As Amartya Sen has explained:
There is a real motivational tension in the use of the logic of compensation for
reading social welfare. If compensations are actually paid, then of course we do
not need the compensation criterion, since the actual outcome already includes
the paid compensations and can be judged without reference to compensation
tests . . . . On the other hand, if compensations are not paid, it is not at all clear
in what sense it can be said that this is a social improvement . . . . The compensation tests are either redundant or unconvincing.
Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 947 (2000);
see also RAY, supra note 34, at 25 (“Unless decisionmakers can ensure that all project benefits are redistributed at no cost (in which case the Kaldor criterion is redundant), the link
between potential welfare [in the sense of the Kaldor test] and actual welfare is not
straightforward.”).
41. This idea is formalized in A. Mitchell Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. ECON. 407 (1972). E.J. Mishan also makes the “long-run” argument:
[E]ven though it may be the case that for each change sanctioned by the [potential] Pareto criterion a number of people will be made worse off, a succession of
such changes is not likely to inflict losses on the same group. Over time, therefore, there can be a presumption that everyone or nearly everyone will be made
better off by consistent application of the Pareto criterion.
MISHAN, supra note 37, at 171.
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that particular persons may suffer large losses in particular rounds
of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation, such that the gains they reap in other
rounds are not substantial enough to make them net winners from
the overall practice. Consider, for example, the hardly unrealistic
case where a Kaldor-Hicks efficient decision (perhaps the decision of
an environmental, health, or safety agency) causes grave physical
harm or death to a few persons. Those persons could well be better
off in a world where agencies follow a practice of Pareto-evaluation
rather than Kaldor-Hicks evaluation and generally decline to issue a
regulatory directive unless the outcome produced by that directive is
truly Pareto-efficient relative to the status quo.42
The attribution of Pareto-efficiency to the practice of Kaldor-Hicks
evaluation is also false for a more subtle reason. There is a whole
range of evaluative practices that governmental and regulatory
agencies could follow other than Kaldor-Hicks evaluation and its salient alternatives (like Pareto-evaluation). Agencies could follow
stranger alternatives such as approving projects only if they generate
a certain kind of welfare benefit, or only if they benefit persons in a
particular part of the country, and so on. But of course a practice of
Kaldor-Hicks evaluation will not be Pareto-efficient relative to all alternatives. For example, if Joe Smith is a person, then the regulatory
practice of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation will not be Pareto-efficient relative to the regulatory practice of making those and only those decisions that benefit Joe Smith, since Joe will be better off under this
latter practice than under Kaldor-Hicks evaluation!
In short, there is a “Pareto-frontier” of regulatory practices along
which practices are Pareto-noncomparable with each other, as well
as an “interior” area of regulatory practices where each practice is
Pareto-inferior to some practice on the frontier. Even if the practice
of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation lies on the frontier, the criterion of
Pareto-efficiency can at most explain why that practice should be
chosen over certain “interior” practices, but not why it should be chosen over noncomparable practices (like the Joe Smith practice) that
also lie on the frontier or that lie in the interior but are noncomparable with the Kaldor-Hicks practice. The long-run argument is not a
defense of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency simpliciter? a defense against all
alternative regulatory practices? but is at best a defense of that
practice against a particular set of alternatives: namely, those prac-

42. This practice would not be well-defined unless the “status quo” outcome were defined, but presumably that could be done with reference to the action/inaction distinction
(the status quo is the outcome in which the agency fails to act), or with reference to some
common law baseline (the status quo is the outcome in which the set of legal rights, duties,
and so on, is closer to the set defined by traditional property, contract, tort, and criminal
law).
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tices compared to which the Kaldor-Hicks practice is truly Paretosuperior.
Fourth, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is sometimes linked to Paretoefficiency by introducing risk or uncertainty.43 The general idea
seems to be that a Kaldor-Hicks change can prove (ex ante) Paretooptimal once individuals or the government have probabilistic rather
than perfect information. But a simple example will suggest that
probabilistic considerations do not reliably support the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion. Imagine a project that will affect ten people, five men and
five women, producing some welfare benefit worth $200 for each of
the ten persons and some welfare setback worth $300 for five of the
ten persons. The defender of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency might argue
that each of the ten persons calculates the expected net monetary
impact of the project upon himself or herself as $50, so that the project is, ex ante, a welfare improvement from the point of view of each
person and therefore, ex ante, Pareto-efficient. 44
But this argument is spurious. First, although the project is necessarily Kaldor-Hicks efficient (since $2000 is greater than $1500),
each person will not necessarily calculate his or her expected net
gain from the project as $50. P1 might have good grounds for the assessment that his risk of falling in the losing group is 90%. Similarly,
if one person is a woman and it can be accurately predicted that four
of the five women will be losers, then (knowing nothing more) the expected impact of the project upon her is -$40 ((80% ? -100) + (20% ?
200)). The point here is that it takes much more than Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency plus risk or uncertainty to ensure that the project is, ex
ante, a welfare improvement from the point of view of each person; it
takes a particular pattern of probability assessments as well. Absent
that particular pattern, we are still left without any defense, ex ante
or ex post, of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
43. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 41.
44. The argument would be that each person, not knowing who will suffer the setback, would estimate the impact of the project on her welfare thus:
Probability

Possible Outcome
of Project

Weighted Value of
Outcome

50%

-$100

-$50

50%

+$200

+$100

Total Expected Value of Project:

+$50

In other words, she will consider she has a 50% chance of coming out $200 ahead and a
50% chance of coming out $100 behind. Thus the expected value of the project is $50. If
each person is risk -neutral, each should count this project as an ex ante welfare improvement.
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Second, even if we put this point aside, the putative risk-based or
uncertainty-based linkage from Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to Paretoefficiency remains hazardous. Assume that each person in the example just described adopts the same estimate of his or her chances of
benefit and setback from the project: 100% chance of a $200 gross
gain, 50% chance of a $300 gross setback, and thus an expected net
gain of $50. So the project is, ex ante, welfare improving from the
point of view of each person (at least on the simplifying assumption
that each person is risk-neutral). This hardly implies that government should expect the project to be universally beneficial and, on
those Paretian grounds, choose the project. After all, government
knows for sure that there will be persons who are made worse off by
the project—namely, the five unidentified persons who will in fact
lose $100 net. So the project is not, ex ante, an unequivocally good
thing, from the point of view of government or of any other “observer”
who takes into account the well-being of all ten persons. In short, the
project is not, ex ante, Pareto-efficient; it would only be, ex ante, Pareto-efficient if government (incorrectly) expected that everyone
would end up with a net gain from the project. Nor of course is it, ex
post, Pareto-efficient, since in fact five persons end up losing. Thus
the Pareto criterion provides no reason to choose the project. 45
To generalize: Even if the right pattern of probability assessments
transforms a Kaldor-Hicks project into a project that is welfareimproving from the point of view of each affected person, such a project can still fail to be either ex ante or ex post Pareto-efficient. It can
be clear ex ante, to a regulatory agency or some other government institution, that at least one person (not fully identified) will be
harmed on balance by a government policy—that the policy will not
be universally beneficial. This is true even if each person rationally
expects to be a gainer and even if government has no further information ex ante than that available to each and all of the affected persons. For this important reason, among others, the putative link from
Kaldor-Hicks to Pareto-efficiency, via risk or uncertainty, is a spurious one.46
In the example just considered, the Kaldor-Hicks move at stake
was a small-scale regulatory choice of one option over another, rather
than a large-scale social choice of one regulatory practice over another, such as the practice of Kaldor-Hicks evaluation over the practice of Pareto or “Joe Smith” evaluation. However, my analysis ap45. This line of argument is advanced by John Broome, who claims that ex ante
valuations of the risk of death are an inappropriate basis for cost-benefit analyses of governmental projects that cause death. See John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB.
ECON. 91 (1978).
46. The defender of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency might use risk or uncertainty to draw a
link from that criterion to the concept of consent, rather than to Pareto -superiority. This
strategy is discussed and criticized below.
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plies equally to the case of choosing practices. If one practice (P 1) is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to a second practice (P2), and if information is probabilistic rather than perfect, it is still only contingently
true that P1 is, ex ante, welfare improving from the point of view of
each person affected by the practices. And even if this is true, it may
still be the case that P1 is neither ex post nor ex ante a Pareto improvement. If at least one person loses from the practice, and if government has sufficient information to expect that, then P1 is not universally beneficial either ex ante or ex post.
Fifth, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is sometimes defended by reference to considerations of “consent.”47 The least plausible version of
this defense runs as follows: since (1) the winners’ gains from a Kaldor-Hicks move could be redistributed to the losers, producing a universal benefit, and since (2) everyone would consent to the KaldorHicks move together with the Paretian redistribution, we can conclude that (3) everyone would consent to the Kaldor-Hicks move. Just
because everyone would consent to the Kaldor-Hicks move plus Paretian redistribution (S'), and S' is related to the Kaldor-Hicks move
alone (S) via a certain transformation (the redistribution), it hardly
follows that everyone would or should or does consent to S.
A much better version of the consent-based defense of KaldorHicks efficiency builds upon the idea, discussed above, that the introduction of risk or uncertainty can transform an individual’s
evaluation of a Kaldor-Hicks move. Consider the following argument
for the Kaldor-Hicks criterion: (1) A Kaldor-Hicks move48 is, ex ante,
welfare-improving from the point of view of each affected person; (2)
every person would consent to a move that is, ex ante, welfareimproving for her; and, therefore, (3) every person would consent to a
Kaldor-Hicks move. One problem with this syllogism, already mentioned, is that a Kaldor-Hicks move may not be, ex ante, welfareimproving from the point of view of each affected person; that depends upon the pattern of probability assessments, and any a priori
or conceptual link between Kaldor-Hicks and a particular pattern is
spurious. But let us put that issue aside. Assume that, as it happens,
all of the following are true of a particular Kaldor-Hicks move: (a) the
move is not ex post a Pareto improvement, since at least one person
will end up losing from it; (b) government does not believe ex ante
that the move is a Pareto improvement, since (given its probability
assessment) government believes that at least one person will lose
47. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 20, at 88-115; Herman B. Leonard & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in
VALUES AT RISK 31, 34-36 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV . 487, 491-95 (1980).
48. “Move” here could be a small-scale decision or a large-scale move from one regulatory practice to another.
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from the project; and (c) each person, given her information, counts
the move as an ex ante welfare improvement for her, and government knows that. The interesting question here is whether government has moral grounds to approve the move—grounds consisting in
the fact that each person would consent to the move—even though it
is neither ex ante nor ex post a Pareto improvement.
I think not, although the question is clearly not an easy one. If
everyone affected actually consents to the move—if an actual contract is signed by all, or if the move is universally approved in a referendum—then there are moral grounds in favor of the project. Actual consent has moral force. But it is not clear that hypothetical consent does. 49 To begin with, it is clear that hypothetical consent does
not have the same moral force as actual consent. For example, if I
would or should contract with you to the effect that I do A if you do
B, and you do B, then the grounds for forcing me to do A or pay damages are surely weaker than if I actually had contracted to do A upon
your doing B.
Further, in the case of the hypothetical consent to a Kaldor-Hicks
move that flows from probabilistic information, it is not clear why
hypothetical consent should have any moral force. Suppose a person
(P) is, ex post, a loser from the Kaldor-Hicks move, but as a result of
risk or uncertainty, P’s ex ante assessment (if P were to make such
an assessment) would be that the move would produce an expected
gain for him. P does not actually consent to the move, but he would
do so if the question were raised in a scenario of social contracting.
Why should this sway government in favor of the move? Note that P’s
hypothetical consent to the move is partly uninformed; he would approve it only because he is ignorant of the fact that it will end up
harming him. In short, the best version of the consent-based argument for Kaldor-Hicks appeals not to actual consent, nor to fully informed hypothetical consent, but to partly uninformed hypothetical
consent, and thus is hardly compelling, even in the empirically contingent case where the partial information available to each actor
makes the project seem an expected gain for her.
Sixth, the Kaldor-Hicks standard is sometimes defended as a
workable decision procedure. The idea is that Kaldor-Hicks offers a
clearer and easier way for agencies, courts, applied economists,
and/or legal scholars to evaluate governmental choices (as compared
to direct evaluation of governmental choices in light of a full social
welfare function) and that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency tracks the true social welfare function sufficiently well to be a viable proxy.50 This is
49. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV .
2203, 2305 (1992) (contrasting moral force of actual and hypothetical consent).
50. See Arnold C. Harberger, Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics:
An Interpretive Essay , 9 J. ECON. LIT. 785, 796 (1971) (presenting three “basic postulates”
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quite plausible. 51 But it fails to answer the question under consideration now: is Kaldor-Hicks a normative (specifically, a moral) criterion?52
A theory of regulation starts from a normative framework with
reference to which regulatory policies, choices, institutions, and decision procedures can be assessed. In order to know whether KaldorHicks is a “good” or “viable” or “appropriate” decision procedure—
that is, in order to assess the claim that it generally produces “good”
or “good enough” outcomes, that its decisional “costs” are “low,” that
it is unlikely to be “misused” by practitioners, and so on—we need
criteria for appraising the goodness and badness of outcomes, the
existence and level of costs, and the fact and extent of misuse. And
even if this is denied—even if we somehow can intuitively “know”
that Kaldor-Hicks is a normatively appropriate decision procedure
without knowing what the criteria for normative appropriateness
are—the point remains that justified decision procedures and
normative criteria are distinct. A given standard can constitute a
justified decision procedure without constituting a normative
criterion, and vice versa. Neoclassicism is the view that posits
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as one (if not the only) basic normative
criterion. The question at hand is whether Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
indeed has this status; and to characterize it as a viable decision
procedure is simply to switch debates.
Seventh and finally, the defense of the Kaldor-Hicks standard is
sometimes married to a certain moral skepticism, in particular a
skepticism about the possibility of interpersonal welfare comparisons. 53 This was certainly true of the original defense of the standard,
set forth by the economists Kaldor, Hicks, and Scitovsky.54 They proposed the hypothetical-compensation standard in a milieu where
overall well-being was thought to be indeterminate or unknowable,55
and as a way to rank Pareto-noncomparable states without making
interpersonal welfare comparisons. But as I shall argue at greater

as the answer to a need for a set of standards, and arguing they provide a basis for “a
professional consensus on procedures”).
51. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 194-243 (defending cost-benefit analysis as a justified decision procedure in light of the moral criterion of overall well-being).
52. On the difference between decision procedures and moral criteria, see DAVID O.
BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 216-17 (1989).
53. It is unclear to me whether Richard Posner is still committed to the Kaldor-Hicks
standard, but if so, that commitment is now wedded to a kind of moral skepticism. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY passim (1999) (attack on moral theorizing); id. at 235 (equating “normative economics” and “cost benefit
analysis”).
54. See Hicks, supra note 8; Kaldor, supra note 8; Tibor de Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV . ECON. STUD. 77 (1941).
55. See Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J.
635 (1938) (articulating a skeptical view about interpersonal welfare comparisons).
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length below, the criterion of overall well-being is neither indeterminate nor unknowable. Modern theoretical welfare economists, unlike
Kaldor and Hicks and their contemporaries, are generally not skeptics about the possibility of interpersonal comparisons. 56
In any event, even if such skepticism were warranted, the leap to
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion would be unjustified. We would still need
an affirmative argument why, given two Pareto-noncomparable
states, the one that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient is better. I have tried to
show that no such argument is forthcoming; thus skepticism about
interpersonal comparisons, if warranted, would simply warrant us in
a general skepticism about the normative comparability of Paretononcomparable states via judgments of “overall well-being” or “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency”—or anything else.
My argument against the moral significance of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency concludes here. That Kaldor-Hicks lacks moral importance is,
as I have said, hardly a novel point. It is a point ably articulated in
the legal literature.57 But scholarly appeals to the Kaldor-Hicks
standard—explicit appeals or, as in the case of some neoclassicists,
implicit appeals—have not ceased, and so the point bears the emphasis and elaboration that I have given it. Further, it should be underlined that someone who rejects the moral importance of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency (as I do) need not reject it for all the various reasons presented by its past critics. The argument against Kaldor-Hicks presented here is, in significant ways, different from and more modest
than the arguments previously advanced by scholars who oppose that
standard or, more generally, law and economics.
2. Some Spurious Criticisms of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
Note what I have not said in criticism of Kaldor-Hicks. To begin
with, I have not criticized Kaldor-Hicks for sometimes leading to an
indeterminate ranking of social states. This is the so-called Scitovsky
paradox: it is possible for one social state (S1) to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to another (S2), while at the same time S2 is KaldorHicks efficient relative to S1. 58 The Scitovsky paradox is closely re56. See, e.g., BOADWAY & BRUCE , supra note 29, at 137-69. The so -called BergsonSamuelson social welfare function is routinely employed by modern welfare economists as
a criterion for evaluating social states; it assumes interpersonally comparable utilities. See
id. But see Robert A. Pollak, Welfare Comparisons and Situation Comparisons, 50 J.
ECONOMETRICS 31, 31 (1991) (claiming that “most economists think interpersonal comparisons are nonsense”).
57. See sources cited supra notes 30-33.
58. See Scitovsky, supra note 54. For textbook discussions, see, for example, BOADWAY
& BRUCE , supra note 29, at 96-101; YEW -K WANG NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS : INTRODUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC CONCEPTS 59-66 (1980). A more precise formulation of the
Scitovsky paradox is as follows. Given two states, Si and Sj, where Si is the status quo and
Sj is an alternative, let us say that the Winners in Si are those persons who are better off
in Si than Sj; that the Losers in Si are those persons who are worse off in Si than Sj; that
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lated to another phenomenon, often discussed in the legal literature—the fact that P’s “willingness to pay” to gain a good does not
necessarily equal what he would be “willing to accept” in compensation for its loss. 59 That is, a person’s preferences as between various
goods can change as her total wealth changes. And sometimes the
critics of Kaldor-Hicks have argued that, because of the Scitovsky
paradox, Kaldor-Hicks cannot be a true moral criterion.60 But this
criticism is unpersuasive.
The Scitovsky paradox means that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does
not enable a “complete” ranking of social outcomes such that each
outcome is better, worse, or precisely equal to every other. But so
what? Genuine moral criteria do not necessarily enable complete
rankings of social outcomes. For example, the criterion of overall
well-being does not: if one social state (S 1) is a little more pleasurable
for one person (P1) than a second state (S2), but S2 allows a second
person (P2) to accomplish his professional goals a little better than
S1, then S1 may be neither better, nor worse, nor precisely equal to
S2 in light of overall well-being. It may instead be welfareincomparable. Similarly, if S1 decreases the cumulative deviation
from average welfare relative to S2, but S2 decreases the cumulative
deviation from the welfare of the richest person relative to S 1, then
S1 and S2 may be neither better, nor worse, nor precisely the same
with respect to the criterion of equality.61 Indeed, the point that true
normative criteria need not enable complete rankings of states
should have been obvious from an examination of the Pareto critethe Winners in Sj are those persons who are better off in Sj than Si; and that the Losers in
Sj are those persons who are worse off in Sj than Si. Note that the Winners in Si are just
the same persons who are the Losers in Sj, and that the Losers in Si are just the same pe rsons who are the Winners in Sj. So there are really only two relevant categories of persons,
who can be referred to as the Winners, those who benefit from a change in the status quo
(the Winners in Sj/Losers in Si) and the Losers, those who lose from a change in the status
quo (Losers in Sj/Winners in Si).
What Scitovsky pointed out was this: It is possible for states S1 and S2 to exist, with S1
the status quo and S2 the alternative, such that (1) there is a reallocation of goods in S2
from the Winners to the Losers that makes at least one person better off in S2 and no one
worse off, as compared to S1; and yet (2) there is a reallocation of goods in S1 from the Losers to the Winners that makes at least one person better off in S1 and no one worse off, as
compared to S2. See id.
59. See generally Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs.
Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993).
60. For an example of this criticism within the legal literature, see Coleman, supra
note 31, at 518-20; within the theoretical literature on welfare economics, see BOADWAY &
BRUCE , supra note 29, at 96-101; within the literature on applied welfare economics and
cost-benefit analysis, see PEARCE & NASH, supra note 36, at 28-31; and within the philosophical literature, see HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 9, at 96.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 158-61 (arguing that outcomes can be incomparable with respect to welfare and other moral criteria, and citing sources); see also LARRY
S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 19-52 (1993) (suggesting that cumulative deviation from average
welfare and cumulative deviation from the welfare of the richest person are, inter alia,
possible conceptions of equality).
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rion; where P1 is better off in S1, and P2 is better off in S2, neither
state is better than, worse than, or precisely equal to the other with
respect to Pareto-efficiency, since some S3 can be Pareto-efficient
relative to S 1 but not S2.
Nor have I tasked Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for running afoul of the
“incommensurability” of diverse goods. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and
its cousin, cost-benefit analysis, have been roundly criticized for reducing all the various impacts that governmental choices can have to
dollar- or resource-equivalents. These criteria involve the “pricing” of
physical safety, friendship, environmental preservation, sexual fulfillment, and other such “priceless” goods, or so the criticism goes. 62
For reasons I have articulated at length elsewhere,63 I think the “incommensurability” criticism of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or of costbenefit analysis fails. If Kaldor-Hicks efficiency did track something
of basic importance about outcomes—long-run Paretianism, expected
Paretianism, consent, or whatever—neither incommensurability nor
the Scitovsky paradox would preclude counting Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a normative criterion and operationalizing it through the
cost-benefit procedure.
Finally, I have not faulted Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for running
afoul of “rights” (deontological criteria), equality, perfectionist values,
overall well-being, or any other normative criteria distinct from Kaldor-Hicks that the critic might posit. To be sure, one state (S1) can be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to another (S2) even though S2 is better in light of rights, equality, perfectionist values, and so on. Then
again, S3 can be better than S4 in light of rights, even though S4 is
better in light of equality. And S5 can be better than S6 in light of
equality, even though S6 is better in light of overall well-being. Distinct moral criteria can conflict; that is exactly what makes them distinct. Unless our moral framework is assumed to be a monistic one—
and why should we assume that?64—the fact that a proposed moral

62. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, V ALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 190-216 (1993);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM , Plato on Commensurability and Desire, in LOVE ’S K NOWLEDGE:
ESSAYS O N PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 106 (1990); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES 115-22 (1996); Lester B. Lave, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed
the Costs?, in RISKS , COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM
REGULATION 104, 113 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI . L. REV . 1, 64-66 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV . 779, 782-85 (1994).
63. See Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L.
REV . 1371, 1401-17 (1998).
64. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1990) (arguing
against monism).
65. “Outcomes” here are total world-histories. If outcomes are taken instead to mean
discrete states of affairs, then the preference-based view claims that P is intrinsically benefited by an outcome (thus defined) if, and only if, he prefers it. On this ambiguity in the notion of an outcome or state, see Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 202 n.97.
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criterion can conflict with another, accepted criterion, is no grounds
for rejecting the proposal.
The fact that I do not fault Kaldor-Hicks efficiency on the grounds
of incompleteness (Scitovsky reversals), incommensurability, or potential conflict with other criteria will become significant when I present my own theory of regulation, the welfarist theory. Such criticisms could be leveled against welfarism, just as they have been leveled against Kaldor-Hicks; but they are effective against neither.
C. The Preference-based View of Well-being
So much for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the first component of neoclassicism. What about the second component, the preference-based
view of well-being? There are strong grounds for rejecting a straight
preference-based view. It is less clear whether the best alternative is
(1) a modified preference-based view, or (2) an objective-list view
with some minimal role for preferences. I tend to think that the most
persuasive theory of well-being is the first, a modified preferencebased view. This is less of a departure from neoclassicism than the
second alternative, objectivism, but the difference will be sufficiently
significant for regulatory purposes that it merits delineation.
1. Problems with the Preference-based View
What’s wrong with the straight preference-based view of wellbeing? The view is that a person (P) is benefited by one outcome (S1)
as compared to another (S2), just in case P prefers S1 to S2. 65 One
large problem is that preferences can be motivated by a range of considerations, including but not limited to P’s welfare.66 A preference is
simply a ranking of world-states or, perhaps, a ranking that is conceptually connected to the actions of the person who holds the preference.67 In either case, P’s grounds for the ranking can be anything
that motivates him to count one outcome as better than the other.

66. This difficulty with the straight preference-based view of well-being is widely recognized within the philosophical literature on well-being. See SUMNER, supra note 9, at
134-35; John Broome, Choice and Value in Economics, 30 O XFORD ECON. PAPERS 313
(1978); Allan Gibbard, Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good, and the Intrinsic Reward of a Life, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 165, 173-75 (Jon Elster &
Aanund Hylland eds., 1986); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest and the Concept of SelfSacrifice, 10 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 105 (1980); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of
the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977); David
Sobel, On the Subjectivity of Welfare, 107 ETHICS 501 (1997).
67. On the nature of a “preference” and the possible conceptual connection between
preference and choice, see, for example, S.L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS : PERSONALITY
AND POLITY 55-83 (1989); PREFERENCES (Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels eds., 1998);
Richard Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158, 161-64 (1990); Arthur Ripstein, Preference, in VALUE,
WELFARE , AND MORALITY 93-111 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1993).
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For example, P might rank S1 over S2 on moral grounds. Thus he
may prefer S1 because he believes that equality is of prime moral
significance and S1 advances the value of equality better than S2, or
because he believes that the environment is intrinsically valuable
and S1 is better than S2 in that regard, or because S 2 involves some
action of his that he takes deontological constraints to prohibit. Alternatively, P might rank S1 over S2 by virtue of some relationship he
has. Thus, he may believe that S1 is better for the welfare of some
friend or relation of his and, although P is personally indifferent between the two outcomes, choose S1 out of loyalty. Or, the ranking
might be grounded in a role of P’s: perhaps P is an American, or a
Jew, or a teacher, and it is constitutive of that role to prefer S1 to S 2.
Finally, P might rank S1 over S 2 for reasons of nonmoral goodness: it
does not matter to his life whether S1 or S 2 occurs, but S1 is better,
say, in light of aesthetic values. 68
There are surely some kinds of motivating reasons such that, if P
is motivated to rank S1 over S 2 by virtue of these kinds of reasons, he
is indeed typically made better off by S1. Call such reasons welfareproductive. We might agree that self-interested reasons are welfareproductive: if P prefers S1 to S2 on the grounds of his own welfare,
then he is typically better off if S1 occurs. We might also think that
reasons concerning certain objective welfarist goods are welfareproductive: if P prefers S1 to S2 on the grounds that S1 involves more
fun for him, or a more genuine accomplishment, or a deeper involvement with important others, then P is typically better off if S1 occurs.
However one delineates the category of welfare-productive reasons, it is implausible that all reasons motivating preferences are
welfare-productive. The straight preference-based view insists that
moral reasons, relationship-based reasons, role-relative reasons, reasons of nonmoral goodness, and all other considerations that might
motivate P to prefer or rank S1 over S2 are welfare-productive. But
why think that? To begin with, it is counterintuitive. More seriously,
it is ungrounded; there is nothing in the possible connection between
preference and choice, or in the general desiderata of a theory of
well-being, to move us even prima facie towards thinking that all
preference-motivating reasons are welfare-productive. As for the
connection between preference and choice, people can certainly
choose options that have no personal benefit or are personally detrimental. As for the general desiderata of a theory of well-being, it is
certainly plausible that preferences are a necessary condition for a
welfare improvement (P cannot be made better off by S1 over S2
unless, inter alia, he prefers S1 to S2), but it is a logical mistake to
68. The possible disjunction between welfare and preference satisfaction in the kind
of cases just described is discussed at length in David Sobel, Well-Being as the Object of
Moral Consideration, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 249 (1998).
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leap from this plausible point to the conclusion that preferences are
both necessary and sufficient for a welfare improvement (P is made
better off by S1 over S2 just in case he prefers S 1 to S 2), which is what
the straight preference-based view of welfare says. 69
A second problem with the straight preference-based view of wellbeing is that preferences can be uninformed, unreflective, nonautonomous, or otherwise nonideal. 70 A person may, for example, prefer
smoking to abstinence; were she fully informed about the damage
that smoking does to her internal organs, she would prefer abstinence. Another person may prefer building a house on the mountainside lot that she owns to leaving it bare. She knows that the mountainside is part of a rare, old-growth forest, but not having fully deliberated on that point, she still prefers to build. Only if the
information about the forest were integrated with her other, background information and with her background commitments, values,
and goals, would she come to prefer an undeveloped lot.
One standard view in the philosophy of well-being is that “ideal”
conditions for preference formation are simply the conditions of full
information and deliberation, 71 but it is not clear whether this is
right. 72 For example, suppose a person (P), who was horribly abused
as a child, prefers to torture cats. He retains this preference notwithstanding full information about the pain that his actions cause the
suffering animal, and notwithstanding all the deliberation of which
he is capable. Yet it seems counterintuitive that the world is made
better, even pro tanto, when P tortures a cat. To resist this conclusion, one might characterize P’s preferences (albeit fully informed
and deliberate) as nonautonomous, in the sense that he lacks the capacity to revise his preferences, or in the sense that the set of preferences which are possible for him is not sufficiently large, or in the
sense that his preferences are rooted in a particular sort of upbringing, or in some such related sense.
2. Alternative Theories of Well-Being
I see two theories (more precisely, families of theories) of welfare
that are responsive to the problems with the straight preferencebased view just described and yet retain enough of that view to re-

69. See Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 197-204 (distinguishing between the claim
that preference satisfaction is necessary for welfare and the claim that preference satisfaction is both necessary and sufficient for welfare, and defending the former).
70. See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 9, at 156-71.
71. See David Sobel, Full Information Accounts of Well-Being, 104 ETHICS 784, 792
n.15 (1994) (noting the prevalence of full-information accounts of well-being within philosophical scholarship and citing sources).
72. See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 45-46 (1987); SUMNER, supra note
9, at 162-71.
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main plausible accounts of what makes a life go well. 73 The hedonic
view of welfare—equating welfare with pleasurable sensations and
the absence of painful sensations—“solves” these problems at the
significant cost of excluding preferences from the picture entirely.
Even if hedonism were amended to make joint reference to pleasure/pain and preference satisfaction, the problem would remain that
we can prefer for ourselves, and benefit from, much more than the
presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. Objectivism that counts
hedonic sensations as one entry on a larger list of objective goods 74 is
surely an improvement over straight hedonism, but it falls to the
criticism that no amount of objective goodness in one state (S1) over
another (S2) can make S1 better for a person (P) unless P prefers (or
at least comes to prefer) S1.
This leaves the following candidates.
Sophisticated Preferentialism: P is better off with S1, as compared
to S2, just in case (1) P prefers S1 over S2; and (2) P would prefer S1
over S2 under ideal conditions; and (3) P’s preference and ideal
preference are suitably restricted.
Sophisticated Objectivism: P is better off with S1, as compared to
S2, just in case (1) P does better in S1, in light of the totality of objective welfare goods (friendship, accomplishment, community involvement, fun, pleasure, and so on); and (2) P prefers S1 over S2.

How exactly the notion of “ideal conditions” should be specified is a
matter for further debate among sophisticated preferentialists. A
parallel point can be made about the goods identified as “objective
welfare goods” by sophisticated objectivists, and about the grounds
for thus identifying them. This is the sense in which these are families of welfare theories rather than specific theories. Note that both
kinds of theories are sensitive to the criticism I leveled above against
simple objectivism—namely, P cannot be made better off in the teeth
of his actual preferences. This is the key insight behind the straight
preference-based view. It is incorporated into sophisticated preferentialism and sophisticated objectivism by making P’s actual preference
for an outcome a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for that outcome to improve his well-being.
What about the choice between sophisticated preferentialism and
sophisticated objectivism? Both are plausible, but which is the
uniquely right theory or kind of theory? This is a difficult question.
Sophisticated preferentialism, as here articulated, contains a large
73. See generally JAMES G RIFFIN, WELL -BEING 7-72 (1986) (discussing different theories of well-being, specifically hedonic, preference-based, and objectivist views); DEREK
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493-502 (1984) (same); SUMNER, supra note 9 (same).
74. For plausible examples of such lists, see JOHN FINNIS , NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 85-90 (1980); G RIFFIN, supra note 73, at 67-68; and G EORGE SHER,
BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 199-201 (1997).
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and embarrassing lacuna: the failure to state just how preferences
should be “restricted” such that thus-restricted preferences, and only
those, are welfare productive. Filling the gap by requiring that preferences be “self-interested” or that they “concern P’s life” would be
circular; these formulations, in effect, define the class of “restricted”
preferences by reference to their effect on welfare, yet it was the very
concept of welfare that sophisticated preferentialism was trying to
explain through the notion of restricted preferences.
Mark Overvold has developed a noncircular account of restricted
preferences. 75 Roughly, P’s preference for an outcome is welfareproductive for P if the outcome entails P’s existence. But this runs
afoul of the objection that various morally required outcomes can entail P’s existence, and be preferred by him on moral grounds, without
benefiting him.76 (Imagine the case where P, who has committed
wrong, prefers that he suffer because he believes retributivism about
punishment to be true.) Other philosophers have, in less detail, proposed accounts of preference restriction different from Overvold’s,
but these accounts, too, have troubling and maybe fatal flaws. 77
On the other hand, sophisticated objectivism may not be able to
avoid the problem of restricting preferences. That problem is superficially avoided through the incorporation of objective goods, where
each good constitutes a criterion for ranking outcomes and, for each
pair of outcomes, specifying those persons who have fared better or
worse as between the two. (So, for example, the value of “fun” would
tell us whether a given outcome is more fun for anyone and, if so, for
whom.) But the avoidance may be superficial. If the objectivist simply gives us a list of objective goods, we can protest that a mere list is
ad hoc. What are the grounds for placing various goods on the list? 78
And if the objectivist tries to ground his list in collective or normal
preferences of some sort (as many working in value-theory now try to
do), we are back to the problem of restriction.
Quite apart from all this, sophisticated objectivism is vulnerable
to the criticism that it is conformist. If “objective values” for a given P
75. See Mark Carl Overvold, Morality, Self-Interest, and Reasons for Being Moral, 44
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES . 493, 499-501 (1984); Mark Carl Overvold, Self-Interest
and Getting What You Want, in THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 186 (Harlan Miller & William H. Williams eds., 1982); Overvold, supra note 66, at 117-18 n.10.
76. See Sobel, supra note 66, at 505-06 (criticizing Overvold’s theory on this and other
grounds).
77. See id. (generally discussing and criticizing attempts to “restrict” preference, i.e.,
to identify some subset of welfare-productive preferences).
78. L.W. Sumner has made this objection:
The particular items on Finnis’s list [of objective goods] do not matter for our
present purposes; what does matter is that he has no account to offer of what
makes something (anything) a source of our welfare—what gains it a place on
the list—if this does not depend on our attitudes or concerns.
SUMNER, supra note 9, at 46.
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are specified as the things that P would prefer under ideal conditions, then sophisticated objectivism is not an alternative to preferentialism. But if “objective values” are specified more narrowly, then
(seemingly) it becomes impossible for P to benefit by an idiosyncratic
or contrarian way of life, since such a life is one that is good for P
only in being endorsed by him and in no other way.
I tend to think that sophisticated preferentialism is on balance a
better welfare view than sophisticated objectivism, and that the
problem of preference restriction—which clearly bedevils the first
view, if not the second—will eventually be solved. Further, preferentialist views are much more widely adopted by modern philosophers
and other contemporary scholars doing rigorous work on the nature
of well-being.79 Finally, sophisticated preferentialism is closer to neoclassicism than sophisticated objectivism, and it thus represents a
less dramatic change in prevailing theories of regulation. For all
these reasons, the remainder of this Article is written on the premise
that sophisticated preferentialism (not sophisticated objectivism) is
the correct account of well-being. That premise will be of some significance in Part III, where I criticize so-called proceduralist theories
of regulation; and it will be of particular importance in Part IV,
where I turn from my criticism of neoclassicism and proceduralism to
defend my own, novel theory of regulation, which I call “welfarism.”
III. PROCEDURALIST T HEORIES OF REGULATION
A. Characterizing Proceduralism
I use the term “proceduralist” to mean a moral theory of regulation which accords intrinsic significance, not merely instrumental
significance, to the fact that a regulatory agency followed or failed to
follow some specified type of procedure. In other words, a proceduralist theory stipulates that the moral status of a regulatory choice is a
function of criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn, where at least one Xi is a procedural
criterion in that it refers not to the legal content of the directives issued by regulators, nor to the broader social context in which those
directives are issued, but specifically to the decisionmaking processes
that the regulators traversed (or failed to traverse) in issuing the directives. The most significant body of theoretical work on regulation,
other than neoclassicism, consists of theories that are (or at least are
plausibly understood as) proceduralist. Under this rubric I include
traditional and modern variants of pluralism, civic republican theo-

79. See Sobel, supra note 71, at 792 n.15 (“[A] truly impressive and diverse list of contemporary ethicists have found [some kind of desire-based or preference-based] account of
well-being congenial.”).
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ries, and negotiated rulemaking or collaborative governance theories. 80
The pluralists, the civic republicans, and the collaborativegovernance theorists clearly direct their attention to the procedures
by which regulatory policies are enacted and advocate certain procedural alternatives while criticizing others. This common feature of
these theories does not yet demonstrate them to be proceduralist—as
I have defined that term—because it is possible that their concern for
procedural forms is instrumental, not intrinsic. The pluralist might
simply think that a process of self-interested bargaining among
groups is the best way to effect the substantive moral criteria that
govern regulatory choices: criteria such as welfare maximization, the
equalization of welfare or the opportunity for welfare, and the promotion of the environment or other perfectionist values. Similarly, the
civic republican’s commitment to public-spirited deliberation about
the common good might be grounded in the contingent and empirical
claim that deliberation produces “good” or “right” laws and other
regulatory directives, with “good” or “right” specifiable solely in
terms of the legal content of the directives plus general social context, and not in terms of the decisionmaking processes that were
used to formulate the directives. 81 And the collaborative-governance
theorist might advocate regulatory procedures characterized by “[a]
problem-solving orientation,” “[p]articipation by interested and affected parties in all stages of the decision making process,”
“[p]rovisional solutions,” “[a]ccountability that transcends traditional
public and private roles in governance,” and “[a] flexible, engaged
agency”82—to use Jody Freeman’s list of procedural desiderata—on
purely instrumental grounds.
But there is significant textual evidence that at least some pluralists, civic republicans, and collaborative-governance theorists do
have a noncontingent and nonempirical attachment to regulatory
procedures—in short, that they are proceduralist, as I have defined
that term. 83 Note further that proceduralism constitutes a distinctive
80. See sources cited supra notes 3-7.
81. One author has noted:
[It is open to] question whether civic republicanism defines the public good procedurally or substantively. If defined substantively, the common good is akin to
a right answer, and it implies a politics that emphasizes deliberation in order
to ensure higher-quality decisionmaking. If defined procedurally, the public
good . . . implies a politics that emphasizes participation so that each citizen
has the opportunity to experience self-government.
Note, supra note 6, at 1404.
82. Freeman, supra note 7, at 22-23.
83. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 7, at 27 (“[P]articipation in regulatory problem solving by interested and affected parties has an independent, democratic value.”); Gey, supra
note 6, at 810 (claiming that civic republicans define virtuous outcomes as those that result
from selfless, collective deliberation); Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 1514 (“[Under civic re-
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type of moral theory of regulation, while instrumentalism does not.
Instrumentalism about a given procedure (to be plausible) presupposes some prior and independent theory of the criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn
applicable to regulatory choices; for it would only be plausible to say
that a given procedure has the empirical tendency to produce outcomes that are better with respect to a given set of criteria. It would
not be plausible to suggest that a given procedure has the tendency
to produce outcomes that are better with respect to the correct set of
criteria whatever that set happens to be.
For these reasons, I will generally focus in this section upon the
proceduralist construal of pluralism, civic republicanism, and collaborative-governance theory. Bargaining, deliberation, or collaboration can be defended instrumentally, but that possibility will be kept
in abeyance until it becomes clear why proceduralism fails. Further,
I will launch a global attack on proceduralism, an attack which is
meant to target all its variants, including the pluralist variant that
takes bargaining to be of intrinsic importance, the civic-republican
variant that takes deliberation to be of intrinsic importance, and the
collaborative-governance variant that takes a certain kind of collaborative engagement by the regulatory agency and interested parties to
be of intrinsic importance. Readers of the legal scholarship on regulation are well accustomed to civic-republican arguments against pluralism, 84 to collaborative-governance arguments against civicrepublicanism, 85 and to other scholarship that criticizes one or more
procedural forms only to conclude by favoring another. My approach
will be less discriminating and, therefore, less familiar. Proceduralists of all stripes have made a common mistake, and their theories
are equally flawed, since the moral criteria governing regulatory
choice do not include procedural criteria—or so I will now try to
show.
B. The Defense Based on Moral Skepticism
What’s wrong with proceduralism? Let me flip the question
around: How might proceduralism, of any kind, be defended? First,
the proceduralist might be a moral skeptic. She might think that
publicanism] government’s primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate
about altering preferences and to reach consensus on the common good.”); id. at 1535
(“Some commentators have even suggested that participation in determining the identity
of the political community is itself a good, thereby rendering civic republicanism inherently
as well as instrumentally valuable.”) (citing sources); SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 35 (“A different conception of autonomy places an emphasis on the freedom of collectivities or communities—a freedom embodied in decisions, reached by the citizenry as a whole, about
what courses to pursue. . . . An important form of freedom may consist in precisely these
processes of collective self-determination.”).
84. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 1533-34.
85. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 7, at 19-21.
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regulatory choices cannot be evaluated as morally better or worse,
right or wrong—that where the regulator has the option of choosing
one of two outcomes (O1 or O2), any statement to the effect that the
regulator is truly morally obliged to choose O1 (because O1 maximizes
welfare, or equalizes welfare, for example) is nonsense. There is certainly a flavor of skepticism in some versions of pluralism, 86 which
originated at a time when logical positivism87 and legal realism 88
were ascendant, and when many philosophers and other intellectuals
indeed denied the existence of moral truth. The argument from skepticism to pluralism that pluralists (at least traditional ones) sometimes seem to advance goes roughly like this:
(1) there is no objective moral standard by which to assess governmental choices;
(2) rather, statements purportedly describing choices as better or
worse, right or wrong, simply express the subjective preferences of
the speaker;
(3) more generally, human actions can be fully explained by reference to the preferences and beliefs of actors, with no need to invoke
moral criteria or anything else beyond preferences as the driving
force behind actions; and therefore
(4) all that is true, and all that needs to be true, of governmental
choices is that they result from a process of bargaining between
self-interested actors, each seeking to maximize her preferences
given her beliefs.89

This argument is both unsound and invalid. It is unsound because
the first two premises are untrue. There are objective moral standards applicable to governmental choices and other human actions;
statements attributing moral obligations, permissions, and so forth,
to governmental actors are meaningful, sometimes true, and need not
merely express the preferences of the speaker. A persuasive case
against moral skepticism, and in favor of moral cognitivism, has been
86. As Richard Stewart observes:
Implicit in [the interest-group model of administrative law] is the assumption
that there is no ascertainable, transcendent ‘public interest,’ but only the distinct interests of various individuals and groups in society. Under this assumption, legislation represents no more than compromises struck between compe ting interest groups. . . . In the extreme form of this view, there is no objective,
independent yardstick by which one can measure the content of compromise;
compromises are legitimated by the process of their negotiation. . . . Pluralist
political theory may be regarded as a translation into collective terms of the
principle of subje ctivity of individual values.
Stewart, supra note 3, at 1712 & n.206 (citing ARTHUR FISHER BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF
G OVERNMENT (1908), and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE G OVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951)).
87. See, e.g., ALFRED J. A YER, LANGUAGE , TRUTH AND LOGIC (1936).
88. See generally LAURA K ALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE , 1927-1960 (1986).
89. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1671-76; see also ARTHUR FISHER BENTLEY, THE
PROCESS OF G OVERNMENT (1908); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE G OVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
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presented by a number of contemporary philosophers working in
metaethics, including Michael Moore,90 David Brink,91 Michael
Smith, 92 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,93 John McDowell, 94 and others.
Cognitivism is probably now the dominant (if not exclusive) position
in philosophy;95 the skeptical consensus characteristic of the era of
logical positivism is surely long past. But even if the demise of moral
skepticism were unwarranted, and the initial premises of the argument just sketched were true, the problem would remain that the inference from those two premises plus the third to the pluralistproceduralist conclusion is be mistaken. The three premises merely
imply the following: (4)* all that is true of governmental choices is
that they result from a process of bargaining by self-interested actors. The premises do not additionally imply that governmental
choices need to, ought to, or should result from a bargaining process.
In fact, the premises imply the opposite: if in general objective moral
criteria do not exist, then in particular the objective moral criteria
that might require a bargaining process do not exist, and the purportedly objective statement that governmental choices need to,
ought to, or should result from such a process is nonsense. The only
kind of statement, objectively, that the moral skeptic-cum-pluralist is
permitted by her own skepticism to utter is a positive statement
about the kinds of governmental processes that do or will occur,
namely (4)*.96 Normative pluralism grounded upon skepticism is selfdefeating.
More generally, any kind of proceduralism founded upon skepticism is self-defeating. Skepticism denies that moral truths exist, and
it construes moral claims as playing the “expressive” role of articulating the speaker’s preferences, or some other such non-truth-stating
role. 97 But then the claim that governmental actors are morally
90. See, e.g., Michael Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV . 277 (1985).
91. See BRINK, supra note 52.
92. See MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM (1994).
93. See Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence, in ESSAYS
ON MORAL REALISM 256 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988).
94. See John McDowell, Values and Secondary Qualities, in MORALITY AND
O BJECTIVITY 110 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985).
95. See generally Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends, in
MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE : SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 3 (Steven Darwall et
al. eds., 1997) (providing overview of contemporary metaethics, in particular the debate between cognitivists and noncogntivists). See also BRINK, supra note 52 (same); DAVID
MCNAUGHTON, MORAL VISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1988) (same); Smith, supra
note 92 (same).
96. Or objective conditionals. That is, if you want government to do X, then you want
it to follow a particular procedure, since that procedure leads to X.
97. See, e.g., Darwall, et al., supra note 95, at 17 (“Most noncognitivists are expressivists: they explain moral language as expressing moral judgments, and explain moral judgments as something other than beliefs.”); SMITH, supra note 92, at 16 (“Expressivists deny
that moral judgments represent the world as being one way rather than another. . . .
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obliged to follow a particular procedure—whether it is a preferencedriven (bargaining) procedure or something else—cannot be true either.
So much for the first, skeptical defense of proceduralism. The several other defenses that I will consider all incorporate a cognitivist
rather than skeptical view about the nature of morality. All assume
that moral statements can be true or false, and that they are sometimes true; in particular, the remaining defenses assume that moral
criteria applicable to regulatory choices truly exist and, most specifically, that moral criteria obliging regulators to follow certain procedures exist. There is nothing self-defeating in this combination of
claims (in contrast to the combination involved in skeptical proceduralism). The question, rather, is whether the cognitivistproceduralist’s final claim—the one that makes her theory proceduralist—is a claim we have sufficient reason to accept.
C. The Foundationalist Defense
Foundationalism is one possible way to defend proceduralism
within a cognitivist moral framework. The idea here is to invoke morality’s foundations—to argue that moral truths, at bottom, are
truths that issue from certain sorts of procedures—and then to move
from this premise to the conclusion that the moral criteria applicable
to regulators include procedural criteria. Certainly there are respectable foundationalist views that see moral truths as issuing from certain sorts of collective procedures. By “foundationalism,” I mean a
general view about the truth-conditions of moral statements—a general view about why an utterance asserting the existence of, for example, a moral obligation, permission, or criterion is correct. 98 John
Rawls is a famous example of a contemporary philosopher whose
foundationalist view involves a collective procedure. Rawls’ A Theory
of Justice99 argues that the requirements of justice are those provisions that self-interested parties, bargaining about a social contract,
but operating under a “veil of ignorance,” would agree to.100 More recently, Tim Scanlon has built a moral theory upon a substructure
that is more consensualist than the foundational bargain described
by A Theory of Justice.101 Scanlon suggests that the hypothetical parties whose deliberations result in moral principles should be seen as
adopting an impartial, not a self-interested, point of view, and that
[They] rather serve to express the judger’s attitudes of approval or disapproval, or perhaps
their more complicated dispositions to have such attitudes.” (citations omitted)).
98. See generally SHELLY K AGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 189-303 (1998) (describing and
assessing a variety of plausible foundationalist views).
99. JOHN RAWLS , A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
100. Id. at 118-92.
101. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE O WE TO EACH O THER (1998).
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moral principles should (in effect) be defined as principles to which
such parties would universally consent. 102
Does Rawlsian foundationalism, Scanlonian foundationalism,
Habermasian foundationalism, 103 or some other foundationalist view
that (like these) envisions a collective procedure as the constitutive
grounds for moral truths104 lead to proceduralism about regulation
and governance? Certainly some proceduralists seem to have thought
so. For example, there is a foundationalist flavor in much of the literature on civic republicanism. The idea seems to be that impartiality (civic virtue) and unanimity (consensus) are concepts that anyone
thinking normatively about governmental choice would need to invoke—that, foundationally, the “public good” is just what publicspirited citizens deliberating to consensus under ideal conditions
would agree to—and thus that impartiality, consensus, and explicit
consideration of the public good are procedural desiderata for actual
governmental choice.105 One could construct parallel foundationalist
stories in defense of pluralism, collaborative-governance theory, or
other proceduralist views. As I just suggested, the moral foundations
described by Rawls in A Theory of Justice106 would seem more amenable to pluralism than civic republicanism; the Rawlsian social contractors are bargaining, not deliberating (as the very term “social
contract” suggests). The pluralist might try to reason from these
Rawlsian beginnings to the conclusion that regulatory or governmental outcomes should result from a process of bargaining and compromise among selfish, not public-spirited, actors. So foundationalism is,
in principle, a generic strategy for defending proceduralism. But is it
a successful strategy?
The answer is no, and the reason for that answer will become
clearer if we distinguish between two versions of foundationalism:
hypothetical-choice and actual-choice foundationalism. Hypotheticalchoice foundationalism says that moral criteria are those criteria
that would issue from a certain, hypothetical procedure. The proce-

102. See id. at 189-247.
103. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS , THE INCLUSION OF THE O THER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL
THEORY 49-101 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998).
104. See K AGAN, supra note 98, at 240-56 (discussing “contractarian” foundationalist
views, including Rawls’ and Scanlon’s).
105. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 1528-33. Professor Seidenfeld states:
Civic republicanism . . . posits that no individual acting in her political capacity
should be subservient to other political actors. Hence, the theory does not
equate the public good . . . with majority rule. Social consensus about what is
best for the community as a community, not as the aggregation of individuals’
private interests, is the defining feature of the common good. Government’s political decisions—that is, the law—must embody this consensus of the common
good.
Id. at 1528-29 (citing Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 5, at 1550, 1548).
106. RAWLS, supra note 99.
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dure can be specified as you like: it can be a procedure of impartial
deliberation, a procedure of self-interested bargaining, or some other
procedure. Actual-choice foundationalism says that moral criteria are
those criteria that have actually issued from a procedure of a specified kind that has actually occurred (again, specified as an actual deliberative procedure, an actual bargaining procedure, or some other
actual procedure).
Hypothetical-choice foundationalism is a plausible view about morality’s foundations; but it does not lead to proceduralism. Rawls and
Scanlon are both hypothetical-choice foundationalists. Rawls identifies moral principles as those principles that would be chosen by selfinterested parties behind a veil of ignorance;107 Scanlon identifies
moral principles as those principles that would be chosen by impartial parties deliberating to consensus. 108 For both Rawls and Scanlon,
the proposition that one regulatory choice (O1) is better than another
regulatory choice (O2) flows from the proposition:
(1) O1 would be chosen over O2 in a certain, hypothetical, collective
procedure.

And this proposition is in turn consistent with the following propositions:
(2) The actual procedure by which O1 was chosen over O2 does not
conform to the requirements of the hypothetical foundational procedure; indeed
(3) No procedure that has ever occurred conforms to the hypothetical, foundational procedure.

Consider Rawlsian morality, which consists of the following two
principles:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all. . . . Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity. . . . [These] principles of justice are to be
ranked in lexical order . . . [and the] second principle of justice is
lexically prior to the principle of efficiency . . . [and] fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle.109

Then O1 is better than O2, within a Rawlsian view, if O1 is better in
light of the two Rawlsian principles. Equivalently, O1 would be chosen over O2 by self-interested parties bargaining behind a veil of ig107. See RAWLS , supra note 99, at 46-53.
108. See SCANLON, supra note 101, at 189-247.
109. RAWLS, supra note 99, at 302-03.
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norance. But this imposes no constraint upon the actual procedure
that leads to O1 over O2. A regulatory choice is fully compliant with
Rawlsian justice as long as it complies with the two Rawlsian principles, whatever the actual procedure that led to the choice. And the
point can be readily generalized to all kinds of hypothetical-choice
foundationalism: If the hypothetical-choice procedure constitutive of
morality leads to a particular set of criteria (X1, X2 . . . X n), and regulatory choice O1 is better than O2 in light of the totality of X1, X2 . . .
Xn, then O1 is morally better than O2, whatever the actual procedure
by which O1 was chosen.
The objection might be raised that the principles X1, X2 . . . Xn resulting from a hypothetical-choice foundation will themselves include
certain procedural requirements. But it is not clear why this should
be the case. The hypothetical parties, formulating the principles of
morality, are obviously not constrained to produce the requirement
that actual persons actually carry out the foundational procedure—
for example, the two Rawlsian principles do not include such a requirement—nor is it clear why they would end up producing procedural requirements other than a requirement that the foundational
procedure be implemented. (Note that Rawls’ two principles have
hardly any procedural content at all; he is centrally and perhaps exclusively concerned with the effect of governmental choice on the allocation of primary goods and the range of individual liberty.110)
Indeed, it might be argued that hypothetical-choice foundationalism would be less likely to produce a proceduralist morality—a set of
moral criteria including procedural requirements—than other foundationalist views, since the moral work of procedure would already
have been done in the hypothetical situation. The parties in that
situation would see no further need for it. In any event, the point to
be emphasized here is that hypothetical-choice foundationalism will
produce a set of moral criteria (X1, X2 . . . Xn) that may or may not include procedural requirements (depending on the course that the hypothetical process takes), just as nonprocedural foundationalism will
produce a set of moral principles (X1*, X2* . . . Xn*) that may or may
not include procedural requirements. It is X1, X2 . . . Xn or X1*,
X2* . . . Xn* that regulatory institutions must comply with, not the
hypothetical procedure itself.
Another objection that might be raised is epistemic. It is difficult
to know what X1, X2 . . . Xn are. Thus, if a decisionmaker (D) is designing some governmental procedure, specifically, if D is a legislator
or President setting up a regulatory-agency procedure, then the best
course for D is to require that the agency follow a procedure ap110. This aspect of Rawls’ theory is discussed in Paul J. Weithman, Contractualist Liberalism and Deliberative Democracy, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 314 (1995).
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proximating the hypothetical-choice situation. For example, if D believes the hypothetical-choice situation to be a Scanlonian scenario of
impartial deliberation and consensus among all involved parties,
then the best course for D is to set up a legal regime that requires
agency deliberation and encourages public-spirited involvement by
the citizenry.111 The strategy here is to combine hypothetical-choice
foundationalism with moral uncertainty on the part of the agencybuilder, D, to argue for proceduralism.
This strategy is tempting but, I think, unsuccessful. For any plausible specification of the hypothetical-choice scenario constitutive of
moral principles, actual governmental procedures will approximate
that scenario only very imperfectly. Actual agency rulemaking, however public-spirited and consensual, is generally far removed from
the idealized scenario of full reasonableness and universal agreement
posited by Scanlon; and, of course, interest groups that engage in political bargaining are not operating under a Rawlsian veil. So the
epistemic claim becomes the following: Even though the feasible
agency procedure that most closely approximates the hypotheticalchoice scenario is a crude approximation, the reasonable course for
the agency-builder D (given his uncertainty about what morality requires) is to instruct agencies to employ this crudely approximate
procedure.
Maybe this claim is true, but I doubt it. Wouldn’t D have some
evidence as to what morality requires—as to what the correct moral
criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn really are? 112 And wouldn’t he then design
agency procedures in light of (his best understanding of) X1, X2 . . .
Xn, rather than simply instructing agencies to do their best to implement the foundational, moral procedure? For example, D might
come to believe that overall well-being is one of the moral criteria X1,
X2 . . . Xn and that cost-benefit analysis is the agency decisionprocedure best justified in light of overall well-being; and it would
then be reasonable for D to instruct agencies to engage in cost-benefit

111. See id. (presenting epistemic case for proceduralism).
112. The substantive moral theory advanced by A Theory of Justice, together with the
voluminous scholarly responses to that book, is at least some evidence of what selfinterested contractors bargaining behind a veil of ignorance would choose. Similarly, the
emerging corpus of scholarly work on Scanlon’s theory (presented first in a 1982 article,
T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982), and in fuller form in his book What We Owe
to Each Other, supra note 101) is at least some evidence of the principles that impartial
and deliberative contractors would agree to.
More generally, whatever methodology D has used to determine the nature of the foundational moral procedure will also, presumably, provide him some evidence of what the X1,
X2 . . . Xn are. For example, if he has determined the nature of that procedure through a
combination of internal deliberation and consultation with scholarly and other experts,
then internal deliberation plus consultation with scholarly and other experts should give D
some evidence about the content of the X1, X2 . . . Xn.
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analysis (as one component of their procedures), even though costbenefit analysis is surely not a component of the foundational, moral
procedure.113
Note that the epistemic argument has a self-defeating aspect. D
knows that moral principles are those that would be chosen by a certain, hypothetical procedure; but he does not know enough about the
content of those principles to do anything but set up a governmental
procedure approximating the hypothetical one. Why does D have
good evidence (independent of governmental choice) about the foundations of morality, but no good evidence (independent of governmental choice) about the content of morality? Note further that the
epistemic argument is really an instrumental, not an intrinsic one,
and thus is not an argument for proceduralism as I have defined it.
The claim is not that morality includes a procedural criterion Xp,
along with substantive criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn. The claim, rather, is as
follows:
(1) the hypothetical-choice procedure that is the foundation of morality gives rise to some substantive criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn; but
(2) because those who design regulatory agency procedures are ignorant as to the precise content of the X1, X2 . . . Xn, the best course
for them, in light of X1, X2 . . . Xn, is to instruct agencies to implement some approximation of the foundational procedure.

In any event, this particular (instrumental) claim about regulatory
agency procedures is unpersuasive.
So much for hypothetical-choice foundationalism. Hypotheticalchoice foundationalism is, again, a very plausible view about the nature of moral truth; but it does not lead to proceduralism. Actualchoice foundationalism does lead to proceduralism, but it involves a
highly implausible view about the nature of moral truth. The actualchoice foundationalist says that one outcome (O1) is morally better
than another (O2) if and only if O1 actually results from the specified
sort of procedure (or, a bit more weakly, if and only if O1 has an appropriate nexus to an actual procedure that meets the foundational
specification, for example, where O1 is better than O2 in light of
standards enacted by a body that meets the foundational specification).
Actual-choice foundationalism is a purely expository device on my
part. It is designed to illustrate what would need to be true about a
foundational view for there to be a direct link between such a view
and proceduralism. Actual-choice foundationalism is not a foundational view that moral philosophers have, in fact, defended, and it is

113. On the status of cost-benefit analysis as a welfare-justified decision procedure, see
Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 28, and infra Part IV.E.
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easy to see why they have not done so. Imagine that no procedure
meeting the foundational specifications has actually occurred, or at
least no such procedure with a nexus to O1 and O2. Then the upshot
is that the O1-O2 choice must be morally neutral: O1 and O2 are
equally good, or incomparably good, or something like that, such that
O1 is not definitely better than O2 nor is O2 definitely better than O1.
But O1 could be substantively horrendous, relative to O2. It could be
a policy that causes massive welfare losses, large-scale inequalities,
and serious damage to environmental values. 114 To insist that O1 in
such a case remains no worse than O2—because no procedure of the
specified type has actually selected O2 over O1—is deeply counterintuitive. Overall well-being, equality of welfare, environmental preservation, deontological constraints, and other moral criteria may all
derive their force from the fact that they would be chosen in a certain, hypothetical situation; but it is not the case that their moral
force is suspended until some actual body confirms them.
D. The Conventionalist Defense
A third strategy for defending proceduralism, distinct from moral
skepticism and moral foundationalism, is the conventionalist strategy. Conventionalism (as I use the term here) is the view that morality, or some part thereof, is a function of social norms. 115 Conventionalism could be a general view about morality (in which case it becomes a kind of foundationalism); or, less ambitiously, it could be the
view that certain moral criteria (for example, criteria of objective
welfare-value, which set forth better or worse “ways of life”) are reducible to social norms. 116
Social norms have been conceptualized in various ways but,
roughly, norms are constituted by common beliefs and behaviors. 117
Crucially, social norms are distinct from legal norms and procedures. 118 This distinction is a central point in the burgeoning litera-

114. There is obviously nothing in the values of overall well-being, equality of welfare,
and environmental preservation that entails that an outcome which is seriously worse
than another with respect to one of the values, or all taken together, will actually have
been rejected by a governmental body or by some other such mechanism for collective
choice.
115. See BRINK, supra note 52, at 14-36 (defining conventionalism and distinguishing
conventionalism from noncognitivism).
116. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 3-5 (1994) (explaining that
valuable activities depend on social practices for their availability and, to a degree, even
for their existence).
117. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview
148 U. PA. L. REV . 1363, 1467-72 (2000) (describing various conceptualizations of “social
norms”).
118. See id.
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ture on social norms; 119 and it amounts to the fatal flaw in the conventionalist defense of proceduralism. However social norms are defined, it is not the case that the (assumed) truth of conventionalism
will make certain regulatory procedures intrinsically important.
Consider a simple version of conventionalism that defines social
norms, and some or all moral criteria, by reference to the evaluative
judgments shared by a large majority of the relevant society.120 One
outcome is better than another, in light of social norms, only if a
large majority of the society would judge the first to be better. Imagine further that the only evaluative judgments shared by a large majority of the relevant society with respect to regulatory agencies are
substantive judgments. There is not, let us assume, general agreement that regulatory agencies should follow or refrain from following
particular procedures. Then in this society regulators have no intrinsic, conventional obligation to follow or refrain from following certain
procedures. The regulator’s sheer decision to follow a particular procedure will not (without more) be conventionally good or bad. For example, it might be widely agreed in the society that certain wilderness areas are precious. Then if one outcome (O1) damages the areas
relative to a second (O2), O1 will be conventionally worse than O2 regardless of the procedure by which O1 was adopted. Conversely, if the
two outcomes are neutral with respect to their impact on the wilderness areas, the regulator’s choice of one or the other will be conven-

119. The legal scholarship includes ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, O RDER WITHOUT LAW : HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992);
Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV . 947 (1997); Steven
A. Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999);
William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV . 545; Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI . L. REV . 943 (1995); Richard H.
McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARV . L. REV . 1003 (1995) [hereinafter McAdams, Cooperation and
Conflict]; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV . 338 (1997) [hereinafter McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM . L. REV . 903
(1996); Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV . 1643 (1996); and Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537 (1998). Yet further entries in the legal literature are cited by Hetcher, supra, at
2-3 nn.2-4.
120. Cf. Cooter, supra note 119 (arguing that the existence of a norm involves the punishment of nonconformers by “norm enforcers” who have “internalized” the norm);
McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, supra note 119 (arguing
that norms involve a preexisting moral consensus among some portion of the population,
which becomes widely known and is then informally enforced by the withdrawal of esteem
from norm-violators).

280

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:241

tionally neutral regardless of the procedure by which the choice was
resolved. 121
It might be objected that this example does not vitiate the link between proceduralism and conventionalism. Rather, what the example
shows is that (on the simple version of conventionalism under consideration here) regulators in the United States have intrinsic procedural obligations if, and only if, a large majority of Americans believe
that certain regulatory procedures are bad or good. Thus it is only in
the special case where there is no procedure whose goodness or badness is supported by an evaluative consensus that proceduralism
fails. True enough. If the goodness or badness of a particular procedure (P*) is supported by an evaluative consensus, then (on this version of conventionalism) regulators have moral reason to follow or refrain from P*, independent of its outcomes. But, relatedly:
(1) for any particular procedure P' (for example, a procedure of
pluralist bargaining, or of civic republican deliberation, or of collaborative governance), regulators will have moral reason to follow
or refrain from P', independent of outcomes, only insofar as an
evaluative consensus supporting the goodness or badness of P' exists; and thus
(2) no conventional argument for P' that transcends the population’s contingent beliefs about procedures is possible.

In short, the proceduralist who presents a conventionalist argument for pluralism, civic republicanism, collaborative governance, or
some other P' is properly engaged in descriptive sociology; all she can
claim is that citizens happen to share a common set of beliefs about
P', and that P' will remain of intrinsic importance as long as they do.
Note, too, that a firm conventionalist argument for P' (civic republicanism, say) as against P'' (pluralism, say) is not really possible, because consensus beliefs may shift from P' to P''. The proceduralist
who wants an argument for her favored procedure, P', that outlasts
the lucky sociological fact that P' also falls under the description, “believed to be good by most Americans,” had better look beyond conventionalism. 122

121. I am assuming here that O1 is not conventionally better than O 2, or vice versa, in
light of some feature other than its impact on the wilderness areas. Otherwise, O 1 might be
conventionally better than O 2, all things considered, even though O1 damages the areas.
122. Again, my discussion here has focused on a particular, simple version of conventionalism; but what I say can, I think, be generalized.
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E. The Expressivist Defense
A fourth possible strategy for defending proceduralism might be
called expressivism. 123 Law is sometimes described as expressive insofar as it has a value-creating function.124 The idea is that legal outcomes can, themselves, be (partly) constitutive of our evaluative and,
specifically, moral framework. How might this idea underwrite proceduralism? Consider the following:
An Expressive Case for Proceduralism
If regulators follow procedure P*, and they end up choosing O1 over
O2, then O1 is morally better than O2, either conclusively (strongform expressivism) or prima facie (weak-form expressivism).

Expressivism circumvents some of the above-noted difficulties in the
skeptical, foundationalist, and conventionalist arguments for proceduralism. Expressivism (as here presented) is cognitivist, not skeptical. Unlike actual-choice foundationalism, it does not adduce P* as a
procedure constitutive of all moral criteria, but rather as a procedure
that supplements other grounds for moral distinctions. O 3 can be
morally better than O4, even if the O3-over-O4 choice is not the outcome of P*—the expressivist allows as much; but where O1 is chosen
over O2 by means of P*, then O1 is (conclusively or at least prima facie) better. In effect, actual-choice foundationalism makes the implementation of the favored procedure a necessary condition for
moral distinctions, while expressivism (more plausibly) makes its
implementation a merely sufficient condition. Finally, by contrast
with conventionalism, expressivism eschews any link to social norms
and practices. P* is claimed to be morally constitutive, quite apart
from whether P* is generally believed to be morally constitutive (or
otherwise favored by existing social norms), and quite apart from
whether the O1 that results from P* is generally believed to be better
than the alternative O2 (or is otherwise favored over O2 in light of social norms).
123. “Expressivism,” as I use the term here, is one kind of cognitivist moral view and
thus is quite different from the noncognitivist metaethical view often referred to by moral
philosophers as “expressivism.” See sources cited supra note 97.
124. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 70 (“[The] expressive or symbolic
dimensions of policy are central [because] [p]art of what policy-making does is to define, interpret, and create collective understandings and values.”). Professor Sunstein has also articulated this view of the law as value-generating, thus:
The effects of any legal rule can be described in an infinite number of ways.
Any particular characterization or accounting of consequences will rest not on
some depiction of the brute facts; instead it will be mediated by a set of (often
tacit) norms determining how to describe or conceive of consequences. It is possible to see a large part of the expressive function of law in the identification of
what consequences count.
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law , 144 U. PA. L. REV . 2021, 2048
(1996).
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Still, expressivism is a problematic strategy for defending proceduralism. One problem is in specifying a procedure (P*) that is not
too idealized to be infeasible, but that is still sufficiently idealized to
be constitutive of the moral standing of the outcomes it produces.
Consider a civic-republican specification of P*: P* is the procedure
where regulators sincerely attempt to be impartial, where they deliberate pretty well, where they are not too uninformed, and where
some kind of consensus is reached among a large fraction of those interest-group representatives or other members of the public who participate in the regulatory process. Why should P* constitute O1 as
morally better than O2, even prima facie? Let’s assume that hypothetical-choice foundationalism is true and also that the foundation
of morality is some idealized, civic-republican style procedure,
roughly along the lines that Scanlon suggests. Call it P +. P* is not the
same procedure as P +; if it were, P* would be infeasible. So O1 could
be chosen by O2 through P* even though O2 would be chosen over O1
through P+. To be more concrete, O1 could be an outcome that causes
large welfare losses and widespread environmental degradation, or
in which an innocent victim is sacrificed for the greater good, in violation of her deontological rights. But why should the fact that O1
was chosen over O2 in a not-too-bad procedure, by civic-republican
lights, confer any moral authority on O1, when O2 would be chosen
over O1 in a perfect civic-republican procedure? Conversely, in the
case where both P* and P+ point in favor of O1, we do not need to invoke P* to explain the betterness of O1; that is fully explained by P+,
our civic-republican foundation.
The proceduralist could respond to this objection by denying hypothetical-choice foundationalism. To make the response sharpest, assume she posits a foundation for morality that has nothing whatsoever to do with collective choice or approval. Perhaps she posits a
traditionalist view of morality. She might claim, “In general, one outcome is better than another if the first is traditionally believed to be
better, in the relevant society. But in the special case where O1 is
chosen over O2 through P*, O1 is at least prima facie better on those
very grounds.” Yet if morality is generally a matter of traditional beliefs, not hypothetical procedures, then why does P* have a morally
constitutive role? In short, the expressivist faces a dilemma: either
she adopts a hypothetical-choice foundationalism that makes some
idealized version of P* the general grounds of morality (in which case
we can ask why feasible and nonideal P* is also morally constitutive),
or she does not (in which case we can accuse her of inconsistency in
ascribing moral power to P* while asserting that the general grounds
of morality are quite different).
This line of attack on expressivism might be overcome. Perhaps
there is some feasible governmental procedure P* such that its out-
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comes are guaranteed to be morally good or right, at least prima facie. I have not shown definitively that P* cannot or does not exist.
But even if P* does exist, the kind of proceduralism that follows from
its existence is really quite thin. Regulators are not obliged to follow
P*, even prima facie. If they follow a different (and nonconstitutive)
procedure which is instrumentally appropriate in that it produces
morally better O3 as against morally worse O4, then the regulators
have not done anything wrong, even prime facie. (Contrast this with
the standard view, to be considered in a moment, that certain, participatory procedures are intrinsically important because they enhance the welfare of participants. If this view is right, then regulators are obliged, at least prima facie, to follow the participatory procedures.) Further, it may be the case that regulators are all-thingsconsidered obliged not to follow P*. This possibility is avoided only if
P* has a conclusive rather than merely prima facie role in fixing the
moral standing of its outcomes; but that strong-expressivist claim
raises the plausible objection that no nonideal governmental procedure could guarantee moral betterness.
F. The Interest-Based Defense
So much for expressivism. The fifth and final strategy for defending proceduralism to be considered here is widespread in the legal
literature.125 This is the view that certain governmental procedures
are intrinsically beneficial for certain persons (paradigmatically,
those persons who participate in the procedures). Call this the interest-based defense of proceduralism. Expressivism, conventionalism,
and foundationalism all, in different ways, attempt to give the favored procedure a constitutive moral role, or to draw a special link
between the procedure and something else that has a constitutive
moral role (for example, conventional beliefs or a hypothetical proce-

125. The view that certain governmental procedures are intrinsically beneficial for certain persons has been particularly important in the legal literature on procedural due process. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV . 885, 886 (1981) (“The unifying thread in this literature [on procedural due process] is the perception that the effects of process on participants, not just the
rationality of substantive results, must be considered in judging the legitimacy of public
decisionmaking.”); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due
Process, in DUE PROCESS : NOMOS XVIII 126, 127 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1977) (“[Participatory] procedures seem responsive to demands for revelation and participation. They attach value to the individual’s being told why the agent is treating him
unfavorably and to his having a part in the decision.”). As Professor Summers e xplains:
My principal thesis in this Essay is that a legal process can be good, as a process, in two possible ways, not just one: It can be good not only as a means to
good results, but also as a means of implementing or serving process values
such as participatory governance, procedural rationality, and humaneness.
Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values” 60 CORNELL L. REV . 1, 4 (1974).
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dure). The interest-based defense is quite different. It prescinds from
issues of moral truth and constitution. Instead, it says, much more
straightforwardly, that a particular item of moral significance,
namely human welfare, can be directly affected by the procedures
that regulators employ, quite apart from the welfare effect of outcomes.
The interest-based defense of proceduralism certainly possesses
intuitive resonance. Imagine a regulatory agency that furnishes no
opportunity whatsoever for participation by the public.126 No notice of
proposed directives is published; no public commentary on these proposals is even received, let alone solicited; and no public statement
justifying enacted directives is ever issued. This is true not only
when the directives are general rules, but even when they are individualized orders that fix the rights, duties, and other legal positions
of named parties. Even in the case of adjudication, the persons who
are affected (however directly) by agency decisions are not afforded a
hearing, or any component of a normal hearing, except (let us assume) publication of the directive that the agency finally enacts.
Surely this participation-free procedure amounts to an intrinsic welfare setback for members of the public, or at least for those who want
to participate in the decisions of the insulated agency!
I deny that it does. 127 Specifically, I deny that it does insofar as
participation diminishes the accuracy of the agency’s decisionmaking
process; and conversely if participation enhances accuracy, the participatory procedure is already justified on instrumental grounds and
so the interest-based argument for participation is superfluous. To
see this, imagine that the participation-free procedure leads to outcome O rather than O*, that a participatory procedure would lead to
outcome O* rather than O, and that O is substantively better than
O* (that is, it is better apart from the procedure by which the O-O*
choice is resolved). Then participation is a bad thing (from the point
of view of the rest of our moral framework), and the welfare-claims of
those who insist upon participation should be discounted. The welfare-claims of the would-be participants are arguably no different, in
this sort of case, from the welfare-claims of those who purport to reap
an intrinsic benefit from discrimination or governmental action that
126. In short, imagine that the agency provides none of the elements of procedural due
process identified by Judge Friendly in his classic article, Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of
Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV . 1267 (1975).
127. I do not deny that the participation-free procedure just described would be unconstitutional under existing doctrines interpreting the Due Process Clause; but one can give
content to that clause and defend a judicial role in enforcing it without believing that participation or other procedural elements have intrinsic value for welfare. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (setting forth a three-factor framework for determining what process is “due,” which arguably envisions procedure as instrumentally, rather
than intrinsically, valuable).
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violates moral rights simply because they “like” or “want” these injustices. 128 On the other hand, if the participatory procedure leads to
O* rather than O, and it is O* that is the substantively better outcome, then the welfare-claims of the would-be participants need not
be discounted. However, the claims need not be discounted only because the regulators already have instrumental grounds here for
choosing the participatory procedure, as the one that leads to the
substantively best outcome O*.129
The point can clearly be generalized beyond participation. Take a
given agency choice situation. Imagine that one procedure (Paccurate) is
the instrumentally justified procedure—the procedure that the legislator, President or administrator (D) who designs the agency’s procedures is justified in requiring the agency to follow in light of substantive moral criteria X1, X2 . . . Xn—and that a second procedure (Pinterest) is the procedure that supposedly intrinsically benefits the welfare
of the citizenry or some subset thereof. One possibility is that, in this
situation, Paccurate is Pinterest. If so, regulators can have intrinsic
grounds for following Pinterest, but this procedure turns out to be the
very one that regulators would have been obliged to follow (Paccurate) if
governmental procedures had no intrinsic welfare value. Alternatively, in the given choice situation, Pinterest might be different from
Paccurate. 130 If so, we are left to wonder how it can be a good thing for
human welfare to skew government towards outcomes that are otherwise morally unfavorable. So either interest-based proceduralism
makes no difference to what is morally required of regulators; or, if it

128. See, e.g., G EOFFREY SCARRE , UTILITARIANISM 155-62 (1996) (suggesting that sadistic preferences should not be incorporated in the calculation of social welfare); John C.
Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND
39 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (same). See generally RAWLS, supra note
99, at 395-587 (arguing that a person’s welfare goals, i.e., his conception of his self -interest,
can and should be revised to reflect moral requirements).
129. Larry Alexander has made a similar point:
I do not deny that two procedures that are otherwise equal in factfinding accuracy and that do not violate moral side-constraints may differ in their achievement of other values. And if the procedures are otherwise not only equally accurate, but also equally intrusive on privacy, equally costly in resources, and so
forth, we should surely choose the procedure that has more positive or fewer
negative byproducts. The more important question, however, is whether either
accuracy or social resources should be sacrificed to achieve such values as participation.
Larry Alexander, Are Procedural Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?, 17 LAW & PHIL.
19, 36 (1998).
130. I have not considered the case of equality or incomparability. It might be that, in a
given choice situation, there are a number of procedures that are equally well or incomparably well justified, instrumentally speaking, and that only one is Pinterest . In th at special
case I would concede that intrinsicalist considerations could justify choosing Pinterest . See
Alexander, supra note 129, at 36.
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does, there is a powerful argument that the putative intrinsic interests in regulatory procedure are spurious. 131
The key to my case against interest-based proceduralism is, obviously, my discounting of certain welfare claims: where the procedure
of purported intrinsic benefit (Pinterest) differs from the instrumentally
justified procedure (Paccurate), the intrinsic welfare value of Pinterest is
deflated. Is this discounting fair? As I have suggested, there are certainly other cases where we discount someone’s claim to be intrinsically benefited by an outcome, institution, or procedure that is (otherwise) morally wrong (for example, a discriminatory or rightsviolating outcome). The proceduralist might object that there are
other cases where we do not discount someone’s claim to be intrinsically benefited by an outcome that is (otherwise) morally wrong. For
example, if I like fishing and everyone else likes jet-skiing, and a
lake can only be used for one or the other, then the outcome in which
the lake is used for fishing is morally wrong apart from its effect on
my welfare. But that does not mean that my interest in fishing
should be discounted; rather, the interest in fishing retains full force
and should be thrown into the balance along with the interests of the
jet-skiers. 132 This is a fair objection. I think that procedural interests
are more like discountable interests in discrimination or rights violation than they are like nondiscountable interests in fishing; but the
point is surely debatable.
My claim that procedural interests are discountable is, in part, an
appeal to the reader’s intuitions. Where procedure Pinterest leads to
morally worse results than Paccurate, it seems intuitively problematic
to think that some person P’s welfare is genuinely improved by the
131. Might the proceduralist exploit the disjunction between what is ex ante justified
in light of X1, X2 . . . Xn, and what is ex post justified? Paccurate, as I have characterized it, is
the procedure that the designer D is ex ante justified in requiring the agency to follow—in
other words, the procedure that D is justified in requiring, given less than perfect information on D’s part. (For more discussion of moral choice under uncertainty, see infra Part
IV.E. If D had perfect information, he would know already what X1, X2 . . . Xn required in
every choice situation and presumably could just instruct agencies to do that.) But Paccurate
might not be ex post justified in a given agency choice situation; it might not end up producing the outcome that is best in light of X1, X2 . . . Xn.
So it is possible that in a given agency choice situation (1) Paccurate deviates from Pinterest,
but (2) Pinterest leads to the outcome that is ex post justified. In such a scenario, should the
welfare-value of Pinterest be discounted? Perhaps not. Even so, this (partial) response to my
discounting argument does not change how the designer D should act. He is still ex ante
justified in requiring agencies to follow Paccurate, rather than requiring them to deviate in
some cases from Paccurate and follow Pinterest instead. D, after all, does not know which are the
cases in which Paccurate produces results that are ex post unjustified; if he did know that, he
would revise Paccurate so as to eliminate the disjunction, and the cases in which procedural
interests are nondiscountable because Paccurate and ex post-justifiability deviate would disappear.
132. Note the paradox otherwise: if the fishing interest is discounted then, symmetrically, the jet-skiing interest should also be discounted, and we end up with no interests at
all.
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performance of Pinterest. We do have strong intuitions about the sorts
of procedures that government ought to follow (for example, about
the need for participation by the person who will be directly affected
by an adjudicative hearing), but these intuitions (I think) are generally connected to the belief that the procedure at stake enhances,
rather than diminishes, accuracy. Relatedly, our intuition that participation and other procedural features have welfare-value is not (I
think) severable from the belief that the features are accuracyenhancing.
Further, I would suggest, the discountability of procedural interests is consistent with the account of well-being I have defended in
this Article, namely sophisticated preferentialism. Consider a given
person (P) who claims to have an intrinsic welfare interest in a particular procedure, Pinterest, as compared to another procedure, Paccurate,
even in the case where Pinterest leads to morally worse results. Given
sophisticated preferentialism, P truly benefits from Pinterest only if:
(1) P prefers Pinterest to Paccurate, and
(2) P would prefer Pinterest to Paccurate under suitably ideal conditions.

The first prong of this schema is unproblematic: people can have all
sorts of odd preferences. But why think that P’s preference for Pinterest
would survive idealization? Perhaps P thinks that Pinterest serves his
own welfare: he prefers Pinterest to P accurate even where the first leads to
O*, the second leads to O, and O* is morally worse, because O* is
better for P than O. Yet in such a case P does not really have an idealized preference for a particular procedure (Pinterest); rather, he has
an idealized preference for outcomes (O* over O) and, derivatively,
for whatever procedure leads to them.
What we need to show is that P can have a preference and an idealized preference for Pinterest which is
(a) not merely an instrumental preference, derivative of the outcomes that Pinterest produces (for example, a preference for morally
better outcomes, or for outcomes that are beneficial to P himself);
and
(b) which retains force even where Pinterest produces O* rather than
O and O* is morally worse than O.

I am skeptical that such idealized preferences actually obtain; and if
they do obtain I would guess that they occur so infrequently and (relatedly) are sufficiently idiosyncratic, that they would make little difference to the moral calculus of regulators. Given a case where Paccurate leads to O and Pinterest leads to O*, there would need to be sufficient persons who prefer and ideally prefer Pinterest (notwithstanding
its moral costs), such that regulators are all things considered
obliged to use Pinterest—that is, such that the welfare benefit of Pinterest
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compared to Paccurate outweighs the welfare and other moral costs of
O* compared to O. My conjecture (debatable, to be sure) is that the
frequency of such cases is trivial.
IV. A WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION
This Part defends a welfarist theory of regulation and describes
the implications of that kind of theory. What is a welfarist theory? By
that I mean a normative theory of regulation which asserts the following propositions:
??Overall well-being is morally relevant to regulatory choice, if not
morally conclusive of regulatory choice. It is one criterion (perhaps supplemented by others) that bears upon the moral status
of regulation.
??The right theory of well-being is sophisticated preferentialism.
??Other moral criteria possibly bearing upon regulatory choice include distributive criteria, deontological criteria, and perfectionist criteria, but not the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, nor
procedural criteria.

Welfarism, thus described, is really a family of moral theories
rather than a unique one. For example, the version of utilitarianism
that incorporates a sophisticated preferentialist view of well-being is
a welfarist theory; so is a consequentialist theory that takes both
overall well-being (again understood in sophisticated preferentialist
terms) and the equal distribution of well-being as criteria for ranking
consequences; and so is a mixed theory that combines the consequentialist theory just mentioned with deontological constraints such as
the constraint against intentional harming. It would be nice to be in
a position to argue for a unique normative theory of regulation. That
would be a more impressive and practically significant accomplishment than defending a family of views, such as welfarism. But I am
in no such position now, nor am I likely ever to be. On the other
hand, welfarism excludes the theories that have been most important
within American legal scholarship, namely neoclassicism and proceduralism—no theory can be both a welfarist theory and a neoclassical theory, or both a welfarist theory and a proceduralist theory—and
thus a defense of welfarism should, by itself, have real payoffs.
In the initial parts of this Article, I argued for certain components
of welfarism. Specifically, I tried to show that sophisticated preferentialism is indeed the correct account of well-being; that Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency is not a moral criterion; and that no procedural standard
(for example, a standard requiring regulators to allow citizen participation or to engage in deliberation prior to choosing outcomes) is a
moral criterion either. But the central component of welfarism—the
moral relevance of overall well-being—remains to be shown. Is over-
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all well-being a determinate concept? Given two regulatory choices,
such that some persons gain by the first choice and others gain by
the second, is it meaningful to say that one choice or the other is better in light of overall well-being? Does not such a statement implausibly presuppose that interpersonal comparisons are possible? And
even if such comparisons are possible, why does overall well-being
have moral force? Why should an increment to P2’s well-being be
grounds for P1 to accept a decrement to her own, just because P2’s increment is (in some sense) greater than P1’s decrement?
Section A argues that overall well-being is a determinate concept.
Section B argues that the concept is not only determinate, but possesses moral force. 133 Section C discusses the possible role of distributive, deontological, or perfectionist criteria within a welfarist theory.
Sections D and E describe the implications of welfarism for regulatory choices and institutions. Section D compares welfarism to neoclassicism. Although welfarism is, in effect, refurbished neoclassicism, there remain substantial differences between the two theories,
and I elaborate these. Section E compares welfarism to proceduralism. Here, the implications of the new theory are even larger, since
for the welfarist the only moral significance of regulatory procedures
is in producing welfare-maximizing choices and, perhaps, choices
that also fairly distribute welfare, maximize perfections, and comply
with whatever deontological norms limit government regulators.
A. Interpersonal Comparisons and the Determinacy of
Overall Well-Being
Sophisticated preferentialism makes welfare a combination of (restricted) actual preference and (restricted) ideal preference. It says: P
would be better off with S1, as compared to S2, just in case:
(1) P prefers S1 over S2; and
(2) P would prefer S1 over S2 under ideal conditions; and
(3) P’s actual preference and ideal preference are both suitably restricted.

The difference between sophisticated preferentialism and the simple
preference-based view of welfare, which is the view that is conventional within welfare economics and which neoclassicism incorporates, lies in conditions (2) and (3). The function of condition (2) is to
add ideal preference; the function of condition (3) is to restrict both
actual and ideal preference. But it does not seem that either of these
conditions will help sophisticated preferentialism solve the problem
133. Sections A and B are a more elaborate and, in some respects, materially different
version of the argument presented in Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 197-209.
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of interpersonal comparisons—a problem that, famously, bedevils the
simple view.134
Why are interpersonal comparisons a serious problem for the simple preference-based view of welfare? That view, again, says that P
would be better off with S1, as compared to S2, just in case P prefers
S1 to S2. The problem arises once we move from Pareto-superiority to
Pareto-noncomparability, that is, once we add a second person (Q) to
the picture, such that P is benefited by S1 over S2 but Q is benefited
by S2 over S1. How should we decide whether S1 or S2 is better for
overall well-being—that is, better in light of the aggregate welfare of
P and Q?
One approach would be to rely upon P’s and Q’s ordinal ranking of
the outcomes, but this approach seems morally arbitrary and no one
(as far as I am aware) has seriously advocated it. Imagine that there
are N possible outcomes. P and Q assign numbers of 1 to N to each
outcome, depending on their preferences, with N given to the very
best outcome and 1 given to the very worst. 135 In particular, P gives a
ranking of P1 to S1, and P2 to S2 (where P1 > P2); while Q gives a
ranking of Q1 to S1 and Q2 to S2 (where Q1 < Q2). Then the ordinalist would say that S1 is better for the overall welfare of P and Q if
and only if P1-P2 > Q2-Q1.
The ordinalist approach to interpersonal comparisons is quite
problematic, for several reasons. First, it assumes that the N outcomes are equally “spaced” in light of overall well-being—that the effect on overall well-being of moving P from her lowest-ranked outcome (the outcome assigned number 1) to her next-lowest-ranked
outcome (the outcome assigned number 2) is the same as the effect
on overall well-being of moving her from her next-lowest-ranked outcome to the outcome assigned number 3. More generally, it assumes
that the effect on overall well-being of moving P from an outcome assigned number i to an outcome assigned number i+k is the same regardless of where i and i+k are in P’s rankings.
Second, it assumes that different persons are equally productive
of well-being. Any policy that moves P up r units in his ranking,
while moving Q down q units will necessarily increase overall wellbeing, so long as q is smaller than r, regardless of what the set of N
134. See generally K EN BINMORE , G AME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: PLAYING
FAIR 282-96 (1994) (presenting problem of interpersonal welfare comparisons and various
possible solutions); Peter J. Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and
How They Are and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 200
(Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991) (same); Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of
Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104 MIND 473 (1995) (same).
135. This assumes that neither person is indifferent between any two outcomes; otherwise, the ordinalist method here described would need to be modified.
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possible outcomes is. For example, suppose we are in a universe with
only three outcomes: S1 (complete bliss for P, torturous pain for Q),
S2 (complete bliss for P, dampened only by a headache and a hangnail; mild pleasure for Q), and S 3 (complete bliss for P, dampened
only by a headache; complete bliss for Q). P will rank S1, S2, and S3 3,
1, and 2, respectively, while Q will rank them 1, 2, and 3. Thus, the
ordinalist approach ranks S1 better than S2 in light of overall wellbeing, even though ever-blissful P’s relief from headache and a hangnail is purchased at the cost of moving Q from mild pleasure to torturous pain.
A somewhat more attractive approach, advocated by J.R. Isbell 136
and others, is to determine overall well-being based upon P’s and Q’s
cardinal rankings of the outcomes. 137 These cardinal numbers will be
derived from each person’s ordinal rankings of the various outcomes,
plus her rankings for the various outcomes as compared to risky lotteries of the outcomes. Roughly, P will be told to assign the number 1
to his very best outcome, 0 to his very worst outcome, and a number r
to every intermediate outcome such that he would be indifferent between that intermediate outcome and a lottery with a probability of r
for the very best outcome and 1-r for the very worst. Q will be told
the same. Overall well-being is then determined, quite simply, by
adding P’s numerical increment or decrement (in terms of her cardinal numbers) to Q’s increment or decrement (in terms of her cardinal
numbers). If, for example, P assigns P1 to S1 and P2 to S2 (where P1
> P2), and Q assigns Q1 to S 1 and Q2 to S2 (where Q1 < Q2), then S1
is better overall as compared to S2 if and only if P1-P2 > Q2–Q1. This
approach is more attractive than the ordinalist approach because it
does not assume equal “spacing.” The numerical difference between
the number assigned by P to his worst outcome (0) and his next-toworst outcome need not be the same as the difference between the
number assigned to his next-to-worst outcome and his third-worst
outcome.
However, there turn out to be various technical objections to the
cardinalist approach. 138 Quite apart from these objections, the approach is suspect because—like the ordinalist approach—it assumes
that different persons are equally productive of well-being. Moving P
136. See Hammond, supra note 134, at 215-16 (discussing Isbell’s construct); Hausman, supra note 134, at 479-82 (same); Ruth Weintraub, Do Utility Comparisons Pose a
Problem?, 92 PHIL. STUD. 307, 317-18 (1998) (same).
137. Isbell’s technique has, in effect, been adopted by the so -called QUALY approach to
evaluating governmental projects that affect longevity or health. See Robert Fabian, The
Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 118, 119, 124
(George Tolley et al., eds., 1994) (stating that “QUALYs [i.e., quality-adjusted life years]
returning to different individuals should be weighted equally” and that “a full healthy life
for each individual carries the same weight” (internal quotations omitted)).
138. See Hausman, supra note 134, at 479-82.
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from his very worst outcome to his very best outcome is assumed to
have the same effect on overall well-being as moving Q from her very
worst outcome to her very best outcome; more generally, moving P a
fraction (r) of the way from his very worst outcome to his very best
outcome is assumed to have the same effect on overall well-being as
moving Q the very same fraction (r) of the way from her very worst
outcome to her very best outcome. This effect is reflected in the cardinalist’s assignment of the same numbers, 0 and 1, to each person’s
worst and best outcomes, and in the fact that the numerical increments or decrements summed across persons to determine the effect
of a given move (S2 to S1) on overall well-being are unweighted. It is
one thing to say that persons have an equal claim to well-being, that
is, that equality of well-being or other such distributive criteria are
relevant to regulatory choice. It is quite another to say that overall
well-being is itself inherently distributive, in that whatever the set of
possible outcomes, overall well-being is a function of P’s and Q’s cardinal rankings normalized on a zero-one scale. Imagine that P is an
ascetic, while Q’s welfare is exquisitely sensitive to small changes in
the world that would barely make a difference to P. Then, for a given
cardinal increment, that increment, experienced by P, should have
less significance for aggregate well-being than if experienced by Q.
(This is just what it means, after all, to say that P is an ascetic, while
Q is not.) But the cardinal approach makes this impossible; it ignores
affective differences and other such differences that bear upon the
capacity of persons to contribute to aggregate welfare.139
A third approach to interpersonal comparisons of welfare, on a
simple preference-based view of welfare, is the well-known suggestion of Harsanyi140 and others141 that we look to the extended preferences of an impartial observer. P prefers S 1 to S2, while Q prefers S2
to S1. Observer I is asked to
(i) imagine herself in P’s shoes, with all of P’s characteristics including P’s preferences, moving from S2 to S1;
(ii) imagine herself in Q’s shoes, with all of Q’s characteristics
including Q’s preferences, moving from S1 to S2; and
139. See AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 98 (1970) (criticizing the Isbell approach because it fails to allow “interpersonal variability of capacity for
satisfaction”); RAWLS, supra note 99, at 323 (making a similar criticism); G RIFFIN, supra
note 73, at 120 (making a similar criticism and noting “It is not the case that we all reach
the same peaks and valleys.”).
140. See Harsanyi, supra note 128; see also John A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the
Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING,
supra note 134, at 255, 289-97 (presenting Harsanyi’s model).
141. See, e.g., James Griffin, Against the Taste Model, in INTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 134, at 45, 52 n.15 (citing other scholars who
develop variants of Harsanyi’s model, including Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, R.M. Hare,
and Donald Davidson).

2000]

WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION

293

(iii) decide whether she would prefer the first move or the second.

The extended-preference approach is inviting first because it is sensitive to the possibility of affective differences and the like that make
persons differentially welfare-productive, and second because it is
open to the possibility that outcomes might be differentially “spaced”
in terms of persons’ welfare. All this would bear upon I’s ranking of
the S2-S1 move for P, as compared to the S1-S2 move for Q. The problem with the extended-preference approach lies elsewhere. It is that
different impartial observers might have different rankings of the
relevant items. For example, observer I might prefer being P and
moving from S2 to S1, over being Q and moving from S1 to S2; while
another observer (I*) might have just the opposite preference.142
What is Harsanyi to say to this objection? He might say that, if I
and I* were sufficiently idealized, that is, if their preferences were
sufficiently informed, sufficiently deliberate, and so on, then both
would prefer either the first move to the second or the second move to
the first. But is this true? One person could have an idealized preference for vanilla ice cream, while another could have an idealized
preference for chocolate ice cream, just by virtue of differences in
their physical makeups and backgrounds. If this is true, then it is not
clear why idealized I and idealized I* could not have different preferences over the moves for P and Q. Observers I and I* may just have
different “tastes” with respect to the prospect of becoming one person
or, instead, a different person (P or Q) in a world that undergoes a
particular change (the move between S1 and S2).
A final approach to determining overall well-being, consistent
with the simple preference-based view, is to translate each person’s
preferences over outcomes into cardinal units of one or another basic
resource for well-being, where an objective, public, and cardinal scale
for measuring such units exists. For example, an objective, public,
and cardinal scale of dollars exists; it is an objective fact that P has,
say, $100, while Q has $80, and that moving P to a level of $90 would
decrease her stock of dollars more than moving Q to a level of $85
would increase Q’s. So where the outcomes to be compared are S1 and
S2, we can give P a dollar equivalent Dp for the S 2-to-S1 move, and Q
a dollar equivalent Dq for that move. We can then subtract the Losers’ equivalents from the Winners’ equivalents to determine the effect of the move on overall well-being. In short, cost-benefit analysis
in terms of dollars, or liberty, or any other objectively-scaled resource
could be understood as a methodology for interpersonal comparison—
142. See G RIFFIN, supra note 73, at 53-54 (articulating this kind of criticism of Harsanyi); Hausman, supra note 134, at 477-78 (same); see also BINMORE , supra note 134;
HURLEY, supra note 67, at 103-11; Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal
Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 134, at 17, 2238.
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where the existence of an objective scale is meant to get around the
unwelcome effect of subjectivity (the divergence between the extended preferences of I and I*) that afflicted Harsanyi’s approach,
while the reliance on a welfare resource is meant to make plausible
the claim that cost-benefit analysis and overall well-being are just
equivalent. But are they? Can they be, even where cost-benefit
analysis is performed in terms of a basic resource—a “primary
good,”143 to quote Rawls, such as dollars?
It seems not. The central claim of cost-benefit analysis, again, is
that the move from S2 to S 1 is better in light of the overall well-being
of P and Q just in case the winner P’s resource equivalent Rp (for example, a dollar equivalent) is larger than the loser Q’s resource
equivalent Rq. This claim is problematic, regardless of how Rp and Rq
are defined.144 If Rp and Rq are defined as the amounts that P and Q
would be willing to pay or accept for the S2-to-S1 move, given their
actual holdings of the basic resource, then the claimed identity between cost-benefit analysis and overall well-being bumps up against
the objection that these numbers can be distorted by the differential
size of P’s and Q’s holdings. Imagine that S1 is an outcome in which a
particulate fouls the sky, thereby improving the beauty of the sunsets that P views, but causing respiratory distress to Q. Because P
owns tremendous amounts of the resource, he is willing to spend a
very large amount (Rp) to purchase the sunset; that large expenditure will still leave P free to purchase everything else he needs. Because Q is relatively poor in her resource holdings, she is willing to
spend less (Rq) to purchase relief from respiratory distress; 145 additional amounts beyond Rq are needed by Q for goods even more important than relief from respiratory distress, for example, food or
shelter. So Rp is greater than Rq but the S2-to-S1 move still seems to
decrease, not increase, overall well-being; respiratory distress is
more important for welfare than a pretty sunset. To put the point
more generally and abstractly, the proposal to define Rp and Rq in
terms of P’s and Q’s actual holdings of the resource ignores the possibility that the resource may have diminishing marginal utility; and

143. RAWLS, supra note 99.
144. See Adler, supra note 63, at 1373-74; Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 191-95.
145. If Rp is the amount that P is willing to spend in S1 to purchase the sunset then,
technically, Rq is the amount that Q would be willing to accept in S1 in compensation for
the respiratory distress—not the amount that Q would be willing to pay (in S2) to purchase
relief from distress. However, it is particularly easy to see that the amount P is willing to
spend to purchase the sunset could be greater than the amount Q is willing to spend to
purchase relief, by virtue of differences in their holdings of the basic resource. Further, absent special circumstances (such as would arise if the respiratory distress and sunset made
a large difference to Q’s and P’s overall well-being), the amount that Q is willing to accept
in compensation for the respiratory distress should be equal to the amount that she is willing to spend to purchase relief from it.
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yet it is widely recognized that the marginal utility of all goods, including basic resources (like dollars), can and usually does diminish.
One way around the diminishing-marginal-utility objection to
cost-benefit analysis, perhaps, is to define Rp and R q in terms of P’s
and Q’s normalized resource-holdings rather than their actual holdings. If P and Q had equal amounts of the resource, how much would
P pay for the S2-to-S1 move, as compared to the amount that Q would
require for the S 2-to-S1 move? The difficulty here is the same as with
Isbell’s cardinal-utility approach to interpersonal comparisons, and
with the ordinalist approach: Persons can be differentially productive
of well-being. Although P and Q may have an equal distributive
claim to the resource, that does not entail, and it does not seem plausible to say, that P’s (diminishing) function relating basic resources
and well-being is necessarily the same as Q’s (diminishing) function.
If P is ascetic while Q is super-sensitive, P’s Rp (defined in the “normalized” way described above) can be bigger than Q’s Rq even though
the S2-to-S1 move, like all other changes in the world, makes barely a
difference to P’s welfare.146
To sum up, interpersonal comparisons of well-being are seriously
problematic for the simple view that equates well-being with preference satisfaction. All of the preference-based approaches to interpersonal comparison—the ordinal approach, Isbell’s cardinal approach,
Harsanyi’s extended-preference approach, and the cost-benefit approach—encounter cogent objections. And these problems with interpersonal comparisons would seemingly carry over from the simple
preference-based view to the view espoused by welfarism, namely sophisticated preferentialism.
The sophisticated preferentialist could follow an ordinal, cardinal,
extended-preference, or cost-benefit approach, defined in terms of actual preference. That is, the sophisticated preferentialist could say:
??P is better with S1 as opposed to S2 because P’s actual restricted
preference favors S1 and his ideal restricted preference favors S1
??Q is better with S2 as opposed to S1 because Q’s actual restricted
preference favors S2 and his ideal restricted preference favors S2
??Whether S1 or S2 is better for the overall welfare of P and Q depends on P’s and Q’s actual restricted preference; in particular
the [ordinal approach/cardinal approach/extended-preference
approach/cost-benefit approach] is the right way to integrate ac146. The point that money can have differential welfare productivity as between
equally wealthy persons, e.g., because of their physical differences, has been recognized in
the literature on pain-and-suffering damages. See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 70-73 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis 97 YALE L.J. 353, 364 (1988). See
generally Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Painand-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV . L. REV . 1785 (1995).
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tual preferences so as to arrive at a judgment of overall wellbeing.

But then the above-described objections to the ordinal, cardinal, extended-preference, and cost-benefit approaches apply directly to the
sophisticated preferentialist’s proposal.
Alternatively, the sophisticated preferentialist could use P’s and
Q’s ideal preferences to determine overall well-being by plugging
ideal preferences into the ordinal, cardinal, extended-preference, or
cost-benefit approaches; but it is not clear why the difficulties with
such approaches are avoided by the shift to ideal preference. Take
Isbell’s cardinal approach, in which the idea would be to assign 1 to
the outcome ranked very best by P’s ideal preference, 0 to the outcome ranked very worst, and a number r to each intermediate outcome such that P, choosing on the basis of his ideal preferences,
would be indifferent between that outcome and an (r, 1-r) lottery of
the very best and worst outcomes. This approach still assumes, implausibly, that moving P from his very worst to his very best outcome
must have exactly the same effect on overall well-being as moving Q
from her very worst to her very best outcome.
What to do? One option is to abandon the project of interpersonal
comparisons. The sophisticated preferentialist could say that, where
two outcomes are Pareto-noncomparable, overall well-being is simply
indeterminate. But this option is deeply unattractive. As the philosopher Daniel Hausman has rightly commented: “[I]f a conception of
well-being does not permit one to make interpersonal comparisons in
an acceptable way, then that conception of well-being is itself unacceptable.”147 It may be true that some, even most Paretononcomparable outcomes are welfare-noncomparable; but the view
that all such outcomes are welfare-noncomparable is highly counterintuitive.
Imagine that S1 involves a painful death for thousands (who prefer not to die); in S 2, the thousands do not die, but P suffers a mild
headache (which he prefers not to have). S1 and S2 are Paretononcomparable, but surely we would want to, and can, say that S2 is
better for overall well-being than S1. If sophisticated preferentialism
fails to warrant such an obviously true statement, then that should
be taken as a strong and maybe decisive objection against this welfare view.
Note further that if sophisticated preferentialism disables judgments of overall well-being, then it also disables the comparisons of
welfare levels necessary for distributive criteria (for example, the cri147. Hausman, supra note 134, at 474. Hausman continues: “[I]nterpersonal comparisons are an ineliminable part of human life.” Id. at 489. For similar statements, see Harsanyi, supra note 128, at 49; Weintraub, supra note 136, at 307.
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terion that seeks to equalize well-being, or to maximize the welfare
position of the least well-off).148 To put the point epistemologically, in
choosing between sophisticated preferentialism and other welfare
views (for example, hedonism, simple objectivism, or sophisticated
objectivism), we ought to strive for a “reflective equilibrium” 149 where
the chosen view is the one best supported by intuitive judgments as
well as systematic considerations. Sophisticated preferentialism, if it
entailed the welfare-noncomparability of Pareto-noncomparable
states and the impossibility of welfare-level comparisons, would be so
counterintuitive and so systematically problematic that it could not
be the equilibrium welfare view.
A more palatable option for the sophisticated preferentialist is to
use objective values as a basis for interpersonal comparisons. James
Griffin (one of the leading philosophers of well-being, and an advocate of something like the sophisticated preferentialist view) has argued that judgments of overall well-being as between Paretononcomparable states reduce to judgments of overall objective value.
We have a picture of normal human desires: virtually all persons, when informed, want to live autonomously, to have deep personal relations, to accomplish something with their lives, to enjoy
themselves. With experience, we build up such a profile of the
components of a valuable life, including their relative importance—a chart to the various peaks that human life can reach.
These values, if our profile is complete, cover the whole domain of
prudential [i.e, welfare-related] value. They are valuable in any
life; individual differences matter not to what appears in this profile of general prudential values, but to how, or how much, a particular person can realize one or other particular value.
. . . [Consider] Mill’s interpersonal comparison of Socrates and
the Fool. . . . What [the person making the comparison] needs to
make is a judgment of a very different sort from what we ordinarily understand by a personal preference. He needs to know how
much persons generally, when informed, would want each life, how
desirable they are. This judgment can be expressed as a personal
preference, but the nature of the judgment is very special: it is a
judgment about prudential values that is independent of what any
particular individual’s desires or preferences happen to be.150

The objectivist approach to interpersonal comparisons is sometimes framed (as Griffin seems to frame it) in terms of a list of objec-

148. See BOADWAY & BRUCE , supra note 29, at 137-70 (discussing extent to which different “social welfare” criteria, such as the utilitarian criterion or distributive criteria, demand interpersonal comparability of utility levels or differences).
149. See NORMAN DANIELS , JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1996) (presenting and extending Rawlsian idea of “reflective equilibrium”).
150. G RIFFIN, supra note 73, at 114-17.

298

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:241

tive values V1, V2 . . . Vn, such that the comparative effect of S1 and
S2 on overall well-being is a function of how they compare with respect to each Vi, plus tradeoff rates between different values. 151 (So if
V1 is the value of physical pleasure, and V2 is the value of artistic accomplishment, then we might determine that: (1) moving from S2 to
S1 increases Q’s physical pleasure by twenty units and decreases P’s
physical pleasure by ten units, thus producing an overall increase of
ten units of physical pleasure; (2) moving from S2 to S1 decreases Q’s
artistic accomplishment by eleven units, and increases P’s artistic
accomplishment by eight units, thus producing an overall decrease of
three units of artistic accomplishment; and (3) one unit of artistic accomplishment is worth four units of physical pleasure, objectively
speaking, and so the move from S2 to S1 decreases overall objective
value.) This may be the right way to make overall judgments of objective value, but it need not be. The objectivist about overall welfare
is not committed to the existence of cardinally measurable “values”
plus tradeoffs between these. Rather, and more weakly, she is committed to the existence of some sense in which it can be “objectively”
true that P is benefited more or less by the move from S2 to S1 than
Q is harmed.
What is that sense? Objectivity, with respect to matters of value,
morality, and norms, is plausibly understood as the convergence of
judgments or preferences under ideal conditions. To quote Michael
Smith, “[It] is desirable [that is, more valuable, morally better, or
otherwise normatively better] that p in C just in case we would all
desire that p in C if we were fully rational.”152 As Smith elaborates:
[T]he truth of a normative reason claim requires a convergence in
the desires of fully rational agents. However note that the convergence required is not at the level of desires about how each such
agent is to organize her own life in her own world. In their own
worlds fully rational agents will find themselves in quite different
circumstances from each other, circumstances that are conditioned
by their different embodiments, talents, environments, and attachments in their respective worlds. Their desires about how to
organize their own lives in their own worlds will therefore reflect
these differences in their circumstances. The convergence required
is rather at the level of their hypothetical desires about what is to
be done in the various circumstances in which they might find
themselves.153

Some person’s performance of action A is objectively, normatively
better than an alternative, just in case everyone, under ideal condi151. See also Scanlon, supra note 142, at 39-44 (apparently advocating this approach to
interpersonal comparisons).
152. SMITH, supra note 92, at 166.
153. Id. at 173.
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tions, would prefer in this situation to perform A, or so Smith plausibly proposes. 154 In particular, I would argue, S1 is objectively better
for P’s welfare than S2 just in case everyone under ideal conditions
would (restrictedly) prefer to be P experiencing S1 rather than P experiencing S2. And the S2-to-S1 move is objectively better for the
overall well-being of P and Q—where P benefits from the move and Q
loses—just in case everyone under ideal conditions would (restrictedly) prefer to be P moving from S2 to S1 rather than Q moving from
S1 to S2. 155 For example, where S2 involves complete bliss for one person but torturous pain for a second, and S1 involves bliss dampened
by a headache and hangnail for the first person and mild pleasure for
the second person, S1 would represent an improvement in overall
well-being if and only if everyone under ideal conditions would prefer
(restrictedly) to replace torturous pain with mild pleasure (to be the
second person moving from S2 to S 1 rather than to be rid of a headache and hangnail that dampen complete bliss (to be the first person
moving from S1 to S2).
Note that the objectivist model of interpersonal comparisons, as I
have framed it, is really quite close to Harsanyi’s extendedpreference model. This should make the objectivist model more palatable to the reader accustomed to thinking of welfare in economic
terms, as exclusively a function of preference, since Harsanyi’s and
similar approaches have been the most influential accounts of interpersonal comparison within welfare economics. 156 The crucial difference between Harsanyi’s model and my own is this: While Harsanyi
simply assumes that idealized observers I1, I2 . . . In will have the
same preferences as between the S2-to-S1 moves for P and for Q, I
make no such assumption. If two observers under idealized conditions of full information, intensive deliberation, and so on, would
have a different preference as between the two moves, then the comparative effect of S1 and S 2 on the overall well-being of P and Q is indeterminate. If and only if all idealized observers would have conver-

154. See id. at 187 (“My handing back a wallet I found in the street in such and such
circumstances is right, for example, only if, under conditions of full rationality, we would
all want that if we find a wallet in the street in such and such circumstances, then we
hand it back.”).
155. This approach, like Harsanyi’s approach, would be extended to comparisons involving more than two persons through the device of a lottery. Each idealized observer
would ask how she would compare the S1 lottery (the chance of being each person in S1,
with probability 1/n where there are n persons in the population) to the S2 lottery (the
chance of being each person in S2 with probability 1/n). See Weymark, supra note 140, at
255 (explaining Harsanyi’s approach, including his use of an equiprobability lottery over
person-states).
156. In particular, it is the approach adopted by Kenneth Arrow. See, e.g., Kenneth J.
Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice, 7 PHILOSOPHIA 223 (1978);
Kenneth J. Arrow, Welfare Economics: Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social
Choice, 67 AM . ECON. REV . 219, 224 (1977).
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gent preferences over the moves can a determinate statement about
overall welfare be made.
But this is no odder than saying that some person’s performance
of an action (A) is morally better than the alternative only if all idealized observers (or all participants in a hypothetical Rawlsian or
Scanlonian scenario of social contracting) would agree that a person
in those circumstances should perform A. Some of our idealized preferences or judgments do converge;157 and it is just in the case of such
convergence that we can speak of objective rightness or goodness,
rather than mere subjective preference. The compelling fact patterns
that undermine the putative impossibility of interpersonal comparisons—for example, the case where S1 involves a painful death for
thousands, while in S2 the thousands do not die, but P suffers a mild
headache—are just cases in which the comparative effects of the outcomes on persons are sufficiently stark that we expect any thoughtful
and well-informed observer to reach the same welfare evaluation of
the outcomes.
What criticisms might be leveled against the objectivist approach
to interpersonal comparison sketched here? One criticism is that this
approach leaves some outcomes welfare-incomparable. Welfare
economists often demand that a social welfare function give a complete ranking of states, such that every outcome is better, worse, or
exactly equal to every other. The approach sketched here does not do
that. 158 If S1 is Pareto-incomparable with S2, and if idealized observers would not converge in their extended preferences over the two
outcomes, then, on the objectivist approach, the outcomes are neither
better, nor worse, nor equally good with respect to overall welfare.
However, completeness is too strong a feature to require of a
moral criterion. It is a welcome feature, but not a necessary one. (As
I have already observed, the Pareto criterion is itself incomplete.)
Various prominent philosophers and economists—including Joseph
Raz,159 Amartya Sen,160 Thomas Hurka,161 and Larry Temkin 162—have
persuasively argued that we should accept the existence of some incomparabilities with respect to the criterion of overall well-being or
with respect to related criteria (for example, the criterion of equal
well-being).163 For example, if P goes for a revitalizing walk in the
157. See SMITH, supra note 92, at 187-89.
158. See, e.g., BOADWAY & BRUCE , supra note 29, at 137-70.
159. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322-35 (1986).
160. See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 46-48 (1992).
161. See THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 86-88 (1993).
162. See TEMKIN, supra note 61, at 141-47.
163. For philosophical and legal discussion about the issue of “incommensurability,”
including (although not necessarily limited to) the problem of incomparability, see
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
See also ANDERSON, supra note 62, at 44-64; G RIFFIN, supra note 73, at 75-92; HURLEY,
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park in S1 but not in S2, and Q enjoys an evening with friends in S2
but not in S1, and the two outcomes are otherwise identical, it seems
very plausible that (1) S1 is neither better nor worse for overall wellbeing than S2 (revitalizing walks and friendly talks do not differ in
their effect on the overall welfare calculus); but also (2) S1 is not precisely equal to S2 in light of overall well-being (since the outcome S3
in which P goes for a slightly more revitalizing walk is better for
overall well-being than S1, but still neither better nor worse than S2);
and therefore (3) S1 and S2 are incomparable with respect to overall
well-being.
A second and more serious objection is that sophisticated preferentialism is inconsistent with an objectivist approach to interpersonal comparison—that this approach would lead us to a more objectivist theory of well-being, either simple objectivism or the more
plausible view I have term sophisticated objectivism. But where is
the inconsistency? Sophisticated preferentialism is a much better
theory than simple objectivism because it preserves the truism that
P cannot be benefited by an outcome unless he prefers it (or comes to
prefer it). It is perfectly coherent to endorse that truism and, at the
same time, to claim that judgments of overall well-being with respect
to Pareto-noncomparable states are a function of objective goods.
Think of the point this way: In deciding who is harmed by a social
choice (a Loser), benefited by that choice (a Winner), or unaffected by
the choice (a Neutral), sophisticated preferentialism relies solely on
persons’ preferences and idealized preferences; it is only at the latter
stage of comparing welfare gains to the Winners with welfare losses
to the Losers that objective goods come into play. By contrast, simple
objectivism ignores preference at every stage, which makes it an implausible account of welfare, while sophisticated objectivism brings
actual preference into play at the first stage, but also brings in objective goods (rather than idealized preference) at that initial stage.
Whether sophisticated preferentialism or sophisticated objectivism is
the correct account of welfare is a close question, but for reasons I
elaborated in Part II, I think the basic categorization of persons as
Winners, Losers, and Neutrals should be solely a function of preference and idealized preference rather than objective goods.
Finally, the objectivist approach to interpersonal comparison that
I have advocated may be criticized because it seems illiberal. Is not
supra note 67, at 254-70; JOHN KEKES , THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM 53-75 (1993); ISAAC
LEVI , HARD CHOICES (1986); NUSSBAUM , supra note 62, at 107; RAZ, supra note 159, at
321-22; HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 89-118 (1997);
STOCKER, supra note 64, at 211-40; DAVID WIGGINS , NEEDS , VALUES, TRUTH 239-62 (1987);
Matthew Adler, Introduction to Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L.
REV . 1169 (1998); John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV . 1
(1990); T.K. Seung & Daniel Bonevac, Plural Values and Indeterminate Rankings, 102
ETHICS 799 (1992).
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the invocation of objective welfare-judgments inconsistent with the
liberal claim that government should be neutral between differing
ways of life?164 But sophisticated preferentialism is significantly responsive to the liberal claim, insofar as it is P’s own preferences that
determine whether he is benefited, harmed, or unaffected by an outcome—whether he is a Winner, Loser, or Neutral. And the definition
of objective goods in terms of convergent ideal judgments should further allay the liberal’s concern; if well-informed persons genuinely
disagree about the worth of the different ways of life at stake, then
ideal judgments will not converge. The liberal who demands yet
more, who eschews any talk whatsoever of objective welfare-value,
will be forced to either: (1) claim that interpersonal comparisons are
impossible; (2) claim that the correct approach to interpersonal comparisons is some approach that doesn’t involve objective values, such
as the ordinal, cardinal, extended-preference, or cost-benefit approaches; or (3) claim that overall well-being lacks moral force. I
have already demonstrated why the first two claims are spurious.
Let me now try to show why the third one also is spurious.
B. The Moral Force of Overall Well-Being
Imagine that a regulatory action, policy, or institution will increase overall well-being relative to alternative regulatory options,
and that this welfare-increasing option does not run afoul of deontological requirements, perfectionist values, or norms of distributive
justice sufficiently weighty to override the criterion of overall wellbeing. Then, the welfarist claims, government is morally obliged to
choose the welfare increasing option. Welfarism says that overall
well-being is morally relevant, if not morally conclusive; the fact that
a regulatory option is welfare-increasing constitutes a prima facie
moral reason for regulators to choose the option. That is, it constitutes a moral reason that will eventuate in an all-things-considered
obligation to choose the option, if there are no overriding moral reasons to the contrary. But why? Why is overall well-being even morally relevant, let alone morally conclusive? Why does that feature of
options and outcomes have moral force?
This important question has been generally ignored, both by welfare economists and by moral philosophers. 165 Welfare economists
have focused exclusively upon the question addressed in Section A
above, namely, is overall well-being determinate? 166 Their working
164. See SHER, supra note 74 (discussing and criticizing various liberal theories, e.g.,
those of Ackerman and Dworkin).
165. Shelly Kagan is one exception. See K AGAN, supra note 98, at 29-40 (arguing that
well-being has prima facie, if not conclusive, moral relevance).
166. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 55; Pollak, supra note 56; INTERPERSONAL
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 134.
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and undefended assumption seems to be that, if overall well-being is
determinate—if interpersonal comparisons are indeed possible—then
overall well-being (“social welfare”) or something like it ought to play
a role in government decisionmaking.167 The assumption is problematic. It is a necessary condition for overall welfare to possess moral
force that it be determinate, but it is not a sufficient condition; I can
concede that my losses can be compared with your gains, without
conceding that your gains constitute a moral reason (even a prima
facie one) for me to suffer losses. This is a point well recognized
within the philosophical literature. Philosophers have generally assumed the interpersonal comparability of welfare and have instead
trained their attention on the question, Is it morally obligatory to
maximize overall well-being?
But that question is almost always mooted within the context of a
debate about utilitarianism. 168 Utilitarians claim that it is always
morally obligatory, all things considered, to maximize overall wellbeing. In other words, they argue that overall well-being is morally
conclusive and not merely morally relevant. The critics of utilitarianism advance familiar counterexamples (for example, killing one to
save five, sacrificing the scapegoat to appease the crowd) to show
why welfare maximization is not always morally permissible and, a
fortiori, why it is not always morally obligatory. Although these
counterexamples are persuasive, they leave untouched the welfarist’s
weaker claim that government officials are subject to a prima facie
moral requirement to engage in welfare maximization. Yet the claim
is hardly self-evident; pace the welfare economists, we need an argument for the moral relevance of “social welfare.”
What would that argument be? The welfarist faces two potent objections. Call the first the “minimalist” objection; call the second the
“egalitarian” objection. The minimalist objection is that no person
has a claim that others suffer losses so as to improve her welfare (at
least if those others lack a special relationship to her).169 The egali167. For a good illustration of this assumption, see Richard Layard and Stephen Glaister, Introduction to COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 29, at 1-2. They reason:
If we have to decide whether to do A or not, the rule is: Do A if the benefits exceed those of the next best alternative course of action, and not otherwise. . . .
[N]o one could complain at that. . . . But how are [numerical] values [of costs
and benefits] to be arrived at? If we assume that only people matter, the analysis naturally involves two steps. First, we must find out how the decision would
affect the welfare of each individual concerned. . . . The second step is to deduce
the change in social welfare implied by all the changes in individual welfare.
Id.
168. For some entries in, or overviews of, this debate, see SCARRE , supra note 128;
J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS , UTILITARIANISM : FOR AND AGAINST (1973);
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 1 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
169. See SHELLY K AGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 5 (1989) (delineating “minimalist”
view); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (defending libertarianism, the
standard variant of minimalism).
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tarian objection is that no person has a claim that others suffer
losses so as to improve her welfare just by virtue of the fact that her
welfare gain is larger than their losses; rather, her justified claim is
that others suffer losses so as to provide her a fair (equal) amount of
welfare.170
Welfarism and Its Critics
Welfarism: Where a regulatory action produces a gain for person
Pw and a loss for Pl, such that Pw’s gain is larger than Pl’s loss,
then government has a moral reason to perform the action and will
be morally required to perform it unless other (and overriding)
moral considerations are at stake.
Minimalism: Where a regulatory action produces a gain for person
Pw and a loss for person P1, such that Pw’s gain is larger than P1’s
loss, then government has no moral reason yet to perform the action. (In other words, government will not be morally required to
perform the action, even if moral considerations besides overall
well-being are not at stake.) Similarly, where a regulatory action
produces a gain for Pw and a loss for Pl, such that this action lessens the inequality between Pw and Pl (because Pw is poorer than
P1), then government has no moral reason yet to perform the action. (Government will not be morally required to perform it even
if moral considerations besides equality are not at stake.) Pw’s welfare is simply not a sufficient basis for imposing a welfare setback
upon Pl. Although Pl is subject to moral duties that are, in some
sense, grounded in Pw’s welfare (for example, the duty not to intentionally and directly kill Pw, to breach a promise to him, or to deprive him of his property), the sheer fact that Pw would be better
off is no grounds whatsoever for making Pl worse off.
Egalitarianism: Where a regulatory action produces a gain for person Pw and a loss for Pl, such that Pw’s gain is larger than Pl’s loss,
whether government has a moral reason to perform this action is
essentially dependent on the welfare levels of Pw and Pl and of
other persons in the population. If the action lessens the inequality
of welfare levels (for example, if everyone else is at level M, and
the action moves both poorer Pw and richer Pl closer to level M),
then government has a moral reason to perform it. If the action increases the inequality of welfare levels (for example, if everyone
else is at level M, and Pw is already above it while Pl is below it),
then government has a moral reason not to perform the action.
170. In recent years, numerous moral philosophers have advanced some kind of egalitarian view. See, e.g., ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE (1991); TEMKIN, supra note 61; Arneson, supra note 67; G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,
26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). See generally JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996). Clearly, not all of these theorists would defend the specific
egalitarian view spelled out below; but that view fits comfortably within the family of
egalitarian theories just cited.
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Further, governmental actions will generally increase or decrease
the equality of welfare, relative to alternative actions. Although
overall well-being might be a relevant consideration when choosing
between options that are equally or incomparably good with respect to welfare-equality, that is a highly unusual case.

The welfarist needs to take very seriously both the minimalist objection and the egalitarian objection. In effect, these objections represent two horns of a dilemma that welfarism must navigate. Either
we are sufficiently linked by the sheer fact of coexistence in a common society (or on a common planet) that everyone has a claim on
everyone else to a fair and equal share of social welfare (which everyone can rightly claim to have helped produce);171 or we are not thus
linked, 172 in which case fellow citizens or Earthlings are under no
mutual moral obligation to equalize welfare, maximize welfare, or
otherwise take account of welfare effects on each other.
I have no foundational rebuttal to the minimalist and egalitarian
objections. A foundational argument for welfarism would try to show
why, given certain plausible premises about the foundations of morality, overall well-being turns out to have moral force. For example,
the welfarist could argue (1) that fellow citizens or Earthlings are
linked in a common scheme of cooperation—pace the minimalist—
such that the welfare each reaps is a joint product of everyone’s effort; (2) that in such a situation, moral obligations are those obligations that the citizens or Earthlings would choose in a initial contract
setting out the terms of social cooperation;173 and (3) under the
proper specification of the contracting scenario (for example, as a
scenario where contractors do not know what the particulars of their
lives will be), the citizens or Earthlings would agree to welfarism,
pace the egalitarian. But I am not sure that this particular foundational argument for welfarism works.
Harsanyi has famously tried to demonstrate that social contractors bargaining behind a veil of ignorance would indeed agree to
maximize well-being,174 rather than (as Rawls claims) to maximize
the position of the least well-off, or to choose an egalitarian standard.
Yet Harsanyi’s demonstration is controversial, 175 both because it relies upon controversial assumptions about the nature of rational
choice under uncertainty and, even more importantly, because it constitutes an argument for utilitarianism, which as I have explained is
vulnerable to persuasive counterexamples. What we would need is a
171. See RAWLS , supra note 99.
172. See NOZICK, supra note 169.
173. See K AGAN, supra note 98, at 240-56 (describing “contractarian” theories about
the foundations of morality).
174. See Weymark, supra note 140, 291 (presenting Harsanyi’s argument).
175. See id.
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hypothetical-contract argument for welfarism, but not for utilitarianism; it is unclear to me how that argument should be developed.
More generally, it is unclear to me that a deductive argument from
any plausible view about moral foundations will lead us to welfarism
but not to utilitarianism. Welfarism is a pluralist, not a monist view;
it gives force to one moral item, while leaving space for qualitatively
distinct others (rights, equality, perfections). Pluralist moral views
are notoriously resistant to foundational demonstration.
Rather, my argument for welfarism will appeal to moral intuitions. 176 It is counterintuitive to think that overall well-being lacks
prima facie moral force, or so I will claim. The counterintuitive implications of minimalism and egalitarianism emerge quite clearly in the
following kind of case.
The Beneficial Meteor: A Counterexample to Minimalism and
Egalitarianism
A shower of meteors has landed on government property. Most of
the rocks are needed for scientific research and museums, but
there is one extra one. This meteor is useless, except for the following: (1) it can be used to relieve Pw’s emphysema, a chronic (but
non-fatal) condition that causes him near-constant discomfort and
prevents him from engaging in sports or other vigorous activities;
and (2) it can be used to alleviate a very mild headache that Pl suffers once every month, which like Pw’s emphysema is resistant to
other medical treatments. Pw is much wealthier than Pl. Pw is a
millionaire. Pl is not impoverished, but neither is she wealthy or
even close. Her income and wealth place her in the lower middle
class, at around the twenty-fifth percentile, while Pw’s income and
wealth place him well above the ninety-fifth percentile.

What should government do with the beneficial meteor? I suggest
that government is morally required to use the meteor to alleviate
Pw’s emphysema—in short, to choose the option that maximizes welfare. First, it seems intuitively clear that government is morally required either to use the meteor to help Pw or to use it to help Pl. Destroying the meteor is a third option for government, but that would
be wrong; the rock can make a significant difference to Pw’s life and a
smaller, but still observable, difference to Pl’s. Further, as between
the options of giving the meteor to Pw and giving it to Pl, it is the welfare-maximizing option and not the welfare-equalizing option that
seems morally correct in this case. Government has a prima facie
moral reason to give the meteor to Pw because it matters to his welfare; government also has a prima facie (and conflicting) moral reason to give the meteor to Pl because it matters to her welfare. Yet the
176. See DANIELS , supra note 149 (describing the “reflective equilibrium” approach to
moral reasoning, which relies in part upon moral intuitions).
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effect on P1’s welfare of giving the rock to her is comparatively quite
trivial, as compared to the effect upon Pw’s welfare of giving it to him.
Relatedly, the (negative) effect upon welfare equalization caused by
giving Pw the meteor is seemingly small, as compared to its (positive)
effect upon overall welfare. Thus, I propose, it is Pw and not P1 who
ought to get the meteor.
The reader may not share my intuitions about the Beneficial Meteor case. She may have strong minimalist leanings, and conclude
that it is indeed a matter of moral indifference whether government
destroys the rock, as opposed to giving it to Pw or Pl. Or, she may
have strong egalitarian leanings, and conclude that government is
morally prohibited from either destroying the rock or giving it to Pw.
Instead, she may insist, the gains to equality that flow from alleviating Pl’s mild headache do take priority over the gains to aggregate
welfare that flow from alleviating P w’s emphysema. I have no systematic or foundational argument to show that such views about the
Beneficial Meteor case are incorrect. If the reader has these views,
then she can quite happily deny that welfarism is the right moral
theory. Appeal-to-intuition arguments within moral philosophy are
persuasive only insofar as the posited intuitions are indeed shared.
“But that’s not my reaction” is always a possible response when the
philosopher claims that a particular reaction to a given case is natural or obvious. On the other hand, if the reader does share my reaction to the Beneficial Meteor case, that the rock should go to Pw, then
she should also espouse welfarism. That reaction and a denial of welfarism are inconsistent.
Is this correct? Is it really true that the joint posture of (1) having
government choose the welfare-maximizing option in Beneficial Meteor and other cases like it and (2) denying welfarism is untenable?
One way to defend the choice of the welfare-maximizing option in
Beneficial Meteor, while denying welfarism, is to argue that this option, giving the meteor to Pw rather than Pl, is actually justified on
some basis other than its maximization of welfare. But what would
that basis be? The moral requirement (such as it may be) that welfare or its prerequisites be equally distributed cannot be the basis for
the choice of Pw. Pw is much wealthier than Pl, and his welfare level
is much higher, notwithstanding the misfortune of emphysema. Nor
do considerations of moral desert 177 ground that choice. Pw might
have performed worthy actions in the past, for which he now deserves a reward (or reciprocally P1 might have done past wrong, for
which her nonreceipt of the meteor is fair punishment, trumping her
egalitarian claim to it); but the facts of Beneficial Meteor, as I have
stated them, do not entail that P w and Pl are differentially situated
177. See generally GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987).
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with respect to considerations of moral desert. The intuition that
needs to be explained is why Pw should get the rock apart from such
considerations.
Perhaps the basis for Pw’s claim is that he has a greater physical
need for the meteor than Pl? The notion here, as articulated in the
work of Thomas Nagel and Tim Scanlon, is that well-being per se is
morally inconsequential. What stand in its stead, so Scanlon and
Nagel claim, are certain elements of well-being, such as physical
pains and pleasures:
If you and a stranger have both been injured, you have one dose of
painkiller, and his pain is much more severe than yours, you
should give him the painkiller—not for any complicated reason,
but simply because of the relative severity of the two pains, which
provides a neutral reason to prefer the relief of the more severe. . . .
But many values are not like this. Though some human interests (and not only pleasure and pain) give rise to impersonal values, I now want to argue that not all of them do. If I have a bad
headache, anyone has a reason to want it to stop. But if I badly
want to climb to the top of Mount Kilimanjaro, not everyone has a
reason to want me to succeed. I have a reason to try to get to the
top, and it may be much stronger than my reason for wanting a
headache to go away, but other people have very little reason, if
any, to care whether I climb the mountain or not.178

The Scanlon-Nagel view might be fleshed out as follows: (1) Only certain elements of well-being (call them “needs”) have moral force. If I
lack a special relationship to you, I have moral reason to satisfy your
needs, but not to increase your well-being per se. (2) Where needs
conflict, we should maximize the satisfaction of needs, ceteris paribus. If one option is satisfying some of P1’s needs by amount N1, and
another option is satisfying some of P2’s needs by amount N2, and N1
is larger than N2, then we should choose the first option, ceteris paribus. (3) In short, we have moral reason to maximize need satisfaction, but not to maximize well-being. (4) Giving the meteor to Pw in
the Beneficial Meteor case is justified because it maximizes need satisfaction—because P w’s need for relief from emphysema is greater
than Pl’s need for relief from a mild headache—and not because it
maximizes well-being.
The difficulty with this account of the Beneficial Meteor case is
that the moral force of needs and the moral force of welfare turn out
on closer examination to be inseparable. A harmless need, that is,
one that involves no welfare-setback for the person in need, surely
178. Thomas Nagel, Autonomy and Deontology, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS
142, 145-46 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). For similar claims by Scanlon, see his book cited
supra note 101.
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lacks moral force. Imagine that Pw is a stoic who sees the emphysema
as a test of his fortitude and thus prefers to have the condition and
would retain this preference under ideal conditions. Then there is no
reason to give him the meteor. Scanlon and Nagel might concede the
point—they might even concede that needs are necessarily harmful,
that conditions of a person do not really constitute “needs” unless
they reduce his welfare—yet still insist that only needs, rather than
harmful conditions of other kinds, give rise to moral requirements.
But why should this be the case?
Imagine that Pw is replaced by Pw*, who is not suffering from emphysema and therefore does not need the meteor, but who can use it
to prevent some welfare-setback that (in terms of aggregate welfare)
is still larger than Pl’s headache. For example, suppose Pw* has labored for years to develop a unique and beautiful garden and all the
plants have contracted a rare disease for which the meteor’s minerals
provide the only cure. If Pw’s emphysema matters morally only because it harms him, and the loss of P w*’s garden also harms him, and
both harms are larger than the trivial harm to Pl comprised by his
headache, then why should Pw, but not Pw*, get the meteor?179 Perhaps it is generally true that relief from physical suffering (emphysema, headaches) is more important for welfare than nonneeded
benefits (the flowering of a garden). However, in a case like the justdescribed modification to Beneficial Meteor where the generalization
is untrue, it is the bedrock moral criterion of overall welfare, not the
proxy of need satisfaction, that determines what choice is morally required.
Another plausible way to argue that the choice of the Pw option in
the Beneficial Meteor case is actually justified on some basis other
than welfare maximization is as follows:
The Prioritarian Account of Beneficial Meteor
Government is required, not to maximize overall well-being, that
is, the unweighted sum of individual well-being, but rather to
maximize the sum of each individual’s well-being as weighted by a
factor that gives greater weight to the well-being of those worse
off, and thus is inversely proportional to that individual’s level of
wealth or welfare. Let us say that PiO is the welfare of each person
(Pi) in outcome O. Then, in comparing outcomes O and O* for the
set of persons {P1, P2 . . . P n}, what is morally relevant is not [(P 1O–
P1O*) + (P 2O–P2O*) + . . . + (PnO–PnO*)], but rather something like
179. James Griffin provides a similar illustration:
A group of scholars may, with full understanding, prefer an extension of their
library to exercise equipment for their health. . . . But then to maintain that
needs create obligations where mere desires do not, or that they create stronger
obligations, is to say that we have an obligation, or a stronger one, to the scholars to give them what they themselves value less, which would be odd.
G RIFFIN, supra note 73, at 45.
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[d(P 1)(P 1O–P1O*) + d(P 2)(P 2O–P2O*) + . . . + d(P n)(P nO–PnO*)], where
d(Pi) is inversely proportional to the level of each Pi’s welfare or
wealth. Giving the meteor to the emphysema sufferer, Pw, in the
Beneficial Meteor case is justified only because the effect of the
meteor on his welfare (PwO–PwO*) is sufficiently greater than the effect of the meteor on Pl’s welfare so as to outweigh the fact that
d(Pw) is smaller than d(Pl).

A prioritarian view of morality, one that compares outcomes with
reference to the criterion of weighted overall well-being, rather than
overall well-being simpliciter, has been advanced in the philosophical
literature 180 and, to some extent, in the modern welfare-economics
literature.181
The problem is that any set of weights posited by the prioritarian
will end up seeming arbitrary. Given any set of weights, a large
enough improvement in the welfare of a wealthier person (Pw) will
justify, at least prima facie, a particular welfare setback to a poorer
person (Pl). Why, then, should not a smaller improvement that increases aggregate welfare also justify, at least prima facie, that same
welfare setback to the poorer person? The prioritarian might answer
that the criterion of overall well-being must be balanced against the
claims of equality or fair distribution—that the weighted aggregate
criterion is what emerges when we start with the more basic criteria
of (1) unweighted aggregate welfare and (2) equal welfare, or some
such basic distributive criterion. I am skeptical that a weighted criterion would thus emerge from a balancing of unweighted aggregate
welfare and a basic distributive criterion. A balancing of those criteria will, I think, lead to some incomparabilities that the prioritarian’s
weighted criterion will fail to reflect. 182 In any event the defense of
prioritarianism just mooted effectively concedes that overall wellbeing does have prima facie moral force.
Alternatively, the prioritarian might answer that the weights just
emerge from the right specification of morality’s foundations, for example, from the right specification of the social contracting scenario.
However, the best developed analysis along these lines, Rawls’ argument in a Theory of Justice, leads not to the weighted aggregate
180. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (rev. ed. 1994).
Shelly Kagan has suggested:
Perhaps, then, to the extent that distribution matters, this factor should be
captured in terms of a principle that gives greater weight to improving the
well-being of those who are worse off: the lower the level of someone’s wellbeing (in absolute terms), the greater the extent to which increasing their wellbeing by a certain amount improves the goodness of an outcome.
K AGAN, supra note 98, at 53.
181. See, e.g., BOADWAY & BRUCE , supra note 29, at 137-70 (presenting various types of
social welfare functions, including those that incorporate a weighted rather than unweighted sum of individual utilities).
182. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (discussing incomparability).
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criterion but rather to a “maximin” criterion that gives lexical priority to the well-being of the worse off.183 If the prioritarian wants to
justify the choice of Pw in the Beneficial Meteor case, and I am assuming here that she does, the maximin criterion will not provide
that justification.
Finally, the prioritarian could claim that it is weighted, not unweighted, aggregate welfare which corresponds to (one component of)
the overall “value” or “goodness” of outcomes. A suitably detached observer, evaluating the “goodness” of world-states, would take
weighted rather than unweighted aggregate welfare to be one dimension of goodness.
However, this claim seems implausible. The prioritarian agrees
that the relevant dimension of goodness is tightly linked to human
welfare; it is human flourishing, or some function thereof, that is at
stake. The prioritarian also agrees that human flourishing or welfare
is interpersonally comparable. (Indeed, his weighting scheme assumes that each person’s welfare in a given outcome can be represented by an interpersonally valid number, a “utility,” which is
weighted and then summed with the weighted utilities of other persons.) The prioritarian should further agree that, as between an outcome where overall well-being is greater and an outcome where
weighted aggregate welfare is greater, there is more welfare or flourishing in the first outcome. (Consider this analogy: The world with
more mass is the world where the aggregate mass of the objects in it
is greater.) Finally, the prioritarian himself is concerned with an aggregative kind of goodness—the kind of goodness that is connected to
“more” or “less.” (Note that a change that produces dramatically
more welfare for one person and leaves everyone else unaffected will
be counted by the prioritarian as a better world, regardless of the fact
that the distribution of welfare may be less equal, balanced, or harmonious.) All this forces the prioritarian to claim, implausibly, that
the world with more welfare or flourishing is not—even from a suitably detached perspective, and even when an aggregative kind of
goodness is at stake—the better world, as far as welfare is concerned.
So much for the strategy of choosing Pw in Beneficial Meteor while
denying welfarism by proposing some criterion other than overall
well-being that purportedly justifies choosing Pw. A second and quite
different way to defend the choice of the welfare-maximizing option
Pw in Beneficial Meteor, while disclaiming a welfarist theory of regulation, is to argue that government’s choices in Beneficial Meteor are
disanalogous to the choices that government regulators face. The
task of regulators is not to parcel out the meteors that fall on the
public lands, or to distribute other sorts of public property, but pri183. RAWLS, supra note 99.
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marily to impose legal duties which constrain the actions of private
citizens. Individuals are commanded not to pollute, not to endanger
species, not to collude in setting prices, not to impose certain risks
upon their employees, and so on. Assume that D is some dutycreating (act-constraining) directive, and that a regulator is deciding
whether to issue D. If government ought to choose the option that
maximizes overall well-being in Beneficial Meteor, but ought not
choose between D and not-D on the basis of overall well-being, then
the lessons of Beneficial Meteor for regulators are indeed very limited.
Why would one think that overall well-being has different force
with respect to duty imposition than it does with respect to meteordistribution? The plausible idea here is that duty imposition raises
deontological issues that are not present in Beneficial Meteor. To be
concrete, imagine that Pl is the only person practically constrained
by D. Also imagine that the issuance of D will cause Pl a slight welfare harm (equivalent to the harm of a mild headache), and that the
failure to issue D will produce a large welfare setback for Pw (equivalent to the harm of emphysema). If the issuance of D will in fringe
some deontological constraint protecting Pl—if it will infringe her
“rights”—then the sheer fact that D maximizes welfare will not justify that option. Welfare maximization, without more, does not warrant the breach of deontological constraints. 184 Further, the view that
any legal duty, at least any legal duty backed by sanctions, implicates deontological constraints (because such duties are coercive restrictions of liberty) is a possible one.
I do not have space here to show why this robustly deontological
view of regulatory duties is wrong. Let me simply point out that the
view is radically at odds with the practices of regulatory agencies.
Roughly, if D infringes the right to liberty, then D is justified only if
the actions it constrains are themselves rights-violating. However,
many of the actions constrained by the antitrust laws, the environmental laws, the food and drug laws, the workplace safety laws, and
other regulatory regimes are not rights-violating actions. Rather,
they are simply actions that produce bad consequences, by reducing
well-being, increasing inequality, degrading perfectionist values
(such as environmental values), or producing some other undesirable
result. There is generally no deontological violation in directing persons to refrain from such actions—surely not if the directive is civil
rather than criminal. 185 Assume this is correct; again, if it is not, then
the proper scope of regulation is radically more limited than most
184. See sources cited infra note 189.
185. Cf. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO O THERS 26 (1984) (articulating the view that a behavior should not be criminalized unless it is harmful or seriously offensive to some person
other than the actor).

2000]

WELFARIST THEORY OF REGULATION

313

modern theorists (neoclassicists, proceduralists, and others) have
thought. Therefore, the imposition of D on Pl does not implicate deontological constraints. Then Pw’s claim to the issuance of D is just as
strong as his claim to the beneficial meteor. Both D and the meteor
help Pw much more than they harm Pl. Both cause only a slight setback to welfare-equality, and both are deontologically permissible.
Overall well-being gives the government sufficient moral grounds to
issue D, just as it gives government sufficient grounds to give Pw the
meteor. The Beneficial Meteor case has plenty of relevance for regulation.
C. Deontology, Perfections, and Distribution: A Note on Nonwelfarist
Considerations
As I have repeatedly emphasized, welfarism refers to the family of
moral theories that make overall well-being morally relevant, not
necessarily morally conclusive. Welfarism, thus defined, includes but
is not limited to utilitarianism. Further, as I have suggested, there
are strong arguments against utilitarianism. The right welfarist theory, the theory that correctly evaluates the actions of regulators and
other government officials, will be a theory such that the moral
status of a regulatory action is a function of a plurality of moral criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn, where W* is overall well-being and Xi is another moral criteria). Unless W* takes lexical priority over the Xi,
which is little more plausible than utilitarianism, welfaremaximizing regulatory actions may turn out to be morally wrong.
The right variant of welfarism will acknowledge that “overall wellbeing” can be outweighed by other moral considerations. 186
What, more specifically, are the conditions under which welfaremaximizing regulatory actions will turn out to be morally wrong?
This Article does not purport to address that crucially important issue. It is plausible that a welfare-maximizing regulatory action can
be morally wrong, all things considered, because it infringes deontological constraints, reduces overall perfection, or reduces overall
equality or the overall satisfaction of other such “distributive” criteria. But which deontological constraints, perfectionist goals, and distributive goals really do bear upon the moral status of regulation is a
large and unanswered question, which I do not have the space to
consider in any detail here. Nor do I mean to insist that the only criteria relevant to government regulation, other than the criterion of
overall well-being, are deontological, distributive, or perfectionist criteria. I simply cite these as the most plausible possibilities. A theory
incorporating W* plus some esoteric Xi that is neither deontological,
186. On pluralism, see, for example, KEKES, supra note 163; STOCKER, supra note 64;
SUMNER, supra note 9, at 200 n.24 (citing sources).
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distributive, nor perfectionist would still be a welfarist theory as I
have defined “welfarism.”187
Deontological constraints are nonconsequentialist duties—
generally duties of inaction rather than action.188 They would prohibit regulators from performing certain types of actions, even where
the consequences of such actions are better than the consequences of
inaction. The pros and cons of deontological constraints have been
much discussed within the modern philosophical literature.189 I tend
to think that the deontologists have made a strong case for the existence of some such constraints—for example, a constraint against direct, intentional killing (I ought not directly and intentionally kill
one person, even to prevent five direct and intentional killings). Assuming this is true, it remains possible that deontological criteria
and consequentialist criteria are “partitioned” between different governmental institutions—between courts, legislatures, regulators, executives, state institutions, and federal institutions—such that regulators are effectively permitted to ignore deontological criteria.190 In
particular, the following idea is appealing:
The Constitutional (Deontological) Partition:
Every deontological constraint binding upon regulators is incorporated in some justiciable requirement of constitutional law. For
example, it would violate the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause for a regulatory official to perform a direct and intentional killing.191 As between two or more constitutional options,
the morally appropriate option for the regulator to choose is the
option with the best consequences.

The Constitutional Partition is appealing because it restores simplicity to the regulator’s moral world: once constitutional courts are in
place, the regulator can act as if morally right actions are, simply, actions with the best consequences.
But is the Constitutional Partition true? If regulators were deontologically constrained, not merely to refrain from consequentially
187. But note that I have given “perfectionism” a definition sufficiently broad that it
becomes hard to see what that esoteric Xi could be. See infra note 194.
188. See David McNaughton & Piers Rawling, Agent-Relativity and the DoingHappening Distinction, 63 PHIL. STUDIES 167 (1991) (providing a precise definition of deontological constraints).
189. See K AGAN, supra note 98, at 152-70; NOZICK, supra note 169, at 26-53;
SCHEFFLER, supra note 180, at 80-114; Richard Brook, Is Smith Obligated that (She) Not
Kill the Innocent or that She (Not Kill the Innocent): Expressions and Rationales for Deontological Constraints, 35 S. J. PHIL. 451 (1997); Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is
Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1994); Frances M. Kamm, NonConsequentialism, the Person as an End-In-Itself, and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 354 (1992); Nagel, supra note 178.
190. Cf. Henry S. Richardson, Institutionally Divided Moral Responsibility, 16 SOC.
PHIL. & POLICY 218 (1999).
191. See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1998).
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justified killing, but also to refrain from any kind of consequentially
justified coercion, the Partition would be clearly false. This is because
most if not all regulatory coercion escapes constitutional review, at
least under modern (post-Lochner) constitutional doctrine.192 However, as I suggested in Section B above, the intuitive support for a
general no-coercion constraint on regulators is much weaker than the
intuitive support for a no-killing constraint. Much regulatory coercion—for example, coercive orders directed at corporate officials and
backed by civil fines that prohibit pollution, unsafe workplace conditions, or unfair labor practices—is seemingly justified as long as it is
consequentially justified.
Yet the failure of the robust deontological view that includes a
general no-coercion constraint does not mean that Constitutional
Partition is true. The correct deontological account might be a modestly robust view, which does not include a general no-coercion constraint, but which does include the core constraint against direct and
intentional killing and also includes other constraints, such as a constraint against the coercive use of the criminal law,193 which are not
fully incorporated in justiciable constitutional norms. The truly hard,
interesting, and unanswered question about deontological constraints for purposes of regulatory theory is whether the correct deontological account is really modestly robust in this way. Constitutional Partition is appealing and, to some extent, plausible, but it
still may turn out to be wrong.
Perfectionist criteria and distributive criteria, like the criterion of
overall well-being, are species of consequentialist criteria. An action
is consequentially justified if the outcome it produces—technically,
the total world-state that it produces—is better than the outcomes
produced by alternative actions. Consequentialist criteria measure
the goodness of outcomes. “Perfectionism”—as I’m using that term
here—is the view that features of outcomes other than welfare can
matter to the outcome’s goodness. 194 A perfectionist criterion Xi is a
criterion such that O1 can fare better than O2 with respect to Xi, even
though O1 and O2 are just the same with respect to welfare, that is,
192. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 490-491 (1955).
193. See FEINBERG, supra note 185.
194. See generally HURKA, supra note 161; SUMNER, supra note 9, at 193-95, 208-17.
This is a simple, but very broad definition of perfectionism. Arguably, the term is better
used to denote a subset of the consequentialist moral criteria that depend on features of
outcomes other than welfare. For example, one might say that perfectionist criteria, properly speaking, concern the realization of certain capacities essential to humans and other
creatures; and one might distinguish between such criteria and aesthetic criteria or environmentalist criteria, which involve neither welfare nor the realization of essential capacities. Because my project in this Article is to defend welfarism—not to advance a particular
view as to the correct moral criteria other than overall well-being—I employ the simple
and broad definition of “perfectionism.”
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even though the welfare position of every person (and every other
welfare subject) in O1 is just the same as her position in O2. Environmental ethicists who argue that the flourishing of nonsentient organisms (organisms without a welfare), endangered species, or whole
ecosystems is a relevant consideration for environmental policy,
quite apart from human well-being or the well-being of other welfaresubjects, are perfectionists. 195 So are aesthetes, who think that beautiful buildings, objects, paintings, and other artworks contribute to
the beauty and thus the goodness of the world even if no one cares
about, or otherwise is benefited by, this aesthetic improvement. So is
the Aristotelian who thinks that an action which makes a given person more perfect but less happy (for example, by making the person
more fully rational, thus creating a more perfect specimen of the species “homo sapiens”) is a good action in at least one dimension. 196
The problem with perfectionism, as Wayne Sumner explains, is
that:
In doing good for someone we are therefore not merely making the
world a better place but also doing something for that particular
person. Now this notion of furthering someone’s good for her own
sake can be generalized beyond the boundaries of our species; I
have a perfectly good sense of what it means to take my cat to the
veterinarian for her sake. But it cannot be generalized indefinitely,
for not all natural objects have a “sake” for which we can do things.
. . . Our ethical sensibilities seem to have much to do with our ability to see things from the point of view of potential victims and
beneficiaries. I am prepared to think that mountains and stars can
fare better or worse on some objective scale of perfection, but this
fact does not give them a point of view on whose behalf I can marshal my services.197

I am inclined to find Sumner’s arguments against perfectionism persuasive, but the issue is one that merits much further work. The viability of perfectionism has been much less explored by philosophers
and theorists than, say, the existence of deontological constraints, or
the nature of fair distribution. Note that if perfectionist goals do obtain, if they do figure in the best moral theory of government, then it
is hard to see how such considerations can be “partitioned” away
from regulators.

195. This is the perfectionist view most widely held now, and thus it is the one most
relevant to regulatory theory. See, e.g., ROBIN ATTFIELD, THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONCERN (1983); HOLMES ROLSTON, III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS : DUTIES TO AND VALUES
IN THE NATURAL WORLD (1988); PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE (1986).
196. See HURKA, supra note 161.
197. SUMNER, supra note 9, at 211.
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The Perfectionist Partition:
Every perfectionist goal applicable to regulators is incorporated in
some nonregulatory institution, which effectively permits regulators to ignore such goals. For example, if one environmental policy
is better in light of overall well-being than a second policy, then
regulators should enact the first policy. If it turns out to be allthings-considered worse than the second policy, in light of perfectionist considerations, then it will be reversed by the legislature.

Perfectionist Partition is appealing, because it further simplifies the
moral world of regulators. However, I cannot see why it would be
true.
Finally, distributive criteria are consequentialist criteria that do
supervene upon the welfare characteristics of outcomes (if the welfare of every person is just the same in O1 and O2, then O1 and O2
must be the same with respect to distributive criteria) but concern
the distribution of welfare rather than the aggregate amount. 198 By
this definition, the following are all distributive criteria:
(1) a criterion that measures the extent to which persons are below
a certain minimum level of welfare (the “poverty line”);
(2) a criterion that measures the extent to which the overall pattern of welfare levels deviates from perfect equality;
(3) a maximin criterion, which gives lexical priority to the welfare
of the worst-off persons.

All of the above criteria are plausible. John Rawls famously argues in
favor of the maximin variant of the idea of proper distribution. 199
Numerous modern philosophers, including Ronald Dworkin, Richard
Arneson, G.A. Cohen, and Eric Rakowski, have argued in favor of the
egalitarian variant, or something like it. 200 Finally, our actual system

198. This definition of “distributive” criteria, like my definition of “perfectionist” criteria, is somewhat simplified. There is a family of views that look to the distribution of “primary goods,” of things that serve as resources for welfare, rather than to the distribution of
welfare itself. See Adler, supra note 117, at 1474-76 (discussing these views, and citing
sources). A criterion that evaluates outcomes in light of the distribution of welfareresources is not, strictly speaking, a criterion that supervenes on the welfare characteristics of outcomes, but still it ought to be counted as a “distributive” criterion. (Supervenience fails because, as between two outcomes identical with respect to welfare, one but not
the other might have resulted from a fair initial distribution of resources.) It is not clear to
me how to modify the simple definition of “distributive” to include resourcist views. The
reader should understand that some such modification is required; because this Article is
not intended to defend distributive views or to make definitive claims about whether distribution and overall welfare can be “partitioned,” I do not pursue the definitional issue
here.
199. See RAWLS , supra note 99.
200. See sources cited supra note 170. It bears noting that some of these egalitarian
philosophers are resourcists. See supra note 198.
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of state redistribution, the “welfare” system, seems to aim at the poverty-line variant. 201
Here, as with perfectionism and deontology, it is tempting to
think that nonregulatory institutions can be structured so that regulators are freed to focus exclusively on aggregate welfare. Some
economists working within the neoclassical tradition have claimed
that although both efficiency and fair distribution ultimately matter
to the evaluation of government actions, it is more efficient and just
as good distributively to pursue distributive goals through the tax
system. 202 Does the claim carry over from efficiency to welfare? Call
this the Distributive Partition:
The Distributive Partition:
Every distributive goal applicable to regulators is incorporated in
some nonregulatory institution, which effectively permits regulators to ignore such goals.

I find the Distributive Partition no more plausible than the Perfectionist Partition. Consider the version of fair distribution that simply
seeks to combat poverty, and is indifferent to differences in welfare
levels among persons above the poverty line. (If the Distributive Partition fails on this poverty-line view, then it should fail a fortiori on
more robust distributive views, such as egalitarianism or maximin.)
Imagine that O1 is welfare maximizing relative to O2, but that O1 is
worse with respect to poverty (for simplicity, because some persons
are below the poverty line in O1 but no one is below the line in O2.)
Why think that a regulatory agency should ignore egalitarian considerations and choose O1?
One possibility is that the legislature will directly reverse regulatory choices that are welfare maximizing, but, all things considered,
morally bad by virtue of their distributive defects. In this example,
the agency will choose O1 over O2 and the legislature will then promulgate a statute requiring O2. This version of the Distributive Parti201. This view is also defended by PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL:
WHAT (IF ANYTHING ) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM ? (1995).
202. See, e.g., K APLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 37; Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design,
81 SCAND. J. ECON. 264 (1979); Polinsky, supra note 41, at 119-27; Steven Shavell, A Note
on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity
Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM . ECON. REV . 414 (1981). Chris Sanchirico
summarizes the claim:
The New [Efficiency] Rationale . . . shunt[s] distributional concerns across disciplinary boundaries from private law to tax. While conditionally conceding the
importance of equity as a political-philosophical value, proponents of the New
Rationale insist that the legal sphere is not the proper place to pursue distributional objectives. Efforts to decrease economic inequality, it is argued, should be
corralled into the tax code, while legal rules should be left in a pristinely efficient state, unsullied by distributive justice.
Sanchirico, supra note 13 (manuscript at 2).
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tion is overly optimistic about the incentives and capabilities of legislatures. In practice, agencies have lots of “slack,” including the ability to pursue policies that increase poverty.
A second possibility is that the defects of O1 can be cured through
the income tax system by either the legislature or a tax agency. Here,
the problem is that some kinds of “poverty” (properly understood) are
incurable. If O1 involves some premature deaths, such that the lifetime welfare of some dying persons is very low—sufficiently low to
bring them below the level of lifetime welfare equaling “poverty”—no
(future) money payments to the estates of these persons will repair
their poverty. A welfare-maximizing regulatory policy might cause
the death of a one-year-old toddler; the total well-being the toddler
realizes over the course of his life will be drastically lower than the
total well-being realized by most persons, and thus the choice of O1
will make the toddler incurably poor.
To sum up, welfarism allows that regulators may need to attend
to features of regulatory options other than their effect upon overall
well-being. Which features are those? That depends both on the criteria apart from aggregate welfare (such as deontological, perfectionist, or distributive criteria) that may bear upon the moral status of
governmental actions, and upon the institutional arrangements or
“partitions” that may make different governmental bodies responsible for implementing different criteria. In this Section, I have speculated in a very preliminary way about the nature of the additional
criteria and relevant arrangements. My very tentative suggestion is
that regulators will not be able to adopt welfare maximization as
their sole aim. Morality will be too complex, and institutional possibilities too crude, to permit that. But this is really just a guess on my
part. The speculations in this section are simply intended to identify
areas for future research, and they do not begin to approach a full
analysis of the problems described here.
D. Welfarism and Neoclassicism: Some Differences
Welfarism is refurbished neoclassicism. The welfarist, like the
neoclassicist, gives central importance to human welfare. Like the
neoclassicist, the welfarist accords preferences a prime role in her account of well-being. Like the neoclassicist, the welfarist is focussed
upon regulatory outcomes rather than the procedures that produce
these outcomes. The neoclassicist need not take regulatory procedures to be intrinsically valuable, and the welfarist, by definition,
does not. Finally, both welfarism and neoclassicism acknowledge that
the moral criterion essential to these views—overall well-being in the
case of welfarism, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in the case of neoclassicism—may be supplemented by other criteria, such as deontological,
perfectionist, or distributive criteria.
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Nonetheless, there remain noteworthy differences between welfarism and neoclassicism, which I will briefly describe in this Part.
These differences have two sources. The first source is the difference
between overall well-being and efficiency. The second source is the
difference between the simple preference-based view of welfare incorporated into neoclassicism and the more nuanced view that is
built into welfarism, namely sophisticated preferentialism. The shift
from neoclassicism to welfarism involves material changes in, albeit
not fundamental alteration of, our normative theory of regulation.
1. Efficient Welfare Losses and Inefficient Welfare Gains
As I have already explained, an option can be Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to an alternative but decrease overall well-being. Reciprocally, the option can be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient but increase
overall well-being. The option of permitting a factory to emit a particulate that causes respiratory distress to poor persons living
nearby, but that also produces a beautiful sunset viewed by rich persons from afar, is welfare decreasing. Nevertheless, this option will
be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the cumulative dollar amount that the
rich persons are willing to pay for the sunset is larger than the
cumulative dollar amount that the poor persons would demand in
compensation for the respiratory distress. 203 Or consider the option of
building a road through the property of an ascetic who is barely
bothered by it (since she is an ascetic), but who would still be willing
to pay a lot not to have the road built (since it has comparatively
more welfare significance for her than other things, which matter
even less). This option will be welfare increasing, but it could be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient if the ascetic’s willingness to pay not to have the
road is large enough.
As the ascetic’s case shows, the deviation between Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency and overall well-being is not simply a matter of wealth effects. 204 Given two persons (P1 and P2) and a regulatory choice that
has the same welfare effect on the two in terms of units of overall
welfare, the two persons may have different monetary equivalents
for that welfare change for any of the following reasons: (1) P1 and P2
have roughly identical functions, mapping wealth and other features
of the world onto welfare, but P1 and P2 are at different wealth levels
(wealth effects); (2) P1 and P2 have roughly identical functions, mapping wealth and other features of the world onto welfare, and have
203. See supra Part II.B.1. Technically, the cost-benefit criterion (sum of willingnessto-pay criterion) and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are not equivalent. The so -called “Boadway
paradox” shows that cost-benefit analysis and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can deviate in special cases. See Adler & Posner, supra note 28, at 190-91 & n.68. For simplicity, I here use
the cost-benefit criterion and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion interchangeably.
204. See Adler, supra note 63, at 1398-1401.
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the same wealth level, but they are differently situated with respect
to other features; or (3) P1 and P2 have significantly different functions, mapping wealth and other features of the world onto welfare.
Nor is it clear to me that wealth effects will, in practice, produce the
largest overall divergence between efficiency and welfare. On the
other hand, efficiency-type analysis, by regulatory agencies and
scholars, is most readily amended to deal with the problem of wealth
effects. The willingness-to-pay and -accept amounts can be weighted
by a factor inversely proportional to the wealth of the person involved.205 Therefore my discussion here of the divergence between efficiency and welfare will focus on those kinds of effects.
Consider a regulatory policy that affects various persons who differ significantly in wealth level. The policy could be a pricing system
for a regulated service that is sold both to richer and to poorer consumers (cross-subsidization of the poorer consumers will benefit
them at the expense of the richer consumers, who would be better off
if marginal-cost pricing were used instead). Or the policy could be a
conservation policy with respect to wilderness areas and other environmental benefits that are mainly enjoyed by richer persons, where
the costs of conservation would be borne by all taxpayers; or a workplace safety policy that benefits poorer workers at the expense of
richer shareholders; or an antitrust policy that benefits poorer
shareholders at the expense of richer consumers; or an “environmental justice” policy that locates a waste dump or some other “locally undesirable land use” in a rich neighborhood rather than a poor
one. Assume that the policy is inefficient. For simplicity, assume that
the policy benefits poorer persons by an amount $P and harms richer
persons by an amount $R where $R is greater than $P, relative to an
efficient alternative. The neoclassicist will say the following about
the policy:
The tradeoff between distribution and efficiency: Although an inefficient policy whose costs and benefits are borne by persons at different wealth levels may be a good thing with respect to distributive goals, it is a bad thing with respect to at least one normative
goal, namely efficiency.206

According to the neoclassical view, if we are faced with the choice between an efficient policy and an inefficient policy that benefits poorer
persons by some amount $P too small to outweigh the losses $R to
richer persons, then we must balance the policy gain in one dimen205. See sources cited supra note 36 (discussing possible modification of cost-benefit
analysis through incorporation of distributive weights); see also Adler & Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105
(2000) (same).
206. See, e.g., K AHN, supra note 11, at 189-93 (analyzing cross-subsidization in this
manner).
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sion (distributive goals) against the policy setback in another dimension (efficiency goals).
By contrast, according to the welfarist view, it is an open question
whether the efficient policy is a good thing in any respect. First, the
inefficient policy may be better on the distributive dimension (as the
neoclassicist recognizes). Second, the inefficient policy may also be
better from the point of view of overall welfare. Although $P is
smaller than $R, the richer persons’ marginal utility of wealth may
be sufficiently smaller than the poorer persons’, such that the $P
shift to the poor causes a larger effect on overall well-being than the
$R shift away from the rich. For the welfarist, an inefficient policy
that secures distributive gains may be an unalloyed good, while for
the neoclassicist it cannot be. Even if the inefficient policy is also
welfare decreasing (assuming a large enough difference between $R
and $P, or a small enough difference in wealth levels between richer
and poorer), the policy’s negative effect on overall well-being will
comprise a less substantial counterweight to distributive goals for
the welfarist than its inefficiency will comprise for the neoclassicist.
All this has practical, not just conceptual, significance, since it means
that the welfarist will end up choosing some inefficient policies that
the neoclassicist would, on balance, reject.
The neoclassicist has another string to her bow. The inefficient,
but egalitarian, regulatory policy and the efficient, but inegalitarian,
policy are not the only options that should be considered. A third and
better option might be combining the efficient regulatory policy with
income tax payments and levies designed to achieve the distributive
goals. Neoclassicists standardly claim the following, or something
like it.
Regulation Is Less Efficient than Taxation in the Pursuit of Distributive Goals207
Given an inefficient regulatory policy, there exists an efficient alternative that, combined with suitable tax payments and levies, is
just as good with respect to distributive goals and better with respect to efficiency.

I have already expressed doubt that, with respect to distributive
goals, the income tax system is always as good as regulation. An efficient regulatory policy may have distributive deficits that no scheme
of tax levies and payments can repair. Reciprocally, some economists
have doubted whether—given an inefficient regulatory policy and the
most efficient tax scheme that achieves all the distributive goals of
the policy—such a tax scheme will always be more efficient than the

207. See sources cited supra note 202 (arguing that the tax system, not legal rules,
should be used to pursue distributional goals).
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policy, since there are efficiency deficits (specifically, work disincentives) associated with income taxation. 208 But let us place these
doubts to one side. It seems plausible that the above-stated neoclassical claim is widely, if not universally, true—that in a significant
number of cases, the tax system can achieve all the distributive goals
of regulation, and in a more efficient manner.
Does this eliminate the divergence between welfarism and neoclassicism? Hardly. Imagine the following: the inefficient policy
causes a gain of $P for the poorer persons, which is smaller than the
loss of $R incurred by the rich. Our distributive goal is to bring all
persons above the poverty level. A tax scheme combined with the efficient regulatory alternative would give $P to the poorer persons,
which makes it just as good as the inefficient policy with respect to
this distributive goal, and would cost the richer persons $Tr. The tax
scheme would also cost other Taxpayers $To . $Tr plus $To is less than
$R, so the scheme is more efficient than the inefficient policy.
Poor

Rich

Other Taxpayers

Efficient Policy

—

—

—

Inefficient Policy

$P

-$R

—

Tax Scheme +
Efficient Policy

$P

-$Tr

-$To

How do the tax scheme and the inefficient policy compare within
neoclassicism and welfarism? Now it is the neoclassicist who perceives an unalloyed good! For the neoclassicist, the tax scheme is unqualifiedly better than the inefficient policy: It is more efficient, and
it is no worse with respect to distributive goals. By contrast, the welfarist agrees that the scheme is just as good with respect to distributive goals, but she notes that it may be worse with respect to welfare.
Imagine that the taxpayers who incur $To are poorer than the richer
persons who benefit from the difference between $R and $Tr. Then,
the tax scheme might be welfare decreasing even though $To is less
than $R minus $Tr. If so, the welfarist would need to balance the
overall-welfare goal against the distributive goal—and, in this case,
would presumably end up rejecting the tax scheme on overall-welfare
grounds, while the neoclassicist would have no reason whatsoever to
reject the tax scheme.
It might be objected that the kind of tax scheme envisioned by the
neoclassicist is a tailored arrangement that taxes the richer persons

208. See Sanchirico, supra note 13.
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(those harmed by the inefficient policy) for the benefit of the poorer
persons (those helped by it), while leaving other taxpayers unaffected.
Poor

Rich

Other Taxpayers

Efficient Policy

—

—

—

Inefficient Policy

$P

-$R

—

Tax Scheme +
Efficient Policy

$P

-$P

—

Indeed, the welfarist, like the neoclassicist, does view this tailored
scheme as an unalloyed improvement over the inefficient policy.
However, that is only because the scheme is Pareto-optimal, relative
to the policy. The notion that the taxing authorities will duplicate the
distributive benefits of inefficient regulation through tailored, Pareto-optimal schemes that carefully burden only those who would be
burdened by the regulation is highly unrealistic. We live in a world
where government officials must generally choose between Paretononcomparable options. This kind of choice, inter alia, is one that
permits welfare and efficiency to diverge.
2. Restricted and Unrestricted Preferences
Neoclassicism incorporates an unrestricted preference-based theory of welfare. According to this view, P is comparatively benefited by
outcome S1, relative to S2, just in case P prefers S1 to S 2. As I have
already explained, the difficulty with this view is that P’s preference
is simply a ranking that is conceptually linked, in some way, with P’s
actions. 209 (The conceptual linkage goes something like this: P prefers
S1 to S2 just in case, if P believes that action A1 leads to S1 and action
A2 leads to S2, P chooses A1.) However, a wide range of factors, unconnected to P’s welfare, can motivate his outcome rankings and,
therewith, his actions. P can prefer S1 to S2 on moral grounds, because he thinks S1 is required by some official or other role that he
holds, or because he believes S1 is in the interests of some community
to which he belongs and which he feels himself obliged to support.
Sophisticated preferentialism, in contrast to neoclassicism, posits
that only a subset of P’s preferences—“restricted” preferences—are
welfare productive for P. Think of the restriction idea this way:

209. See supra Part II.C.
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What Are Restricted Preferences?:
In some cases, (1) P prefers Si to Sj, and (2) P would prefer Si to Sj
under idealized conditions, but Si is not better for P’s welfare than
Sj. In other cases, (1) P prefers Si to Sj , and (2) P would prefer Si to
Sj under idealized conditions, and Si is better for P’s welfare than
Sj. “Restricted” preference is that property of P, Si, and Sj, such
that if the property obtains and if (1) P prefers Si to Sj , and (2) P
would prefer Si to Sj under idealized conditions, then Si benefits P.

This is hardly a full analysis of the concept of restricted preference; I
do not yet have such an analysis to offer. Here are some possibilities:
(a) P’s preference for S1 over S2 is restricted if the ground for P’s
preference is not his belief that S1 is morally required or required by
some legal or social norm; (b) P’s preference for S1 over S 2 is restricted if P prefers S1 under some description that essentially involves P’s own existence; (c) P’s preference for S 1 over S2 is restricted
if the ground for P’s preference is P’s belief that S 1 improves his welfare; or (d) P’s preference for S1 over S2 is restricted if S1 is better for
P in light of some objective welfare good. Each of these possibilities
has flaws, and I am not sure how to balance the flaws against the
merits.
Sophisticated preferentialism is a class of welfare-accounts that,
one way or another, restrict preferences. Welfarism is a family of
moral views that give prima facie weight to overall well-being and
incorporate one or another members of the sophisticatedpreferentialist class of welfare views. In this Article, I have simply
argued that the right moral view is some member of the welfarist
family of moral views, without making further claims as between
family members. On the other hand, it can be said that any member
of the welfarist family of moral views—because that view restricts
preferences, in some way—will diverge from neoclassicism.
Here is a simple way to see the divergence. An agency must
choose between S1 and S2. Some persons prefer S1 to S2, or S2 to S 1,
but they do not restrictedly prefer S1 to S2 or S2 to S1. Call these persons disinterested. Other persons prefer S1 to S2, or S2 to S1, and
they further satisfy the sophisticated preferentialist’s criteria for
welfare—namely, these preferences are restricted and survive idealization. Call these the interested persons. The neoclassicist will consider the effect of the S1/S2 choice, both on the interested persons and
on the disinterested persons, in determining which option maximizes
efficiency. By contrast, the welfarist will focus solely on the interested persons. Changes in the number of disinterested persons, or in
the intensity of their preferences, will not change the welfarist’s
evaluation of the S1/S2 choice with respect to overall well-being.
For example, the S1/S2 choice might be the choice of an antitrust
agency: S1 means having a cartel in a particular market, while S2
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means having competitive conditions in that market. Then, plausibly, consumers and firm shareholders are interested persons, while
the citizen who prefers or disprefers S1 on purely moral grounds
(perhaps because he thinks that cartels prevent destructive competition, or conversely because he thinks they diminish consumer welfare) is disinterested. The welfarist will ignore the disinterested citizen, while the neoclassicist should not—at least if the neoclassicist is
consistent about sticking to the unrestricted preference-based view of
well-being that is standard within welfare economics. After all, the
citizen does prefer S 1 to S2 or S2 to S 1; this preference may well satisfy all the standard axioms of expected-utility theory (it may well be
complete, reflexive, and so on); it can be assumed to have the requisite linkage to the citizen’s actions; and it can give rise to some
monetary willingness to pay for S1 over S2 or S2 over S 1.
Yet it is counterintuitive, unnecessary, and maybe downright incoherent to think that the existence of a citizen with moral views for
or against cartelization should itself change the moral status of cartelization—in particular, the effect of cartelization on overall wellbeing (or, for that matter, on efficiency).210 This is what leads the welfarist to insist on preference restriction, and to train his attention
solely on interested persons (here, consumers and shareholders) in
calculating aggregate welfare. Similarly, suppose S 1/S2 is the choice
facing an occupational health and safety agency, with S1 requiring
firms to impose certain workplace safety devices and S2 permitting
them to omit such devices. Then the preferences of labor activists,
public-interest lawyers, or left-leaning scholars who are morally motivated to give a higher ranking to S1, as well as the preferences of
free-market ideologues who are morally motivated to give a higher
ranking to S2, would be ignored by the welfarist in evaluating the
S1/S2 choice with respect to overall well-being. By contrast, these
preferences would not be ignored by the neoclassicist in evaluating
that choice with respect to efficiency.
In the above cases, I have chosen actors whose preferences are
purely morally motivated to fill the role of disinterested persons. I
took this tack because a purely morally motivated preference is the
hallmark of a preference that is not restricted and that would not be
counted as welfare productive by any sophisticated preferentialist.
Whatever the correct account of restriction, it must, at a minimum,
exclude the case where P prefers S1 just because he thinks S1 is morally required (and would otherwise prefer S2, or be indifferent) as a
case where S1 improves P’s welfare. However, as I have suggested,
the correct account of restriction may end up describing other kinds
210. See generally Adler & Posner, supra note 205 (arguing that agencies should ignore
moral and other disinterested preferences when performing cost-benefit analysis); Railton,
supra note 35, at 55, 71-72 (same).
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of persons as disinterested—for example, persons motivated by legal
obligations, social norms, community loyalties, or considerations
which they do not take to be self-regarding. If so, the divergence between neoclassicism and welfarism will be yet broader.
In practice, it seems, regulatory agencies generally deviate from
the unrestricted preference-based view of welfare and implicitly ignore persons who have policy preferences but seem to be disinterested. 211 The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice do not incorporate citizen preferences for and against antitrust
policies into their cost-benefit analyses of these policies. Otherwise,
the standard regulatory view that cartels and monopolies are generally inefficient would be harder to support, because sufficiently
strong pro-cartel or pro-monopoly preferences on the part of citizens
plus firm profits could outweigh the consumers’ loss. Similarly, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) looks to
workers, consumers, and maybe shareholders, but not to the entire
universe of people who have preferences over OSHA’s policies.
The one exception is environmental law, where the Environmental Protection Agency and other environmental agencies have
begun computing “existence values” for environmental amenities. Individuals who will never physically interact with a particular endangered species, wilderness area, or pristine bit of the atmosphere are
asked how much they would be willing to pay for that amenity to remain in place. These values are then factored into agency assessment
of environmental policies. 212 The neoclassicist would say that the environmental agencies’ unique attention to disinterested preferences
in determining the welfare or efficiency effect of policies is appropriate, and that other regulatory agencies should follow the environmental agencies’ lead. The welfarist would say that the environmental agencies’ unique attention to disinterested preferences is
deeply misguided—that existence values should no more be calculated for environmental amenities than for antitrust policies, workplace policies, transportation policies, redistributive policies, housing
policies, military policies, and so on, and that it is the environmental
agencies whose practices ought to change.

211. See Adler & Posner, supra note 205 (surveying agency practice).
212. See id. (critically discussing EPA’s use of existence values); CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993) (same); MARK SAGOFF , THE
ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988) (same); Symposium, Contingent Valuation, J. ECON.
PERSP., Autumn 1994, at 3-64 (same).
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3. Incomparability and Precise Equality
Options can be neither better nor worse (NBNW) with respect to
overall well-being.213 One option is NBNW than another with respect
to overall well-being if (a) the two options are equally good, or (b) the
two options are incomparably good. If two options (S1 and S2) are
equally good with respect to overall well-being, then any third option
is better than S1 just in case it is better than S2 and, conversely,
worse than S1 just in case it is worse than S2. Incomparability is less
demanding: if S1 and S2 are incomparably good with respect to overall well-being, then a third option can be better than S1 without being better than S2, or worse than S1 without being worse than S2.
In practice (I would guess) agencies are not often faced with a
choice between options that are equally good with respect to overall
well-being. Why? Where NBNW options are good for overall welfare
in different ways—where, for example, the extent of physical pleasure is greater in S1, while the extent of friendship is greater in S2, or
longevity is greater in S1, but convenience is greater in S2—then
there will virtually always be a hypothetical option which is a small
improvement over one option but still NBNW than the other. If so,
the two options by definition are not precisely equal. 214
On the other hand, it could well be the case that regulatory agencies do frequently confront incomparable options. Recall my account
of interpersonal comparisons: S1 is better than S2 with respect to
overall well-being, or worse than S2 with respect to overall wellbeing, if and only if all idealized observers would have convergent restricted preferences as between S1 and S2. Will this occur if S1 is
somewhat, but not dramatically, better than S2 with respect to one
welfare good while S 2 is somewhat, but not dramatically, better than
S1 with respect to another? (For example, what if there are 1000
more annual deaths in S1, but the unemployment rate in S2 is a half
percentage point higher? What if consumer surplus in S1 is $100 million greater than in S2, but twenty endangered species go extinct?
What if workplaces in S1 are moderately safer, but the quality of
education is moderately worse?) When we think hard about the welfare tradeoff between such options, we may conclude that the options
are welfare-comparable—that one option does emerge as better, and
the other as worse. But it is at least plausible to think that a significant fraction of agency decisions involve incomparable, and thereby
NBNW, alternatives.
213. See Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 163, at 1-34 (defining and discussing incomparability);
sources cited supra note 163 (same).
214. See Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 163, at 23-27 (concluding that the “small improvement” argument is a plausible argument for incomparability).
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Would this create a divergence with neoclassicism? Note that two
options can be NBNW with respect to efficiency. Clearly, two options
can be equally efficient; it also turns out that two options can be incomparably efficient. 215 On the other hand, the proportion of regulatory agency choices that are either equally efficient or incomparably
efficient seems to be low. 216 So it is at least plausible that many
agency choices are NBNW with respect to overall welfare, but few
agency choices are NBNW with respect to efficiency.
Imagine that two options are NBNW with respect to a particular
moral criterion X* (where X* is the criterion of overall well-being, for
the welfarist; and the criterion of efficiency, for the neoclassicist).
How should the agency choose between the options? There may be
some other criteria, X1, X2 . . . Xn, that possess moral force, and that
the agency is charged with implementing. (That is, there may be
other criteria not covered by a “partition” that effectively places them
within the jurisdiction of legislatures, courts, or the taxing authorities, and outside the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies). If so, the
agency should choose the option that is better with respect to the applicable X1, X2 . . . Xn.
But it may be that no such X1, X2 . . . Xn exist; or (more likely),
they may exist, but the option may also be NBNW with respect to the
X1, X2 . . . Xn. In such a case, I suggest, the agency is free to choose at
random between the options. It possesses moral discretion. Where an
agency’s alternatives are NBNW with respect to the applicable moral
criteria X*, X1 . . . Xn, the agency might as well decide between the
alternatives by flipping a coin. This is clearly true when the options
are equally good with respect to the X*, X1 . . . Xn; and it is also true
(I have argued elsewhere) when the options are incomparably good
with respect to the X*, X1 . . . X n. 217 If, for example, our beneficial me215. This is a result of the Scitovsky paradox. Take two outcomes O 1 and O 2 that involve the paradox, that is, there is some redistribution from Winners to Losers in O 1 that
makes it Pareto -superior to O2, but there is also some redistribution from Winners to Lo sers in O 2 that makes it Pareto-superior to O 1. Then, O 1 and O 2 are NBNW with respect to
efficiency. However, they are not precisely equal with respect to efficiency, since there will
typically be at least some O* that is efficient relative to O1, but not O 2 (or vice versa). For
example, create O* by taking each person’s holding of each good in O 1 and increasing it
slightly. That guarantees that O* is efficient relative to O1, but there could still be some
redistribution in O2 that makes it Pareto -superior to O*.
216. Why do I say this? Cost-benefit analysis is closely related, if not equivalent, to
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and it is highly unusual for an agency performing cost-benefit
analysis to conclude that one option has neither positive nor negative net benefits relative
to another.
217. See Adler, supra note 63, at 1401-08. Amartya Sen makes this very claim:
Some see completeness as a necessary requirement of consequential evaluation,
but it is, of course, nothing of the sort. A consequentialist approach does involve
the use of maximizing logic . . . [but] [m]aximization only requires that we do
not choose an alternative that is worse than another that can be chosen instead. If we cannot compare and rank two alternatives, then choosing either
from that pair will fully satisfy the requirement of maximization.
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teor can be used to help Phil’s or Pat’s emphysema, and the choice of
one or the other would not affect the fair distribution of welfare
(which would be true if, for example, poverty-line egalitarianism obtained and both Phil and Pat were well above the poverty line) or
perfectionist values, then the meteor-possessing agency is morally
free to give the rock to either Phil or Pat. Either choice is morally
permitted; neither is morally required or morally prohibited.
The upshot of this analysis is that welfarism may confer greater
moral discretion upon agencies than neoclassicism. If, in practice,
agency choices are rarely NBNW with respect to efficiency, then
agencies rarely have moral discretion (within the framework of neoclassicism). 218 If, in practice, agency choices are frequently NBNW
with respect to welfare, then agencies may frequently have moral
discretion (within the framework of welfarism), depending upon the
applicability and content of perfectionist, distributive, deontological,
and other such supplementary moral criteria.
4. The Possibility of Paternalism?
Let me distinguish between weak and strong paternalism. 219
Strong paternalism holds that persons can be made better off in the
teeth of their preferences. That is, (1) P prefers S 1 to S2, but nonetheless (2) S2 can be better for P’s welfare than S1. Weak paternalism
holds that persons can be no better off notwithstanding the satisfaction of their preferences. That is, (1) P prefers S1 to S2, but nonetheless (2) S1 can be no better for P’s welfare than S2.220
Neoclassicism denies both strong paternalism and weak paternalism. This is easy to see. Neoclassicism incorporates an unrestricted
preference-based view of well-being, which says that P is better off
with S1, as compared to S2, just in case he prefers S1 to S2. If P does
prefer S1 to S2, then—the neoclassicist concludes—he is better off
with S1, not S2 (pace strong paternalism). The neoclassicist also concludes that this is a real welfare improvement, rather than a case
where S1 is not better than S2 for P (pace weak paternalism).

Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 40, at 940.
218. This is overstated: an outcome could be better than another with respect to efficiency, while the second outcome is better with respect to X1, X2 . . . Xn, such that the outcomes are NBNW with respect to the balance of X*, X1 . . . Xn and the agency has moral
discretion on balance. Nonetheless, it seems correct to say that if choices are rarely NBNW
with respect to X*, it is less likely that they will be NBNW with respect to X*, X1 . . . Xn.
219. For discussions of paternalism, see G ERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF AUTONOMY (1988); JOHN K ULTGEN, AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTION: PARENTALISM IN
THE CARING LIFE (1995); DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION (1986); and
Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105 (1971).
220. See Feinberg, supra note 219 (distinguishing between “weak” and “strong” paternalism). My distinction is quite different.
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Welfarism denies strong paternalism, but it admits weak paternalism. This is pretty easy to see, too. Welfarism incorporates a sophisticated preferentialist view of well-being. This says (placing to
one side, for now, the issue of restriction) that P is better off with S 1,
as compared to S2, just in case (1) P prefers S1, and (2) P would prefer S1 under suitably idealized conditions. If P does prefer S1 to S2,
then—even if he would prefer S2 under suitably idealized conditions—he does not actually prefer S2 to S1, and he therefore cannot
be made better off with S 2. This shows the inconsistency between sophisticated preferentialism and strong paternalism. On the other
hand, if P prefers S1 to S2 but would prefer S2 under idealized conditions, then P is not made better off by S1. This shows how weak paternalism flows from sophisticated preferentialism.
An example may make the point clearer. P prefers sitcoms to opera but would prefer opera under suitably idealized conditions. The
public television station’s decision to show opera instead of sitcoms
does not make P better off, because he actually prefers sitcoms. So
the strong paternalist view that P is a beneficiary of the station’s
choice of opera is a mistake. Yet the fact that P actually prefers sitcoms does not mean that he benefits if, instead of opera, the station
chooses to broadcast sitcoms. After all, P’s idealized preference is in
favor of opera. Sophisticated preferentialism gives equal weight to
this idealized preference, along with P’s actual preference, in determining what improves his welfare. For the sophisticated
preferentialist, neither programming choice is better for P’s welfare.
P is not better off with the sitcom, nor is he better off with the opera,
since the dual and conjunctive conditions for a welfare benefit—
actual preference satisfaction plus idealized preference satisfaction—
are not true of either option. Among other things, this dual and
conjunctive account of welfare bears out weak paternalism.
What does this mean for regulatory agency policy? It means that
the agency can (weakly) decide that some persons who believe themselves affected by an agency’s choice are actually unaffected. Persons
who are counted as “Winners” or “Losers” under neoclassicism may
become “Neutrals,” neither benefited nor harmed by the choice, and
therefore ignored for purposes of evaluating that choice in light of
overall well-being. Consider, as a plausible example, the laws prohibiting recreational use of drugs. 221 Persons who prefer drug use must
be counted as Losers from an anti-drug policy within a neoclassical
framework,222 but they may well be seen as Neutrals by the welfarist
221. See generally DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS (1992) (presenting detailed
philosophical argument against prohibition of recreational drug use).
222. More precisely, certain persons who prefer drug use must be counted as Losers
from an antidrug policy, within a neoclassical framework. It is arguably consistent with
that framework to say that drug addicts (persons whose preference for drug use is effec-
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(if she thinks they would disprefer drug use under idealized conditions).
It also may mean, a bit more robustly, that where actual preferences are changing, agencies can rely upon idealized preferences as
the sole criterion for determining an option’s welfare effect. Imagine
that P now prefers S1 to S2, and that he will continue to prefer S 1 if it
is chosen by the agency; but he would change his mind and come to
prefer S2 if that were chosen. Then, neoclassicism has no clear basis
for determining which option benefits P. Here, it is neoclassicism
which may well end up classifying P as a Neutral, while the welfarist
could plausibly say that whatever option P would ideally prefer is the
one that benefits him. 223 In such a case (on a plausible specification of
sophisticated preferentialism), P is a Winner with S1 if he ideally
prefers S1, and P is a Winner with S2 if he ideally prefers S2.
E. Welfarism and Proceduralism: A Large Difference
The difference between welfarism and proceduralism is both larger and simpler than that between welfarism and neoclassicism. A
proceduralist theory, by definition, accords intrinsic moral significance to the decisionmaking procedures that regulators follow. A welfarist theory, by definition, does not. Imagine that a regulatory
agency, or an executive or legislative body with authority over the
agency, is making a threshold determination about which procedures
the agency ought to employ. For simplicity, imagine that the regulatory agency has a large set of substantive options that are legally
available to it (specifically, the options of issuing various legal directives, plus the option of issuing no directive), and that the threshold
or procedural choice is a binary choice between Pi and Pj, where Pi
and Pj are alternative possible routines that the agency could follow
in choosing a substantive option. Pi could be cost-benefit analysis,
regulatory negotiation, civic-republican deliberation, a familiar notice-and-comment process followed by an intuitive judgment on the
regulator’s part, or any other combination of standard or esoteric actions by the agency that would result in a particular substantive option. Pj could be any such procedure distinct from Pi. Then the welfarist says this: Whether the agency or oversight body should choose Pi
or Pj is wholly a function of which substantive options the two proce-

tively coerced because their preference is grounded in the withdrawal symptoms and other
suffering they anticipate if they stop using drugs) and persons whose preferences are internally conflicted are not Losers from an antidrug policy. However, the neoclassicist cannot explain why the nonaddict who (without internal conflict) just likes drugs is not a
Loser.
223. See Adler & Posner, supra note 205 (suggesting that agencies could look to fully
informed preferences where actual preferences are changing).
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dures can be expected to produce.224 Relatedly, if Pi and Pj can be expected to eventuate in the very same option, or in the very same slate
of options with the very same probability assigned to each option,
then Pi and Pj are morally identical. It would, in that case, be a matter of indifference which procedure is chosen at the threshold.
In short, for the welfarist, different procedures Pi and Pj should be
understood as lotteries over substantive options (lotteries over possible regulatory directives). Welfarism provides a set of substantive
criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn, where W* is overall well-being and each Xi
is another moral criterion) for evaluating the substantive options.
When fully specified, welfarism should also provide a theory of moral
choice under uncertainty. That theory will specify how regulators or
oversight bodies should choose between actions whose outcomes are
uncertain, as a function of the criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn) plus the
probability of each outcome that the action may produce. The threshold procedural choice between Pi and Pj is a matter of predicting
which substantive options (directives) the different procedures may
produce, with which probabilities, and then applying the substantive
criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . X n) together with the welfarist’s theory of
choice under uncertainty. By contrast, the proceduralist claims the
existence of some procedural criterion XP such that two procedures
can differ with respect to XP, even though they are expected to produce the very same option (or the very same probabilistic slate of options). In the proceduralist’s eyes, the threshold choice between Pi
and Pj should then depend, wholly or at least partly, on how Pi and Pj
fare with respect to XP.
Proceduralism consists of a class of theories, each of which specifies XP in different ways. The civic-republican proceduralist thinks
that XP favors civic-republican deliberation. The pluralist proceduralist thinks that XP favors a process of interest bargaining between
groups. The collaborative-governance proceduralist thinks that XP
favors a certain kind of collaboration between affected parties. Each
such theory gives substantial, if not conclusive, weight to the specified XP in determining procedural choices. The proceduralist does not
(or need not) deny that outcomes can be evaluated, apart from the
procedures that produce them. The proceduralist simply thinks that
the threshold choice of procedures does not reduce to the evaluation
of outcomes. So, given any welfarist theory (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn), that
theory will be paired with a matching family of proceduralist theories
(W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn, XP) that specify XP in different ways. The shift to a
given welfarist theory from some proceduralist theory within the
224. I am ignoring here (1) the direct costs of the two procedures, which may differ,
and (2) the indirect effect that this procedural choice may have on other choices, for example, future procedural choices. For simplicity, and to make the contrast with proceduralism
as clear as possible, I have placed these issues to one side.
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matching family simply involves abandoning any bedrock moral role
for the favored procedural type XP. XP no longer constitutes a basic
moral criterion. That shift has no implications for a choice between
substantive regulatory options, but it clearly may have large implications for the threshold choice of procedures by regulators or by the
executive or legislative bodies that oversee them.
All of this is very abstract. What, concretely, are the procedural
implications of welfarism? Which procedures, in which context, are
regulators required to adopt or to avoid? Answering these questions
requires a specific view as to the substantive moral criteria (W*, X1,
X2 . . . Xn) applicable to regulators. In this Article I have been diligently noncommittal about such specifics, beyond claiming that the
right view includes W* and is therefore welfarist. Assume that the
only substantive criterion applicable to regulators is the criterion of
overall well-being, either because utilitarianism is true (which seems
implausible), or because other criteria obtain but have been “partitioned” away from regulators (which is less implausible, but still
doubtful). In that simple case, the appropriate procedure for the
regulator or oversight body to choose, given the alternatives of Pi and
Pj, or any threshold set of procedural alternatives, is the welfaremaximizing procedure: the procedure such that the slate of outcomes
it can be expected to produce is welfare maximizing, relative to the
slate produced by alternative procedures.
Professor Eric Posner and I have elsewhere argued that the welfare-maximizing procedure for regulatory agencies is often, although
not always, the procedure of cost-benefit analysis. 225 Whether a given
procedure is welfare maximizing, as against alternatives, depends on
the set of substantive options to which the procedures will be applied.
Posner and I claim that cost-benefit analysis is welfare maximizing,
as against standardly proposed alternatives, except where the
agency’s substantive options are skewed by wealth effects 226—except
where the Losers and Winners from some option, as against some
other option, have significantly different wealth levels. If the PosnerAdler claim is correct, and if the only moral criterion applicable to
regulatory choices is the aggregate-welfare criterion, then regulators
would do best, morally speaking, by employing cost-benefit analysis
as the basic procedure for choice between (legally available) directives and other options, to be set aside only where wealth skews are
large.
Again, however, there is serious reason to doubt that overall wellbeing is the sole moral criterion applicable to regulatory choices.
Even taking into account the role of other governmental institutions,
225. See Adler & Posner, supra note 28.
226. Or where cost-benefit analysis is too expensive, given the small expected difference between the options with respect to overall well-being.
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the set of criteria that bear upon regulatory options and, derivatively, procedures will likely include not just the aggregate welfare
criterion W*, but also one or more criteria Xi that are distributive,
deontological, or perfectionist in form. Nor is there any reason to
think that cost-benefit analysis is the morally best procedure, all
things considered. There is no reason to think that—comparing now
the probabilistic slate of options that cost-benefit analysis can be expected to produce to the probabilistic slate of options that each alternative feasible procedure can be expected to produce—the first slate
will be better in light of a fuller set of moral criteria including at
least one distributive, deontological, or perfectionist Xi in addition to
W*. For example, there is no reason to think that cost-benefit analysis tracks how options fare with respect to distributive criteria, or
how options fare with respect to distributive criteria, as balanced
against the criterion of overall well-being. At least Posner and I see
no such reason. However, we do make a weaker claim, which is additional to the basic assertion that cost-benefit analysis is welfare
maximizing. We claim that cost-benefit analysis is one component of
the procedure that is morally best, all things considered. 227 Given
whatever fuller set of welfarist criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . X n) is applicable to regulatory choices, the morally best procedure in light of that
set will include cost-benefit analysis as a distinct part.
The idea is this: The morally best procedure for regulators in light
of (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn) will start with a serial evaluation of the options,
first in light of W*, then in light of each Xi; and it will then move on
to some kind of balancing of the different criteria in case no option is
best in light of all of them. But the best way to evaluate options in
light of W* is to perform cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis
should be performed at that initial stage of the morally best procedure where agencies are attempting to determine how options fare
with respect to W*. It is not a means for determining how options
fare with respect to the Xi, nor for the latter-stage balancing, if that
becomes necessary.
Posner and I could well be incorrect in making the basic claim
that cost-benefit analysis is welfare maximizing. In addition, even if
we are correct in that claim, we could be quite wrong to adv ance the
additional (and much more speculative) assertion that cost-benefit
analysis is a component of the procedure that regulators would do
best to follow, once distributive, perfectionist, and deontological criteria are brought into play alongside welfare maximization. It could
be the case that regulatory negotiation, not cost-benefit analysis, is
the welfare-maximizing procedure. For example, if agencies can be
227. Assuming wealth skews are not too large and cost-benefit analysis is not too expansive.
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predicted to make lots of mistakes in the application of cost-benefit
analysis, or to regularly distort it to their own ends, then the oversight body making a threshold choice between cost-benefit analysis
and other procedures has reason to think that the slate of options
produced by cost-benefit analysis will not be welfare maximizing. Or
it could be the case that civic-republican deliberation, collaborative
governance or for that matter pluralist interest-bargaining, is the
morally best procedure once distributive, perfectionist, and deontological criteria are brought into play.
My point in this article is not to repeat or bolster the Adler-Posner
case for cost-benefit analysis, but rather to bolster the implicit AdlerPosner claim about how cost-benefit analysis should be evaluated.
Cost-benefit analysis should not be rejected as a regulatory or governmental procedure merely because it lacks the participatory or deliberative features favored by civic republicans, pluralists, and other
proceduralists. Evaluating regulatory procedures means first specifying a substantive moral framework (one that includes at least W*)
and then making an empirical assessment of the tendency of different procedures to produce better or worse outcomes or lotteries of
outcomes in light of that substantive framework. Regulators could
still be morally required to do what the proceduralist claims, but if
they are, it will be because the favored procedure tends to maximize
overall welfare, distribute welfare fairly, increase overall perfection,
and induce regulatory compliance with deontological norms. That is
what those scholars who commend participatory or deliberative procedures, as against (say) cost-benefit analysis, now need to show.
V. CONCLUSION
Any plausible moral theory of regulation will give a substantial
role to human welfare. What distinguishes theories, of course, is
what precise role welfare plays, and how specifically that concept is
analyzed. I have appropriated the term “welfarist” (perhaps unfairly)
to denote a particular theory or, more exactly, a particular family of
regulatory theories. This family of theories offers a mixed answer to
various conceptual and normative questions crucial to moral evaluation.
A welfarist theory draws a conceptual link between preference
and welfare, but falls short of equating welfare and preferencesatisfaction. The theorists I have described as “neoclassicists” stipulate that one outcome benefits some person, as compared to another
outcome, if and only if the person prefers the first outcome. By contrast, the welfarist asserts that an outcome must satisfy a more complicated set of conditions to be welfare-enhancing; it must be not only
preferred, but ideally preferred, and both sets of preferences need to
be appropriately “restricted” so as to exclude moral and other disin-
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terested preferences. (This is the view of welfare I have called “sophisticated preferentialism.”228)
Welfarists also offer a mixed answer to the question, What is the
moral significance of aggregate or overall well-being? Utilitarians
view well-being as morally conclusive: the morally required choice, in
any choice situation, is that choice whose outcomes maximize overall
well-being. Other moral theories give zero weight to overall wellbeing; consider a wholly egalitarian theory that requires actors always to choose that option which best promotes the equality of wellbeing, or a “minimalist” theory that merely enjoins them to comply
with certain deontological requirements and otherwise leaves actors
morally unconstrained. 229 By contrast with egalitarians and minimalists, welfarists claim that overall well-being has some weight in
moral evaluation; by contrast with utilitarians, welfarists may also
accord moral weight to other criteria, such as distributive, perfectionist, or deontological criteria. 230
Welfarism, as I have defined it, does not generally specify which
moral criteria, apart from aggregate welfare, possess moral weight.
In other words, a moral theory is “welfarist” if it adopts a sophisticated preferentialist view of welfare and if it sets forth a group of
moral criteria (W*, X1, X2 . . . Xn), where W* is the criterion of overall
well-being and the Xi are other criteria. 231 I have placed only two restrictions on the content of the Xi: first, that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
is not an Xi; and second, that no Xi is a procedural criterion, a criterion in light of which regulatory outcomes identical but for the regulatory procedures that produced them can fare differently. In short,
welfarists do not accord intrinsic moral significance to regulatory
procedure or to the pursuit of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
I have defined welfarism in this way so as to differentiate welfarist theories from the two types of theories that have dominated legal
scholarship about regulation: neoclassical theories and proceduralist
theories. Neoclassicists equate welfare with preference satisfaction
and accord moral weight to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency rather than overall well-being; proceduralists incorporate one or another procedural
criterion into their moral theories. The family of welfarist theories,
by definition, does not overlap either with the family of neoclassical
theories or with the family of proceduralist theories.

228. See supra Sectio n II.C.2.
229. See supra Section IV.B.
230. See supra Section IV.C.
231. The welfarist is not required to set forth criteria (X1, X2 . . . Xn) independent of W*.
Utilitarianism, which specifies W* as the sole moral criterion, also counts as a kind of welfarism. However, as I have explained, it seems unlikely that utilitarianism is the correct
moral theory. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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This Article has argued in favor of welfarism, 232 and against neoclassicism and proceduralism. 233 I have also suggested that welfarism
is closer in spirit to neoclassicism than it is to proceduralism. 234 Welfarists, like neoclassicists, reject objectivist, hedonic, and other nonpreferentialist accounts of well-being; like neoclassicists, welfarists
believe that some aggregative measure, linked to welfare (be it Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or overall well-being) must play a role in moral
evaluation; and, like neoclassicists, welfarists deny that governmental procedures are morally significant per se. 235 Law-and-economics
scholars and others who adopt a neoclassical view are mistaken, but
not dramatically so. The moral theory of regulation proposed by lawand-economists is salvageable, rather than fundamentally flawed,
and I have tried to show here what the appropriate modifications to
that theory are.

232. See supra Sections II.C.2, IV.A-B.
233. See supra Parts II, III.
234. See supra Sectio n IV.D-E.
235. This last statement is a bit imprecise. Given my definition of “neoclassicism,” a
neoclassicist could include a procedural criterion in his theory, but he is not required to do
so.

